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This thesis will address the question of whether there are any situated cognition 
concepts of memory functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory. 
Situated cognition is an umbrella term, subsuming extended, embedded, embodied, 
enacted and distributed cognition. I will be looking closely at case studies of 
investigations into memory where such concepts seem prima facie most likely to be 
found in order to establish a) whether the researchers in question are in fact 
employing such concepts, and b) whether the concepts are functioning well – 
functioning as investigative kinds – and should therefore continue to be employed, or 
whether something has gone wrong in the practice of the science and they should 
employ a different kind of concept. An historically situated approach to the case 
studies will allow me to answer part b) here. 
 
Along the way, I will argue for a way of construing scientific research that I call the 
dynamic framework account, an account of (im)maturity for science, a variety of 
conceptual role semantics with respect to scientific concepts, and the historically 
situated case study-based method I will employ in answering the central question. 
My conclusions, and the way I reach them, constitute contributions to debates about 
situated cognition particularly, and to philosophy of science more generally, as well 
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1. The Question 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, a number of perspectives on cognition which could be grouped under 
the umbrella term situated cognition have come to prominence. These perspectives, 
in one way or another, take into account the world beyond the brain – in which the 
brain is situated – when studying cognition. Such perspectives, including the theories 
of extended cognition, embedded cognition, embodied cognition, enacted cognition 
and distributed cognition, raise a number of perplexing issues, and one of these will 
be explored in what follows. I will be asking whether any situated cognition 
approaches are legitimately being employed in cognitive science, focussing 
particularly on situated cognition concepts of memory. Concepts are legitimately 
employed if they are functioning as investigative kinds (this term will be explained 
below). I will refer to this question (the title question of the thesis) as the situated 
cognition question for short. 
 
I will be taking a philosophy of science approach, in particular using a historically 
situated case-study-based conceptual ecology to analyse the concept(s) of memory 
(MEMORY
1
) that scientists employ in their research. This method will allow me to 
look for situated cognition concepts of memory that have been in use in recent 
practice, and assess the extent to which they are legitimate.  
 
This work will make a contribution to the philosophy of particular sciences that 
study memory, and also to the philosophy of science more generally. I hope that it 
will also be of use to scientists working on memory, particularly those trying to 
engage in the tricky but essential practice that is interdisciplinary scientific research. 
One of the biggest problems facing interdisciplinary research is the partial nature of 
communication between subdisciplines, which I hope can be better understood by 
the analysis of MEMORY in various case studies that is undertaken here. 
 
In this chapter, I will clarify various aspects of the situated cognition question and its 
importance. The central aspect of the question is situated cognition theories, so that 
is where the chapter begins. I will then go on to justify my focus on science, justify 
                                                          
1
 I will follow the practice of using small capital letters to denote the concept (MEMORY). 
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my focus on scientists’ concepts, and explain the notion of investigative kinds, 
defending it as the best way to frame my question. 
 
Situated cognition and a question about memory 
The best known of the situated cognition perspectives to most philosophers is 
extended cognition. I will therefore begin by explaining this position, before moving 
on to outline the others with reference to it. 
 
Extended cognition 
The term “extended cognition” was introduced in 1998 in a paper by Andy Clark and 
David Chalmers (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). According to the hypothesis of 
extended cognition, cognitive processes are extended beyond the head of the 
individual. For example, a player of Scrabble may rearrange the pieces in front of 
him to help him to work out possible words he could play next (Kirsh, 1995: 64–65; 
Clark and Chalmers, 1998: 8–10). On the brainbound view that extended cognition 
aims to displace, this rearranging of the tiles would be seen as an input to or output 
from the cognitive process which takes place exclusively in the head of the player. 
The hypothesis of extended cognition says that the cognitive process includes the 
rearrangement of the tiles. The process therefore takes place spread across brain, 
body and world. The tiles and the player’s hands as he rearranges them are therefore 
as much vehicles of cognition as the neurons and synapses in his head. 
 
Extended cognition proponents aim to change the way we see cognition (no longer 
thinking of it as brainbound), and also to alter the practice of cognitive science. 
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, cognition is drastically changed 
or irreparably damaged in the absence of certain features of the environment, or 
when their manipulation by the agent is prevented. To go back to the Scrabble 
example, if scientists were to study the play of Scrabble, players should be allowed 
to physically rearrange the tiles as they work out what word to play next. If they are 
not allowed to do this, the usual cognitive processes of Scrabble playing will be 
damaged. Expecting people to play Scrabble effectively while not rearranging the 
tiles would be parallel to expecting them to play effectively with partial brain 
damage. In both cases, part of the substrate of cognition is damaged, so the cognitive 




Of course, scientists could still study Scrabble without physical tile rearrangement, 
for example if they wanted to study the role of such rearrangement in Scrabble play. 
But this would again be parallel to the brain damage case: If one wanted to study the 
role of a certain part of the brain in Scrabble play, one could compare play in people 
with and without brain damage to this area. The point is that “normal” Scrabble play 
cannot be expected when cognition is impeded by refusing to allow physical tile 
rearrangement. 
 
Talk about extended cognition refers to the extension of the physical substrate or 
vehicles underlying cognition. It therefore does not imply that cognition has a 
location, merely that its substrate does. In the most neutral terms, the idea is that 
whatever role the brain normally plays in cognition, parts of the external world can 
also play that role. 
 
My question here concerns memory. Not only is memory studied by a wide range of 
disciplines, it is a central case in the extended cognition literature. One of the first 
and probably the most famous example of extended cognition centres on memory. 
This is the example of Otto and his notebook (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). It is 
designed to show that the mental state “belief” can be extended, but it also seems to 
show that the cognitive processes of storing and recalling memories are extended, 
and it has featured in the literature as an example of extended memory ever since 
(e.g. Clark, 2008; Sutton et al., 2010; Wilson 2005a; Heersmink, 2013). 
 
The example concerns two people, Otto and Inga. Inga wants to go to an exhibition 
at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). She remembers that MoMA is on 53rd 
Street and sets off. Otto suffers from memory loss due to Alzheimer’s disease, and 
so writes things down in a notebook, which he carries everywhere with him. He also 
wishes to see the exhibition at MoMA. He looks through his notebook, finds where 
he has written down that MoMA is on 53rd Street, and also sets off. We are meant to 
apply a principle of parity to this case and conclude that both Otto and Inga have the 
belief that MoMA is on 53rd Street, but that in Otto’s case the belief is extended. In 
terms of memory, they have both remembered the relevant information, but in Otto’s 




Here, Clark and Chalmers note that the Otto and Inga case is not necessarily about 
how we use the word “belief”, but about how we should use it. Seeing the mind as 
extended is recommended to us as the simplest and most elegant description of these 
kinds of cases: ‘By using the “belief” notion in a wider way, it picks out something 
more unified, and is more useful in explanation’ (Clark and Chalmers, 1998: 14). 
This is a general point and also applies to memory; this argument in favour of 
extended cognition says that the sciences of memory would be able to provide 
simpler and more unified explanations if they accepted the possibility of extended 
cognition.  
 
Three important points are revealed here. The first is that accepting extended 
cognition would have an effect on scientific methodology, because it recommends 
that scientists treat the inner and outer components as parts of a single cognitive 
system, rather than treating the outer components as mere inputs and outputs to 
cognitive processes. The extended cognition question is therefore of importance for 
scientists as well as philosophers. 
  
The second is that much of the extended cognition debate centres on the science of 
memory, rather than our ordinary language notion of memory. I will follow this 
aspect of the literature and take a philosophy of science approach, the methodology 
for which will be outlined in chapter 5. The choice to focus on science will be 
defended further in the subsection “Why study science?” below. 
 
The third point is that Clark and Chalmers’ argument is a form of inference to the 
best explanation (Lipton, 1991); they advocate extended cognition because it would 
result in better explanations for science. My approach is in line with this aspect of 
the literature in a sense, and this too will be explained and defended further below, in 
the sub-section on so-called “investigative kinds”. 
 
Other situated cognition perspectives 
In addition to the extended cognition story, there are other similar frameworks for 
cognition that could be used to give an account of memory. These include 
embedded, embodied, enacted, and distributed cognition. Here I am using “situated 
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cognition” as an umbrella term for all of these perspectives that are opposed to the 
brainbound picture in similar ways.  
 
Different proponents of these theories are not in complete agreement about their 
details, and attempts to taxonomize them precisely therefore vary. I will not attempt 
to contribute to this taxonomic project here; I will make use of Sven Walter’s (2010: 
63–66) working definitions of the different positions to outline the landscape of the 
debate, with one small alteration, and the addition of Edwin Hutchins’ definition of 
distributed cognition. Walter’s first four definitions are: 
 
Embodied Cognition I…: Cognitive processes are partially dependent upon extracranial 
bodily processes. 
Embodied Cognition II…: Cognitive processes are partially constituted by extracranial 
bodily processes. 
Embedded Cognition…: Cognitive processes are partially dependent upon extrabodily 
processes. 
Extended Cognition…: Cognitive processes are partially constituted by extrabodily 
processes. 
 
A few points are worthy of note. First, although Walter uses “constituted” here, it is 
not clear what it could be for a process to be constituted. This should be read as 
explained above, that the substrate of the cognitive process is partly made up of 
extracranial or extrabodily materials, thus the cognitive process is spread over brain 
and body for embodied cognition II, and brain, body and world for extended 
cognition. 
 
The use of “dependent” is also worthy of brief exposition: Exactly what it means 
may be a matter for debate (Walter, 2010: 63), but it is something like ineliminable 
causal dependency, which is weaker than depending for its existence (as this 
stronger kind of dependence would collapse embodied cognition I into embodied 
cognition II, and embedded cognition into extended cognition). 
 
Finally, although Walter construes embedded cognition as dependence upon 
extrabodily processes, in practice this position is rarely if ever held without the 
accompanying belief that cognition also depends on extracranial bodily processes. 
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That is to say that someone who holds embedded cognition also holds embodied 
cognition I (although not necessarily vice versa). For my purposes here then, I will 
alter the definition of embedded cognition slightly, to read:  
 
Embedded Cognition…: Cognitive processes are partially dependent upon extrabodily and 
extracranial bodily processes. 
 
The last of Walter’s definitions is: 
 
Enacted Cognition…: Cognition is the relational process of sense-making that takes place 
between an autonomous system and its environment.  
 
Enacted (sometimes called “enactive”) cognition is part of a broader program of 
enactivism which focusses on the agent’s interaction with the world, rather than 
manipulation of representations (see Noë, 2004; Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
1993). 
 
Walter does not offer a definition of distributed cognition, but the theory can be 
credited to Edwin Hutchins, who characterises it as follows:  
 
[C]ognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group, cognitive 
processes may be distributed in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves 
coordination between internal and external (material or environmental) structure, and 
processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of earlier events 
can transform the nature of later events. (Hutchins, 2000: 1–2). 
 
Distributed cognition differs from extended cognition in its lack of a central 
controlling locus of cognition. Extended cognition is organism centred (Clark, 2008: 
139); it is always someone’s cognition that extends. However, for distributed 
cognition, there is no such individual controller or owner of the cognizing. In 
Hutchins’ example of the navigation of a ship (Hutchins, 1995), the cognitive 
process of navigating the vessel is spread across the team of people involved, their 
instruments, and through time. From an extended cognition perspective, this whole 
process of navigation would not count as cognitive. The only candidates for 
cognitive processes would be the contributions of particular individuals, though each 
14 
 




Situated cognition and memory 
One approach to the situated cognition question is to take an example of a state or 
process that everyone agrees is cognitive. Memory is one such paradigmatic 
example. If extended memory is possible then extended cognition is possible 
because, whatever exactly it means to be cognitive (and this is a subject of intense 
debate), memory is cognitive (and similarly for the other situated cognition 
perspectives). 
 
The specific question I am interested in here then is whether memory is always 
brainbound, or whether there are any cases of extended, embedded, embodied, 
enacted or distributed memory, and what it would mean to claim this. This is an 
important question because how we conceive of memory is currently changing, 
while at the same time there is pressure on the sciences of memory to produce 
results. 
 
New technology has the potential to change how we see memory, and many of the 
examples in the situated cognition literature trade on this. Modern technology is also 
giving rise to speculation that memory itself is changing, for example due to our 
reliance on search engines to find information and the prevalence of portable devices 
with which to access it (see for example Sparrow, Liu and Wegner, 2011). In part 
because of this, we are beginning to question how we see our relationship to older 
more established technologies, and the role of other people. 
 
More specific issues about memory currently shaping the agenda for science include: 
 A question of how young people should be educated to use their memories in 
a world where memory “offloading” to technology is ubiquitous.  
 An increasing elderly population, creating a crisis in how to care effectively 
for large numbers of dementia patients. Changing the environments of these 
patients is one way of helping them (see Clark, 2003: 140), and how this is 
                                                          
2
 Hutchins (2011) reviews Clark’s 2008 book on extended cognition, recommending the theory 
become more “enculturated”. An enculturated version of extended cognition would be a view closer 
to distributed cognition. 
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researched is affected by whether the research is carried out in a situated 
cognition framework.  
 How memory should be treated in law, for example research on false 
memory has had an impact on how eye-witness accounts are treated in court 
(see Elizabeth Loftus et al.’s “lost in the mall” experiments e.g. Loftus and 
Pickrell 1995; and discussion of Loftus’ work in Heaton-Armstrong, 
Shepherd and Wolchover (eds) 1999, especially pp. 25–27). Of particular 
relevance is how memories are affected by communication with other people, 
and situated cognition perspectives may affect how this is construed. 
 Making money from an understanding of memory, for example by making 
advertisements that are particularly memorable. 
 
All of these challenges and changes create a shifting but high-pressure context in 
which memory research is currently taking place.  
 
The sciences of memory are often referred to as immature sciences, but the questions 
they are asking and trying to answer are extremely important. I will develop my own 
account of what it is for a science to be immature in chapter 3, but for the purposes 
of this chapter, the notion can be left intuitive. In the terminology of Dudley 
Shapere, a philosopher whose work I will return to in what follows, the questions in 
this domain are important, but the science is not yet ready. Shapere says that  
 
…in some cases domains which are “important” enough need not be “ready” in order that 
their investigation be considered reasonable and appropriate at a certain stage…Briefly, if 
the problem is deemed sufficiently important, and has achieved a certain level of precise 
formulation, then investigation of the area in question is often considered at least marginally 
appropriate despite the “unreadiness” of current science in other aspects to deal with the 
problem. Such conditions may, indeed…serve as incentives to try to make the state of 
science ready to deal with the problem: research will be generated to increase the precision 
of data about the domain, to develop technology for doing so, and so on. (However, in some 
circumstances, especially when such technological developments do not seem feasible, 
investigation even of domains which are recognized as important will often be looked down 





This is the situation in which the sciences of memory currently find themselves. I 
will explore this situation further in chapter 3, but here I want to note that it is 
important to understand how the sciences of memory work, (what is distinctive about 
them, etc.) for answering the situated cognition question. 
 
The key question I am trying to address is whether memory is the sort of 
phenomenon that can include Otto-like cases, or other kinds of situated cognition 
cases. One way of putting this question is to simply ask “what is memory?” This 
seems like a basic question that is at the root of much scientific research into 
memory. I will argue that the scientific process of asking and answering questions of 
this form is not as simple as it looks. In fact I will argue that we cannot make sense 
of the idea of asking about “memory itself”, shifting instead to an interpretation of 
the question which focuses on scientists’ concepts of memory. The next two sections 
will begin to explain and justify this step, with a fuller exposition in chapter 2. 
 
Why study science? 
Why study the sciences of memory rather than ordinary language or “folk” talk 
about memory? One answer to this is just that my question is about the sciences of 
memory; questions about ordinary language are also interesting, but they are not my 
questions. However, there are some that would block this move by arguing that 
studying the sciences of memory is not an interesting or worthwhile project. I want 
to defend my project against this accusation. 
 
There are two main groups of people who might make this accusation. The first is 
those who claim that the ordinary concept of memory is the object of scientific 
research on memory; it is what the science is trying to explain. We therefore cannot 
look at the sciences of memory in isolation from ordinary talk. The second group 
consists of those who claim that it is memory itself that we want to know about, and 
the ordinary concept is what fixes the reference to this reality, so we should study 
this ordinary concept. On this latter view, the ordinary concept is studied as a means 
to an end; on the former it is the object of investigation in its own right. 
 
I will deal with the former view first. This view says that science cannot get away 
from ordinary mental concepts because they are what the scientists are trying to 
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explain (Tanney, 2013: 291–292). On this view, what a term like “memory” means is 
normatively constrained by its use in memory-talk, and a science that came up with a 
concept that moved away from this memory-talk would be changing the subject and 
telling us, not about memory, but about some other construct of its own devising. A 
philosophy of science study of these new constructs would therefore have no merit in 
isolation from a study of ordinary talk. 
 
While I accept the importance of the use of term “memory” for determining its 
meaning, I reject the conclusion that science is therefore bound by ordinary concepts 
in its investigations. It may use them as a starting point (where else could one start, 
given that scientists are ordinary folk too?) but it often diverges from them for good 
reasons. For example, the ordinary concepts HEAT and FLUID do not coincide with 
the way physics uses those concepts. Why is this? 
 
The scientific concepts are embedded in networks of theory and practice that 
constitute fruitful science. What exactly it is for science to be fruitful is a question 
famously fraught with problems, but roughly it is science that gives good 
explanations, accurate predictions, and produces practical applications that are useful 
for society. I will say more about this in the next chapter, but for now it is enough to 
note that these are not necessarily the aims that ordinary people have in going about 
their day-to-day lives. In ordinary life we may need to do these things to some 
extent, but we do not need to make the same predictions as scientists, do not seek to 
produce the same applications etc. If we did, we would not need science. The uses to 
which terms like “memory” are put within scientific discourse may therefore be 
different to those in ordinary discourse. 
 
To give an illustrative example from the sciences of the mind, consider the 
categorization of mental disorders. Here it may appear that both scientists and 
ordinary people have the shared aim of providing effective psychotherapy, so they 
should have the same concepts. However, there are also other aims that are not 
shared. For example, the scientists may want categories of mental disorder that fit in 
with theories from other disciplines such as neuroscience. This might result in 
categorizations based on brain lesions. Ordinary talk does not share this aim, so need 
not share the same concepts. Ordinary people on the other hand have concepts that 
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have grown up to fulfil the aim of living with psychiatric problems in the absence of 
effective treatments. This aim may have led to explanations of psychiatric illness that 
shift the blame away from the patient (e.g. demonic possession), or shift blame onto 
them in order to justify harsh treatments (e.g. illness as punishment for wrongdoing). 
A science that does not share these aims need not share the same concepts. The 
networks of theory and practice produced by science to meet its aims can be different 
to those used by ordinary people, and so can the concepts that are embedded in them.  
 
The opponent may accept what I have said so far, but insist that problems arise when 
discoveries about the objects of the new scientific concepts are announced as though 
they were discoveries about the objects of the concepts we use in everyday talk 
(Bennett and Hacker, 2003). I accept that, when this happens, it is a problem. 
However, more often it is not just a discovery that is announced, but also an 
accompanying conceptual revision. In these cases, ordinary language adopts a 
scientific term (e.g. “gene”) or changes the meaning of an ordinary term to take on 
board scientific connotations (e.g. “star” in modern ordinary talk usually means 
something like our Sun, a very great distance from the Earth). Even when the 
ordinary language concept does not change in line with the scientific one, the 
concepts are often sufficiently different that there is little or no confusion (for 
example the cases of HEAT and FLUID). 
 
I now come to the second type of criticism introduced at the beginning of this 
section. This was the argument that we should study ordinary language concepts 
because they fix the reference to the phenomena themselves, and it is the phenomena 
themselves we really want to know about. The idea of reference-fixing is familiar 
from Kripke (1972/1981) and is based on the idea that our folk concepts pick out 
kinds based on some underlying essence.  
 
This idea is sometimes supported by arguments that our folk concepts must be 
accurate because they do not classify things randomly or miraculously (Jackson, 
1998: 64
3
); our success in attributing mental states to others (our agreement on what 
                                                          
3
 I am not implying that Jackson would advocate not looking at science. I am only attributing the no-
miracle argument in favour of conceptual analysis to him. 
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states to attribute and the fact that doing so allows us to predict behaviour) would be 
a miracle if there was not a pattern underlying our classifications. 
 
To answer the situated cognition question on this view, one might think that the best 
thing to do would be to analyse our folk concept of memory, to find out what kind it 
fixes the reference to, and then to see whether situated cognition examples would 
qualify as members of this kind. Looking at science may be important for the second 
step of this process – the folk do not often know what the essential properties are 
which their concepts track – but again, science should not be looked at in isolation 
from ordinary concepts. 
 
For the sake of argument in this part of the chapter, let us grant that science is in the 
business of carving up the world into kinds so that there is sense to be made of talk 
about what memory really is. (The next chapter will present a different picture of the 
scientific enterprise). Let us also grant that folk psychology is some kind of theory 
that also attempts to divide the world up into kinds, and that allows us to 
successfully interact with the world and one another. 
 
My response, even given these concessions, is to point out that our success in using 
folk psychological concepts seems only to reduce the likelihood of our being widely 
mistaken in our categories. There is no reason why a few individual categories could 
not be completely wrong, in the sense that they fail to pick out kinds. It is widely 
agreed that we have mistaken categorizations in folk physics (for example a belief in 
a force of impetus that is given to moving objects when they are pushed, and 
mistaken intuitions about the path of an object in circular motion when it is 
released). These mistaken categorizations do not prevent us from interacting 
successfully with the physical world in the vast majority of situations. Similarly we 
could be completely mistaken in some of our mental categories. 
 
The defender of studying folk categories may reply that there is something special 
about folk psychology that blocks the comparison with folk physics. Perhaps our 
first-person access to the mental means that we cannot be mistaken about folk 
psychology in the same ways we can be mistaken about folk physics. If this was 
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right, it would show that not only is the study of folk concepts important, it is more 
important than the study of scientific concepts. 
 
However, a brief consideration of the history of psychology will show that this 





 centuries, but the program broke down amid hopeless disagreement as to 
how it should be carried out and what observations resulted (see Kusch, 1999 for 
historical detail, and Kusch, 1999 and Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1993: 32 for 
some possible explanations for this breakdown). If we had some privileged access to 
the mental, it seems this story should have been very different. There should have 
been no need to attempt to develop special techniques of introspection, and there 
should have been more agreement. The failure of this paradigm alone demonstrates 
that, even if there is something different about mental phenomena compared to 
physical phenomena, we do not have any special privileged access to the mental. 
 
The history of folk psychology may also suggest a lack of privileged access to the 
mental. If Martin Kusch is correct that folk psychology changes over time (Kusch, 
1997: 24), either we have no such special access, or mental kinds in the world have 
changed over time. This latter picture is unappealing to our opponent who needs a 
picture on which kinds are unchanging, to get the idea of reference-fixing off the 
ground.  
 
There is no reason to think that ordinary people have any privileged access to how 
mental phenomena should be divided up that science lacks. There is therefore no 
reason to think that folk psychology is any less likely to be mistaken than folk 
physics, which we have seen can be radically mistaken. 
 
Here I do not need to argue that science is better at describing the world; it is enough 
to justify my project that it gives some description of the world that is worthy of 
study in its own right, without an accompanying study of ordinary concepts. My 
position is therefore open to those who agree with John Dupré (1993) that folk 
categorisations of the world are no worse than scientific categorisations, they just 
meet different aims. It is also open to those who think that science is better at 
describing the world because it has evolved methods best adapted to achieving this. 
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Here, I only want to argue that there is no reason to think that science is worse at 
describing the world than ordinary language, or that scientific concepts can only be 
studied in terms of their relationship to ordinary concepts. This is enough to justify 
my focus on science as a legitimate project. 
 
Why study concepts? 
Why think that it is scientists’ concepts that are important? My view on this will 
become clearer in the next chapter where I discuss how science works and the role 
that concepts play, but here I want to give some suggestion that there is a conceptual 
problem facing the sciences of memory. Given that the problem can be expressed as 
one about concepts, a study of concepts is a reasonable place to look for a solution. 
 
The disciplines investigating memory are very diverse and include at least the 
following: neuroscience, psychology (including cognitive psychology, 
neuropsychology, social psychology, discursive psychology), artificial intelligence, 
human-machine interaction, sociology, philosophy, anthropology. Some of these 
disciplines overlap (e.g. neuroscience and neuropsychology), some may contain 
multiple subgroups studying memory that take very different approaches (e.g. bio-
anthropologists and social anthropologists), and their diversity indicates a great 
breadth of study. When I refer to “the sciences of memory” I mean loosely all of the 
above disciplines, or at least those of their subgroups which have an interest in 
memory. 
 
This breadth of study and wide range of approaches leads to plurality in the study of 
memory. Different concepts of memory and different sets of theories about it are in 
operation for different groups of researchers. Some divide memory into sub-
categories (e.g. long and short term memory, semantic and episodic memory etc.) 
while others divide it into more or different sub-categories, and still others treat it as 
a unified concept.  
 
In addition to this, “what is memory?” (or “what is long term memory?”, “what is 
semantic memory?” etc.) are questions that could be answered with a kind of brain 
process, a specifically located brain state, a functional specification, a list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions (functional or otherwise), a disjunction (again 
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functional or based on substance), a cluster of features (none of which is individually 
necessary), etc.. The interesting thing about the case is that it is currently very open 
which of these could be the case, because different scientific subdisciplines favour 
different options from this (incomplete) list. In later chapters, I will put this in terms 
of the sciences of memory being immature sciences at an early stage of the process 
of conceptual development.  
 
This disagreement and disunity over concepts is something that troubles those 
working in the sciences. For example, there is a large amount of anxiety in 
psychology about the fragmentation of the discipline. The Journal of Clinical 
Psychology article “Psychology Defined” asks: 
 
What is psychology? Is it a single, coherent scientific discipline awaiting transformation 
from the current preparadigmatic state into a more mature unified one? Or, is it a 
heterogeneous federation of subdisciplines that will ultimately fragment into a multitude of 
smaller, more specialized fields? This is, in essence, the “to be or not to be” question of the 
field. Currently, psychology exists as an uneasy compromise between unification and 
fragmentation. On the one hand, the existence of numerous societal institutions suggests that 
psychology is a singular entity at some level. Academic courses, degrees, and departments, 
as well as organizations like the American Psychological Association (APA) suggest that the 
concept of psychology is a specifiable, coherent entity (Matarazzo, 1987). On the other hand, 
a more detailed inquiry reveals a remarkable degree of confusion, fragmentation, and chaos 
at the theoretical level. So formidable is the problem of conceptual incoherence that several 
prominent authors have flatly stated that it is insurmountable (e.g., Koch, 1993). (Henriques, 
2004). 
 
The only things holding the discipline together according to this quotation seem to 
be institutions and organisations, not concepts of the phenomena or the way they are 
investigated. Different scientists studying the same phenomenon have different 
concepts of that phenomenon embedded in different networks of theory and practice. 
This variation is particularly pronounced between different subdisciplines (hence the 
anxiety about fragmentation). 
 
In the first chapter in a collection of papers entitled Science of Memory: Concepts, 
Dudai, Roediger and Tulving acknowledge that the problem of interdisciplinary 




We believe that with proper attention, communication and interdisciplinary understanding 
can be improved. We also believe that a direct confrontation of the issue at what we regard 
as the most fundamental level of knowledge and analysis – the conceptual level – is the best 
approach. The discussion of concepts in contemporary science of memory is 
underdeveloped. Some exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. Tulving 2000; Dudai 2002…), most 
practicing students of memory seem to shy away from spelling out and debating the concepts 
that form, or should form, the foundations of their own science. (Roediger et al., 2007: 1). 
 
They then go on to briefly review some arguments for and against the focus on 
concepts, concluding that the arguments for outweigh those against (Roediger et al., 
2007: 3–5). 
 
The aim of the book is to lay the foundations for ‘a new science of memory’ on the 
assumption that ‘[f]or the practitioners of the science of memory to be able properly 
to exploit, and benefit from, the rich multidisciplinarity of methods and findings, 
they must understand the language and modus operandi of their colleagues in other 
subdisciplines. Such understanding is a sine qua non of the success of the venture’ 
(Roediger et al., 2007: 1). 
 
Much of the literature on memory refers to the problem of variation in MEMORY 
between different subdisciplines (e.g. Sutton, 2004: 188; Wilson, 2005a; Welze and 
Markowitsch, 2005: 64–65; Figdor, 2013). Sutton (2004) gives a good overview of 
the scale of the problem: ‘How could the concepts, models, or practices of such 
glaringly incompatible activities as clinical neuropsychology and media theory, or 
developmental psychology and Holocaust studies ever be imported into 
neighbouring discursive universes? More to the point why would anyone bother?’ 
(Sutton, 2004: 187). He goes on to discuss why and how we might bother, 
concluding ‘I hope that this provides sufficient motivation for trying to show how 
such different memory researchers—from neurobiology to narrative theory, from the 
developmental to the postcolonial, from the computational to the cross-cultural, 
might one day be able to talk to each other.’ (Sutton, 2004: 211). 
 
But even if you are less optimistic than Sutton for the prospects of communication 
about memory, the extent of the conceptual diversity here should still be a cause for 
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concern. Even for more specific subtypes of memory discussed by more closely 
related subdisciplines, there is variation. (For example, concerning the variation in 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY specifically, see Hirst and Manier, 2008: 183; Wessel and 
Moulds, 2008: 289; Wertsch and Roediger, 2008: 318; Barnier et al., 2008: 36–37). 
Even within a subdiscipline, there is polysemy; in a paper about the Cognitive Atlas 
Project which I will consider in detail in chapter 2, Poldrack et al. give three 
different definitions of working memory, all of which are found within neuroscience 
(Poldrack et al., 2011:1). All of this conceptual disunity indicates that the problem is 
a conceptual one. 
 
It is important to note at this point that when I talk about scientists having “different 
concepts”, I do not mean completely different non-overlapping concepts. There is 
still enough in common for communication to take place, albeit sometimes partial 
and with difficulty. I return to the issue of concept individuation and communication 
in chapter 4. 
 
The situation of conceptual disunity makes it appear that there might be no unified 
answer to the situated cognition question for memory. Perhaps some subdisciplines 
use a concept of memory that would be amenable to an extended reading, others a 
distributed reading, and others a brainbound one. Here I will be interested in finding 
out whether this is the case and, if it is, whether that is a situation that should be 
allowed to continue, or whether conceptual unity should be sought. One powerful 
reason to look for such unity would be to facilitate interdisciplinary communication. 
This is important for the sciences of memory, and also for the cognitive sciences, 
since cognitive science is an interdisciplinary enterprise. 
 
One possible way of tackling this question which may look promising is to make use 
of the idea of natural kinds. The variation in MEMORY discussed in this section may 
make it look impossible that memory could be a natural kind, but there is a pluralist 
account of natural kinds available which looks like it might be a good fit. I will argue 
that in fact this is not a helpful way to construe the question, opting instead to put it 
in terms of Brigandt’s notion of investigative kinds (Brigandt, 2003). This is the 




From natural kinds to investigative kinds 
There are two prominent strands in the extended cognition literature, one I will 
describe as metaphysical, and one epistemic. The two strands are intertwined, but I 
distinguish them here because I want to argue that the best strategy is to focus on the 
epistemic strand, while remaining neutral on the metaphysical issue. 
 
What I am calling the metaphysical strand is a line of enquiry about what cognition 
(or particular cognitive states or processes like memory) actually are. In this debate, 
the problem of whether cognition can extend is often put in terms of finding 
demarcation criteria for the cognitive (Kaplan, 2012) or “marks of the cognitive” 
(Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2008). The idea is that if we know what criteria have to 
be met in order for something to count as cognitive, we can see whether putative 
examples of extended cognition meet these criteria. Such criteria have proved 
elusive, and there is debate over whether there even are such criteria (for arguments 
that there are not, see Hurley 2010, Ross and Ladyman, 2010).  
 
In places, Clark himself seems to subscribe to something like this form of argument. 
For example, he claims that genuine cognitive processes are individuated according 
to their proper function of providing information, that is, in virtue of their selection 
history. Alternatively, they may be a side-effect occurring within a mechanism that 
was selected for this function (Clark, 2008; see Allen-Hermanson, 2013 for 
discussion). In a sense, he is here giving a teleological mark of the cognitive. 
 
What I am calling the epistemic strand has already been mentioned above; this is the 
view that construes the debate in terms of inference to the best explanation. The 
argument is that particular situated cognition approaches result in better explanations 
for science than do brainbound alternatives. 
 
In places, Clark seems to endorse this means of arguing. For example, in the 
discussion of Otto’s notebook quoted earlier in this chapter, Clark and Chalmers say 
‘[b]y using the “belief” notion in a wider way, it picks out something more unified, 
and is more useful in explanation’ (Clark and Chalmers, 1998: 14; see also Clark, 
2008: 80 for a similar style of argument in response to a common objection to the 
Otto story). In places he sounds almost entirely instrumentalist, for example in his 
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discussion of the debate between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), the 
Hypothesis of EMbedded Cognition (HEMC), and his solution, the Hypothesis of 
Organism Centred cognition (HOC), he says: 
 
HEC, HEMC, HOC? We should not feel locked into some pale zero-sum game. As 
philosophers and as cognitive scientists, we can and should practice the art of flipping among 
these different perspectives, treating each as a lens apt to draw attention to certain features, 
regularities, and contributions while making it harder to spot others or to give them their 
problem-solving due. (Clark, 2008: 139). 
 
The relationship between the metaphysical and epistemic ways of construing the 
debate is complex, but many believe that in order to be useful in explanations and 
inductions in science, a kind must track a real grouping in the world. Here I argue 
that there is no need to presuppose this. It is the epistemic issue that matters – the 
issue of finding out which concepts result in successful science – not what you 
assume must be true about the world to cause that success. 
 
A natural way to put the metaphysical question is in terms of whether memory is a 
natural kind. It may seem that it is an important question for scientists working on 
memory whether or not it is a natural kind. As Kourken Michaelian says: 
 
If memory is a natural kind, then it will often be profitable to investigate the various memory 
phenomena together, as if they constitute a coherent whole, for then investigation of one kind 
of memory will often tell us something about features of other kinds of memory. But if 
memory is not a natural kind, then it will not in general be profitable to investigate the 
various memory phenomena together, for then investigation of one kind of memory will not 
typically tell us anything about the other kinds of memory; in other words, if the answer to 
the question whether memory is a natural kind is negative, then we should not be aiming for 
a general theory of memory. (Michaelian, 2010: 171). 
 
Not only is there a question about the overarching kind “memory”, there are also 
questions about whether various types of memory (e.g. semantic memory, episodic 
memory) are natural kinds, even if the overarching kind is not.
4
 At this stage 
however, there is not even agreement on how to taxonomise these putative sub-
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kinds. Even text books note that there is some disagreement over the taxonomies 
they give (see e.g. Toates, 2007: 282; Martin, Carlson and Buskist, 2009: 292, 305, 
332); philosophers also recommend changes of taxonomy (e.g. Michaelian, 2010). 
Answers to the natural kinds question about sub-kinds, like the question about 
memory as a whole, would seem to have an effect on how the science should 
proceed – which phenomena should be investigated together, etc. 
 
However, this is mistaken; in fact it is not an answer to the metaphysical question 
that is important here, but an answer to the epistemic question. What will decide this 
issue is how well the sub-kind concepts play their roles in science – how they 
function in explanation etc. – and whether there is a role for an overarching kind to 
play. Whether you think that the success of a concept in allowing fruitful science to 
proceed is down to its picking out a real division in the world is irrelevant to whether 
that concept should continue to be used; the success alone is enough to recommend 
this continuation. In this way, the metaphysical question is reduced to the epistemic 
one in practice.  
 
Some accounts of natural kinds point this way, with a distinctly epistemic slant. One 
example of this is probably the most common and most plausible account of natural 
kinds applied to the special sciences: Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster 
(HPC) theory (e.g. Boyd 1991). It is this kind of account that Michaelian, quoted 
above, is working with, as are others cited in this dissertation, including Paul 
Griffiths and Ingo Brigandt. Due to its epistemic slant, and its popularity with many 
people I cite here, Boyd’s theory is worthy of further discussion. 
 
An HPC kind, as its name suggests, is defined by a cluster of properties. To be a 
member of the kind, an instance does not have to share all of the properties in the 
cluster: ‘[m]ost of the kind members possess most of these properties, but none of 
the properties in the cluster has to be shared by all kind members, permitting 
variation among the members of an HPC natural kind’ (Brigandt, 2011: 3). The 
“homeostatic” refers to a mechanism that makes it such that the kind members share 
the properties in the cluster. For example for the kind species, the mechanism is 
whatever makes it such that cats all share cat-features (interbreeding according to 




The definitions of HPC kinds are determined a posteriori, not by social convention. 
This is because it is the underlying causal structure of the world that makes it such 
that the kind members share the properties which define them. When we group kind-
members, we are therefore tracking something in the world, not merely agreeing on a 
convention. What holds the kind together is causal, not conceptual or conventional 
(Boyd, 1991: 129, 141). This makes it appear that the theory of HPC kinds is an 
answer to the metaphysical question. However, HPC natural kinds can be artificial or 
social kinds; any kinds involved in induction and explanation are included (Boyd, 
1991). This is because Boyd takes science to require kinds that are projectable in the 
sense of Goodman (1955). These are the kinds that can support induction from one 
case to another, and this also grounds explanation. Again, we see that answering the 
epistemic question is primary, despite the extra metaphysical commitment made by 
Boyd and his followers. I therefore advocate focussing solely on this epistemic 
question and avoiding the extra commitment. This is perhaps more an alternative 
reading of Boyd’s theory than an alternative theory, but I think it is an important one. 
 
There are a few reasons to prefer this epistemic approach to the issue: 
 Making fewer presuppositions is a virtue in itself, particularly at the 
beginning of an investigation. 
 
 The sciences of memory are immature sciences; as noted above, it is too early 
to be sure whether memory will come to be defined by a kind of brain 
process, a specifically located brain state, a functional specification, etc., or 
several of these. It is not clear that all of the options would be amenable to an 
HPC reading, or any other natural kinds reading for that matter. This makes 
the metaphysical question a very hard one to answer (possibly impossible 
without further science). Given this, avoiding making metaphysical 
presuppositions in advance is a virtue in this specific case. 
 
 The HPC theory of natural kinds is pluralist, and the epistemic question about 
which concepts would allow the best explanations etc. is therefore going to 
be needed anyway in order to decide which (one or more) of the several 
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possible paths it leaves open should be followed. 
 
According to the HPC theory, a natural kind is a group whose members share 
properties due to an underlying mechanism, and this can be interpreted in a 
pluralist manner: ‘Pluralism about natural kinds would seem the most 
prudent option: there are as many kinds as there are distinct and dissociable 
mechanistic entanglements (Boyd, 1999[a], and Wilson, 2005[b], both 
embrace this kind of idea). What counts as a maximally refined scientific 
kind depends on which mechanistic entanglement is most relevant to the 
practical or scientific project in which one is engaged.’ (Craver, 2009: 584).  
 
We could agree on a pluralist answer to the metaphysical question (that 
extended, brainbound, distributed etc. concepts of memory could all be HPC 
natural kinds), and this would still not tell scientists which of these concepts 
they should work with given the demands and resources they have in their 
particular research. Helping them with this would involve answering the 
epistemic question; which concepts play a role in good explanations is 
relative to what you are trying to explain, what you have available to explain 
it in terms of, what kind of explanation would meet the aims of your research, 
etc. (see chapter 2 for more on this way of looking at the scientific 
enterprise). 
 
It seems that the question of whether memory is a natural kind in the metaphysical 
sense is not the important one here. The important question is about what a science 
using a situated cognition concept of memory would be like – whether it would 
allow us to make good explanations and predictions and produce useful practical 
applications. This is how the question is often put in the extended cognition literature 
(e.g. Clark and Chalmers, 1998: 9–10, Clark, 2010: 49–52) and no metaphysical 




The issue is about the role the concept of memory plays in scientific theory and 
practice. In fact, both Griffiths and Brigandt (Grittiths, 2004; Brigandt, 2011) 
                                                          
5
 In fact Clark, 2010 talks instead about “scientific kinds”, which, like the term “investigative kinds” 
that I favour, is a more neutral term that does not carry a metaphysical account of kindhood. 
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interpret HPC theory primarily in this way – as an epistemic issue about concepts – 
although they do also make the assumptions about underlying mechanisms that I am 
remaining neutral about. I think it is worth ceasing talk about natural kinds and 
following these philosophers in a change in terminology: 
 
A more neutral substitute for ‘natural kind’ that carries many of the right connotations is 
‘investigative kind’ (Brigandt 2003). This term highlights the fact that the emphasis in the 
model of natural kinds outlined above [Boyd’s HPC theory] is an open-ended investigation. 
A natural-kind concept is a concept that it makes sense to seek to clarify through empirical 
inquiry. Such concepts are ongoing projects of inquiry in which extension and intension are 
altered to preserve inductive and explanatory power. (Griffiths, 2004: 907). 
 
This way of putting things has a better fit with my description of how science works 
in the next chapter, where I will talk in particular about conceptual change over time. 
I will also return to it in chapter four, where I discuss concept individuation.  
 
Brigandt says of investigative kinds, ‘[t]he crucial feature of my account…is to 
stress the fact that the species concept as an investigative-kind concept may be 
subject to conceptual change based on empirical findings. Investigative-kind 
concepts exhibit the open-endedness of scientific search.’ (Brigandt, 2003: 1310, 
note 1, my emphasis). Concepts are particularly important given my characterisation 
above of the problem as a conceptual one; the problem is an epistemic one about 
which concepts will best fulfil the roles scientists need them to fill. Conceptual 
change is particularly important for my question, given the shifting context of 
memory research in the modern world, as I said when I introduced the question. I 
will say more about the dynamic nature of science in chapter 2, and conceptual 
change in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Given the aims and focus of my project, the concepts that are legitimate for the 
sciences of memory are those functioning as investigative kinds in the sense set out 
in this section. 
 
Conclusion 
The situated cognition question for memory is particularly difficult given conceptual 
disunity about memory in the sciences. The best way to tackle the question without 
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presupposing a particular outcome to this conceptual disunity is to phrase it as an 
epistemic question in terms of investigative kinds, instead of as a metaphysical 
question. 
 
Whether or not MEMORY or its sub-categories are investigative kinds is the question 
of whether the kinds can support fruitful science, an epistemological question about 
how the concepts function in scientific theory and practice (e.g. in giving 
explanations). By focussing on the epistemological question we can get away from 
the need to speculate about metaphysics, and move towards making concrete 
recommendations for scientific practice. I will therefore sometimes refer to concepts 
of memory being “legitimate”, but never to them being “correct”. The concepts that 
are legitimate are those functioning as investigative kinds in the sense set out here. 
 
My question for this project is “are there any situated cognition concepts of memory 
functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory?” In this chapter, I have 
clarified what is meant by “situated cognition”, “investigative kinds” and “the 
sciences of memory”, and justified my focus on science, and my focus on concepts.  
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2. The Dynamic Framework Account of Science: How Science Investigates 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will set out an account of scientific investigation that I call “the 
dynamic framework account”. It construes scientific investigation as an ever-
changing and interlinked network of theory and practice, and is inspired in particular 
by the work of Dudley Shapere. The section on concepts also makes use of the work 
of Paul Griffiths. Later chapters will analyse the sciences of memory in terms of the 
dynamic framework account, hopefully confirming the usefulness of the picture. 
 
One of the main things the account will enable me to do is to talk about the 
development of concepts (in particular MEMORY) over time. This will be important 
for assessing the development of any situated cognition concepts of memory that I 
find in my investigation, as I will explain in the methods chapter. 
 
In addition to presenting a useful picture of scientific investigation, part of the 
purpose of this chapter is to clarify certain presuppositions I make about science. The 
first section of the chapter will be concerned with these presuppositions. Here I 
cannot consider in detail all the arguments for and against what I say, but I want to 
make clear what is assumed in what follows so that it is clear which aspects of my 
final conclusion are outcomes of my investigation, and which are assumptions that 
were built in from the start. 
 
The main part of the chapter consists of a schematic outline of the dynamic 
framework account, followed by an example experiment that illustrates the account 
(“Effects of caffeine on learning and memory in rats tested in the Morris water 
maze”, Angelucci et al., 2002), in particular how it handles interdisciplinary 
communication. The final part of the chapter is a discussion of concepts within the 
framework, applying the account to some example scientific concepts (WATER, 
GENE, and mental concepts in cognitive neuroscience). This will pave the way for 
my discussion of MEMORY in later chapters. 
 
The aims of science 
In very broad terms, science aims to predict and explain phenomena, and to produce 
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useful practical applications (a form of control of the environment). These ends are 
achieved by a variety of practices including designing and carrying out experiments, 
and producing scientific theories. I take it that these aims are widely agreed upon, 
although details of how to cash them out are much disputed. 
 
One important aspect of this dispute is whether science aims at truth or not. This is 
the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. There are many varieties of 
both of these doctrines and the debate is too complex and involved to get into here 
for reasons of space and focus. However, there is one important presupposition I 
make: that we have no reason to think that there is only one true description of the 
world that science is converging on. In other words, it may well be that there are 
multiple equally correct ways of describing the world. 
 
Some realists may take my position to be a form of anti-realism, and here I am not 
going to dispute that claim. I refer to my position as realist because I assume that 
there is a mind-independent world that constrains which theories and practices will 
produce successful explanations, predictions and applications. Therefore we do not 
have unrestricted proliferation of theories and practices, or proliferation restricted 
only by social and political whims. If this is too minimal a claim to constitute 
realism in the eyes of some readers, they may refer to my position as anti-realist 
without effect on what follows. 
 
The position does run counter to certain kinds of realism. The view it opposes is 
explicit in positions such as convergent realism (e.g. Hardin and Rosenberg, 1982; 
Putnam, 1982), but is implicit in much of the tradition (e.g. in talk about 
verisimilitude or truthlikeness). However, it is not an essential part of many of these 
accounts that there is only one account on which science converges; this was simply 
an assumption in much of the early debate. My assumption is therefore not 
necessarily incompatible with much of what is said by philosophers subscribing to 
various kinds of realism. 
 
My view is derived from the position that John Dupré calls Promiscuous Realism 
(see especially Dupré, 1993). Promiscuous realism is epistemically pluralist in the 
sense that it allows that there could be multiple equally correct accounts of the 
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world. I leave it open at this stage whether science is in practice converging on a 
single account (even though others are conceptually possible) or whether different 
parts of current science are making use of different accounts (compare Cartwright, 
1999). Although later parts of my investigation will bear on this issue, I do not 
presuppose a position. 
 
Even if different parts of science make use of different accounts, it may be that it 
turns out to be most fruitful to work out the relationships between these accounts and 
have them interact with one another. As Rick Dale says ‘[the pluralist approach] may 
also recommend integrating these competing theories in meta-theoretical frameworks 
that would sustain their co-existence’ (Dale, 2008: 156). Much of the literature on 
pluralism discusses potential ways of doing this (e.g. Sandra Mitchell’s Integrative 
Pluralism (Mitchell, 2002, 2003); from a New Ideas in Psychology special issue on 
pluralism (Lamiell et al., 2010), Goertzen’s Dialectical Pluralism, and Smythe and 
McKenzie’s Dialogical Pluralism are attempts at a similar thing). We do not know 
what a successful pluralist picture of the cognitive and social sciences would look 
like—what degree of integration between different accounts of the world there 
should be etc. so this is also something about which I make no presuppositions, 
although my later investigation will bear on the issue. 
 
In summary, I assume that science is aiming to find one or more full or partial 
accounts of the world that allow prediction, explanation and control, rather than 
aiming to find a single complete and true account of the world. I will now go on to 
discuss the process by which science works to meet its aims in terms of the dynamic 
framework account. 
 
Subdisciplines, domains and frameworks 
Domains 
Modern science splits the world into domains for investigation. This is what Shapere 
calls the piecemeal approach. Science did not always take this approach. As Shapere 
says, 
 
This piecemeal approach to the knowledge-seeking enterprise replaced an older holistic 
approach wherein all phenomena were to be dealt with at a stroke, so to speak - attempting, 
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for instance, to explain the nature of "change" or of "substance" in general, or to determine 
the necessary conditions of knowledge in general, an approach which had been widespread 
in the middle ages. (Shapere, 1984a: 641).  
 
It is unimaginable that science today would tackle any topic so broadly, and 
specialisation has if anything increased since Shapere wrote that paper. 
 
Domains then are a very important feature of how science works. What exactly is a 
domain? Shapere tells us the following: 
 
A domain is an association of "items" of putative information into areas for investigation, 
having the following characteristics: (1) the association is based on some relationship (or 
putative relationship) between the items; (2) there is something problematic about the body 
of information so related; (3) that problem is an important one. Contrariwise, the domain 
constitutes a domain of responsibility for a theory of it: the theory is expected to account for 
the items of the domain fully and well. (Usually also, in order to count as a scientific domain, 
(4) science must be "ready" to deal with the problem.) In sophisticated stages of science, 
domains often have names such as "solid-state physics", "rare-earth chemistry", galactic 
astronomy"; but the every-day work of science is done with subject-matters - domains - still 
more specialized than these. (Shapere, 1984a: 641). 
 
So a domain is a collection of interrelated pieces of information about which there 
are scientific problems. The phenomena of interest to a subdiscipline constitute a 
domain, as can narrower subjects of interest. “Memory science” is not a unified 
discipline of any kind and memory is too broad and heterogeneous to be a domain in 
Shapere’s sense. It is made up of bits of other domains which overlap and interrelate 
in complex ways which have yet to be fully worked out (and may not be). However, 
the subjects of many of the subdisciplines studying memory would count as 
domains, and certain types of memory would count as narrower domains within 
these subdisciplines (e.g. semantic memory in cognitive psychology would be a 
domain). More specific subjects of particular research programmes would also be 
domains (e.g. the spatial memory of rats solving a particular type of maze under 
certain conditions). It therefore seems that domains can be construed at different 




Domain formation is itself an achievement; as Shapere says, ‘nature does not come 
to us neatly and obviously packaged into unalterable areas for investigation.’ 
(Shapere, 1984a: 649). However, this is not an achievement that, once reached, 
necessarily remains accomplished. Domain formation and reformation can be an 
ongoing process: 
 
Old domains were split ("salts"; arguments about the unity of the subject of "electricity" in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), items of experience and belief rejoined into 
new domains (electricity and magnetism, and the subsequent history of the interpretation of 
the electromagnetic spectrum), entirely new ones formed (halogens; M-type stars - and note 
the later split of that domain into "giants" and "dwarfs"; leptons and hadrons). What were 
formerly considered bases of classification (shininess, color, crystalline form) came to be 
dismissed as superficial, and other bases, previously considered superficial or not noticed or 
known at all, became fundamental (valency, spin, strangeness). (Shapere, 1984a: 650). 
 
It can already be seen from these examples of Shapere’s that this lumping and 
splitting of domains has an effect on scientific concepts. For example, when the 
domain of “salts” was split, the concept SALT changed. There is currently some 
dispute over how MEMORY is to be split and what the relationships between the 
different subtypes are. This is closely related to the problem of how domains in the 
sciences of memory (individually and collectively), should be organised. 
 
Frameworks 
Here I want to delineate, not just problems and concepts, but all the associated 
theories and practices that make up the piece of scientific investigation in a particular 
domain. This includes methods, experimental apparatus, equations, laws or 
generalisations etc. Here I will refer to this network of theory and practice as a 
framework. All of the elements in a framework are related to one another, and 
changes in one aspect will change other aspects. I will discuss this dynamic aspect of 
the framework below. 
 
Framework is a notion somewhat similar to a Kuhnian paradigm (Kuhn, 1970, 
1996), or disciplinary matrix (Kuhn, 1977), but without Kuhn’s revolutionary 
account of scientific change, as I will explain in the next sub-section. It is also 
similar to the notion of a research program for Lakatos (1968), a research tradition 
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for Laudan (1977), or a research framework for Von Eckardt (1993). The account is 
not necessarily incompatible with all of these (determining this for certain would be 
another project), but it allows me to talk in useful ways that are not obviously 
opened up by other accounts. In particular, my framework account is designed to 
allow me to focus on concepts, and to be construed at different levels, as will be 
made clear in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
The framework can be pictured as a network, where the concepts, methods, goals, 
theories etc. are interconnected nodes, each of which constrains or applies pressure 
to the surrounding nodes. I am focusing on MEMORY so I am interested in concepts 
as nodes. However, it is important to remember that concepts are not the only kinds 
of things that can be nodes; the picture I am advocating is therefore distinct from 
conceptual role semantics as it is usually construed, although that theory also 
pictures an interrelated network of concepts. I will discuss the idea of my account as 
a variety of conceptual role semantics in chapter 4. 
 
The questions a science chooses to ask are one kind of thing that can be nodes, and 
they are shaped by surrounding nodes in the framework, or in other words they are 
not independent of the scientific investigation itself (its theories and practices). As 
Hasok Chang points out, ‘it was one of Kuhn’s main points regarding 
incommensurability that different paradigms have different lists of problems they 
consider legitimate and important.’ (Chang, 2012: 19). Chang goes on to show that 
some different problems were considered important by phlogistonists and oxygenists 
during the Chemical Revolution (see summary table on p.20). This example nicely 
illustrates how having a different theory about the part of the world you are 
interested in leads you to focus on certain questions and neglect others. How the 
domain under investigation is construed is therefore part of the framework, because 
which problems are investigated is a result of pressure from surrounding theories and 
practices, as well as applying pressure to them. 
 
Some current problems of interest in memory sciences were mentioned in chapter 
one, including how memory-use should be taught in schools and universities, and an 
increasing elderly population and consequent larger numbers of dementia patients. 
As discussed in chapter one, these questions arise in part because of increased 
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availability and use of technology, and may be best solved using one of the situated 
cognition concepts of memory. The questions can thus be seen to arise because of 
pressures from social goals and other theories within the framework, and to have an 
effect on the concept of memory employed in answering them. 
 
As well as the questions asked, the standards for what counts as good answers to 
those questions are not independent of the other aspects of the framework. What 
counts as an observation and what counts as a good explanation depend on the 
surrounding theory and practices.  
 
The idea that observation is theory-laden is familiar (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1970, 
1996) and this can be put in terms of the framework account: What counts as an 
observation is shaped by pressure from relevant theories and practices in the 
framework. We can say the same about what counts as a good explanation. Other 
parts of the framework particularly affecting standards for a good explanation 
include theories already accepted by the scientists in question, the aims of the 
science within society, and whether fit with neighbouring subdisciplines is required 
(which often depends on whether collaboration is needed). 
 
This may look problematic, because it lacks any mention of a good explanation as 
one that gets the world right. However on my view, any such standard must be 
implicit in criteria such as meeting the aims of the science, and fit with other 
disciplines. The world constrains what could meet these criteria, so it is already part 
of the picture; it is not the case that any standards would do. However, there is no 
such thing as fitting the world simpliciter, just as there is no such thing as a good 
explanation simpliciter. These things are relative to a framework. 
 
What Shapere says about success is helpful here. According to Shapere, success for a 
theory is about accounting for its own domain.
6
 This is the kind of local success that 
I am interested in here. For Shapere, theories that are both successful and free from 
specific and compelling doubts – doubts which arise from beyond the domain but 
                                                          
6
 Although Shapere says that to be successful is not the same as to be correct, and he still seems to be 




which are not general like radical sceptical doubts – are admissible as ‘legitimately 
usable background beliefs’ or ‘background information’ for the science (Shapere, 




The scientists working in a particular subdiscipline or research cluster constitute a 
social community with a shared framework. Their shared interests partly constrain 
what it is rational for them to ask questions about as well as the standards for what 
constitutes good answers to those questions. But the community of the subdiscipline 
is also embedded in and related to the wider scientific community, and society more 
broadly, and these wider communities’ needs and interests also constrain what it is 
rational to investigate. I noted above that domains can be thought of at different 
levels, depending on the level of community being considered, and we can now see 
that the same is true of frameworks. Here I am focussing primarily on the level of the 
subdiscipline, and the shared framework for investigation at that level. However, it 
would also be possible to investigate at the level of bigger disciplinary groups, or 
smaller research clusters etc. As I said above, these different groups usually 
investigate domains at different levels, e.g. semantic memory for a subdiscipline, or 
spatial memory of rats solving a particular type of maze under certain conditions for 
a particular research group. 
 
The framework taken to be shared between the participants would be construed at a 
coarser level of grain at the subdiscipline level compared to a finer level of grain for 
the research group.
8
 Frameworks that are taken to be shared at higher levels will 
therefore no longer necessarily be shared at lower levels because they are being 
construed at a finer level of grain. This allows us to explain why interdisciplinary 
communication can appear successful, yet problematic. It is successful at the level of 
the overarching discipline, where frameworks are shared. However, described at the 
level of the subdiscipline, communication is much more partial because the more 
fine-grained frameworks at this level are not completely shared. The example below 
will illustrate this. 
                                                          
7
 For Shapere, sciences are rational to the extent that they rely on this kind of background. This aspect 
of the picture will become important later when it comes to assessing science, but for the moment I 
hope just to present the framework account as a useful picture. 
8
 These levels are not intended to imply any kind of reductionism, and it is of course possible to be 




The framework as dynamic 
One of the most important aspects of science to account for is scientific change. The 
framework should therefore be thought of as dynamic. Its change is non-teleological 
because, according to the version of epistemic pluralism explained above, there is no 
reason to presuppose a single “correct” endpoint. 
 
One of the most important accounts of scientific change is Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigm change in scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1970, 1996). However, it has since 
been argued that change in science is often not as revolutionary as Kuhn described. 
A major problem is that if Kuhn’s account was correct, it would be difficult to 
explain consensus among scientists. This is because paradigms, like my frameworks, 
consist of the goals and standards of the science, amongst other things. Paradigms 
are therefore each successful according to their own standards of success, so it seems 
that paradigm shift could only be a matter of taste. 
 
One solution to this is to make change less holistic. For example, Laudan says that  
 
[W]e solve the problem of consensus once we realize that the various components of a world 
view are individually negotiable and individually replaceable in a piecemeal fashion (that is, 
in such a manner that replacement of one element need not require wholesale repudiation of 
all the other components) (Laudan, 1984: 73). 
 
Laudan offers what he calls the “reticulated model”, consisting of methods, theories 
and aims, and the relations between them (Laudan, 1984: 63). The dynamic 
framework account takes this a step further by having more than three components. 
One of its advantages is that other things can be construed as nodes, depending on 
the focus of your investigation, with concepts being of particular interest here. 
 
This makes the interrelations between the nodes even more complex than the 
interrelations between Laudan’s three components. As Laudan says, components can 
be replaced or negotiated in a piecemeal fashion rather than in a full-scale revolution. 
However, on my view, this replacement or negotiation will be constrained by the 




The specific questions asked by a particular science (what exactly it seeks to explain, 
predict and control) is the most obvious thing that will change over time. This is 
partly because the social and political context (e.g. funding availability, the needs of 
society), are always changing. For memory, the questions currently concern the 
issues discussed above, e.g. increasing numbers of dementia patients, but these have 
not always been the main problems faced by memory research, and there is no 
reason to think that they always will be.  
 
Differing focuses for memory research leads to the domain being conceived of in 
different terms and carved up differently between different subdisciplines. Because 
domains and their theories change, what it is to be successful changes too (Shapere, 
1984a: 651). Discussing the history of chemistry, Shapere says that  
 
[t]he very goals of science altered: seventeenth and eighteenth century chemistry passed 
gradually from a goal of perfecting matter to one of understanding material substances in 
terms of their constituent parts, the arrangements of those parts, and whatever it is that holds 
those parts together - that "compositionalist" goal itself having been altered in profound 
ways in the succeeding centuries. (Shapere, 1984a: 650).  
 
An explanation in terms of composition became the type of explanation that was 
considered successful where it would not have been before. This criterion for a good 
explanation was something that emerged over time from the science itself and 
developed from the body of theory and the concepts employed in it.  
 
Chang also discusses the turn to compositionalism (compositionism in his 
terminology) and claims that it was the most important factor in the triumph of 
oxygen over phlogiston (Chang, 2012: 37). This example shows how the type of 
explanation a science looks for can in turn affect the theories and concepts employed 
in that science. The concept OXYGEN changed as theories changed, from the 
essential component of acids, or “acidifying principle”, to the concept we know 
today. I will discuss the role of concepts in the dynamic framework, and consider 




In summary, changes in one part of the framework will have an effect elsewhere. For 
example, once a particular question has been asked and investigated, the results of 
this investigation and associated techniques etc. that may have been developed also 
affect the possibilities for future science. They become part of the background, 
alongside the pressures from society and science in other domains, which constrains 
which questions are seen as important to tackle next, and what would count as good 
answers to those questions. This replaces the idea of a revolutionary wholescale 
change of framework with something that makes better sense of actual change in 
science. 
 
Using my account, we can look at change in science with a particular focus, for 
example on a concept. The ability to focus on different things as nodes is one 
important kind of flexibility my account offers, and the ability to focus at different 
levels is another. I now return to that feature of the account with an example. 
 
Frameworks and levels: An example 
As an illustrative example, consider the scientists working on the experiments 
detailed in the 2002 paper “Effects of caffeine on learning and memory in rats tested 
in the Morris water maze” from the Brazilian Journal of Medical and Biological 
Research (Angelucci et al., 2002). 
 
This example will illustrate how various elements of the framework for a particular 
piece of research can be construed on different levels, and how this affects 
interdisciplinary communication. 
 
In this experiment, rats were released into the maze in a training session, then after 
an interval of 48 hours, released again for a test session to assess their memory of the 
previous training. The rats had been given varying amounts of caffeine at varying 
times, administered dissolved in saline by intraperitoneal injection. Their 
performance was tested by measuring latency to escape to the platform (solving the 
maze), distance travelled from the starting point to the platform, and swimming 
speed. 
 




The present investigation shows that caffeine improves memory consolidation and suggests 
that it can also improve memory retrieval in a task specific for the spatial/relational memory 
system that models the human hippocampal memory system. (Angelucci et al., 2002). 
 
Consider two hypothetical situations in which one of the authors of this paper 
summarises the results by stating “we have discovered that a rat’s memory for a 
maze is better after consuming caffeine”. Compare case a) in which she says this to a 
colleague in the same research group with case b) in which she says the same 
sentence to a friend who is a physicist. 
 
In case a), the scientists share a framework at quite a fine-grained level. Working in 
the same research group, they have shared goals, knowledge of methods and 
practices, etc. In case b), although both parties are scientists, they share a much 
coarser-grained framework. Consider the following aspects of the framework in 
question: 
 
 What it means to “discover” something:  
A “discovery” here is something that is consistent with observations in 
certain types of experiment, to a certain level of accuracy in a certain kind of 
statistical analysis. In Angelucci et al., ‘[d]ata from the training and test 
sessions were analyzed separately by two-way ANOVA taking the number of 
the trial as a repeated measure. Differences between groups were evaluated 
by the post hoc Duncan test.’ P values resulting from these analyses are given 
in the paper, with P ≤ 0.05 being deemed a significant result. In case a), the 
scientists share a knowledge of the types of experiment, the analyses that 
were carried out on the results, and the significance level that would count as 
a discovery. In case b), the scientists probably share the basic idea, but the 
physicist is likely to not be aware of what counts as a good enough level of 
accuracy to declare a discovery in this field (since the standards in physics 
are often different, for example the 5 sigma level of significance required for 
a “discovery” in particle physics is equivalent to P ≤ 0.0000003). He is also 
unlikely to have specific knowledge of the experiments and statistical 
analyses carried out. Of course, they can discuss the details of the experiment 
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etc. and the physicist can learn these things. In this case, he comes to share a 
finer-grained framework with the psychologist in this narrow and specific 
area. He gains something like the kind of “interactional expertise” talked 
about by Harry Collins and Gareth Evans (Collins and Evans, 2002) that a 
sociologist of science can attain in the area of her research. This kind of 
expertise is opposed to the “contributory expertise” of a scientist working in 
the relevant area. Interactional expertise is not enough to allow full 
participation in the research, but it is enough to understand the research 
produced. Even if the physicist gains this interactional kind of expertise, this 
still does not constitute sharing a finer-grained framework in the same way as 
the colleagues, because they still do not share aims, history of researching 
together, fine-grained expertise in carrying out all of the relevant techniques, 
or the broader framework of concepts and methods outside the specific piece 
of research in question. 
 
 What it is to remember:  
This is the most important point for my purposes. In the case of a rat solving 
a maze, “to remember” is something like “to reproduce behaviour”. The type 
of memory or aspect of memory involved in the experiment is also implicit in 
“remember” here. For Angelucci et al., the type of memory is 
spatial/relational memory, which they say ‘models the human hippocampal 
memory system.’ Psychologists distinguish between memory encoding 
(which can be further subdivided into acquisition and consolidation), 
storage/retention, and retrieval. In the experiment, the rats were given 
caffeine in various doses either 30 minutes before training (to test the effect 
on acquisition), immediately after training (to test the effect on 
consolidation), or 30 minutes before the test session (to test the effect on 
retrieval). Their results provide evidence that caffeine aids in memory 
consolidation and retention (it isn’t clear how it could distinguish these two 
things, and this issue is not discussed in the paper), has no effect on memory 
acquisition, and may improve memory retrieval. These specifics would be 
part of the shared framework in case a), but not in case b) because they would 
not be known by the physicist; the physicist may be more inclined to 
generalise the result to everything that we call “memory” in ordinary 
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language. Again, in case b) they could discuss these things and the physicist 
could come to know much of the above, but they would not share the broader 
framework, including innumerable assumptions about memory that have 
been built up over a long period of education and practice.  
 
 What counts as a maze:  
This is an example of a relatively fine-grained piece of knowledge about the 
kinds of experiments that tend to be carried out in this field; it would be 
shared within the field, but not by the physicist. In the example case I am 
using here, the maze is described as follows: 
 
The water maze consisted of a round tank 170 cm in diameter and 70 cm deep, 
filled with water. The water temperature was maintained at 25ºC. A platform (11 x 
14 cm) submersed 2 cm under the water surface was placed on the center of one of 
the four imaginary quadrants of the tank and maintained in the same position during 
all trials. 
 
To “solve” the maze was to find the platform. This is a variant of the Morris 
water maze (Morris, 1984) which is widely used, so would be known about 
within the field, but probably not outside it. As with the previous two points, 
the physicist could come to know about it by further discussion in case b), 
and this would make the sharing of frameworks somewhat more fine-grained, 
but not as fine-grained as in case a). 
 
 What is meant by “after consuming caffeine”:  
This is another point about the specific details of the experiment (how the 
caffeine was administered, how long before attempting the maze, etc.), but it 
is also linked to broader knowledge shared by those who work with animals 
in laboratory experiments. For example, there will be assumptions about 
what constitutes a high dose of caffeine versus a low dose for a rat, and this 
may have certain assumed correlations to what constitutes a high or low dose 
in a human. For Angelucci et al., doses varied from 0.3–30 mg/kg, in 0.1 
ml/100 g body weight, administered by intraperitoneal injection, either 30 





In case a), there is relatively fine-grained communication between the scientists. In 
case b), on hearing “we have discovered that a rat’s memory for a maze is better 
after consuming caffeine”, the physicist will probably hear something like “caffeine 
improves memory in rats”. This is correct, but what has been communicated is 
relatively coarse-grained compared to what is communicated in case a), because a 




My interest is at the level of subdisciplines, and at this level, communication has 
succeeded in case a) because the framework is shared, but not in case b). Although 
this sounds counterintuitive, I suggest that this is because we would normally 
analyse such a conversation at a coarser level of grain at which communication does 
succeed because the framework is shared. The scientist from the rat experiment 
research group and the physicist cannot be said to communicate when considering 
the framework at the subdiscipline level because they do not share enough to achieve 
the aims that would be part of the shared framework at that level. In other words, 
they could not work together like members of the same subdiscipline to meet the 
goals of the subdiscipline. 
 
This account is not meant to give any kind of ontological priority to subdisciplines 
because they too can be changed, typically forming around domains for 
investigation. The point is just that methodologically, it is useful to think about 
frameworks at these levels, since the concepts, theories, goals and practices are those 
had by that group of people. 
 
In terms of my project specifically, the variation in MEMORY between subdisciplines 
can be explained in terms of frameworks. Neighbouring subdisciplines only partially 
share frameworks at the level of grain we are interested in. They have different 
(although overlapping) goals, theories and methods. They also therefore have 
different (although overlapping) concepts.
10
  
                                                          
9
 A layman may hear something like “coffee will improve my memory” which is more coarse-grained 
still. I will not say more about this here, because I am focussing specifically on frameworks and 
concepts in science. 
10
 I will say more about the issue of concept individuation that this raises, as well as related issues 




Using the dynamic framework account 
We have already seen some of the flexibility my account can offer, through allowing 
both focus on different nodes, and focus on different levels. My focus is on MEMORY 
at the level of subdisciplines, but many other possibilities are opened up by the 
dynamic framework account. 
 
What sorts of things does thinking in terms of frameworks allow us to do? I will 
answer this question in more detail in chapter 5, but it should already be clear that 
frameworks can be better or worse at achieving the aims of explanation, prediction 
and control (although the standards for what counts as a good explanation or 
prediction or a successful intervention in the world are not framework-independent). 
Normative judgements about frameworks are therefore possible and desirable.  
 
There is also therefore a notion of progress to be had for the science – the framework 
getting better at meeting the aims of prediction, explanation and control/intervention. 
In line with the openness to epistemic pluralism discussed above, this idea of 
progress retains something important from the Kuhnian picture: it is not a 
teleological notion. In other words, there is no assumption of a final best framework 
that science is working towards. Other attempts to provide a notion of progress while 
respecting this insight often lapse in to Whiggishness. For example Laudan, accepts 
that ‘[a]ll this [notion of progress] sounds rather “whiggish,” and so it should, for 
when we ask whether science has progressed we are typically asking whether the 
diachronic development of science has furthered cognitive ends that we deem to be 
worthy or desirable’ (Laudan, 1984: 65). My account, by contrast, allows us to judge 
research programmes by their own lights without lapsing into the kind of relativism 
on which “anything goes”, thus steering between Laudan and the radical 
interpretation of Kuhn. 
  
The anxiety about fragmentation found in the psychology literature can be described 
as an anxiety about fragmentation and reformation of domains and their associated 
frameworks. But on the view outlined here, changing and reformation of domains is 
a normal process, so psychology need not necessarily be worried about the possible 
fragmentation of the discipline; perhaps the domains need rearranging and new 
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frameworks would be an advantage for investigation. However, there is still reason 
to worry about exactly how the domains should change if they should do so. 
 
How a situated cognition concept of memory can fit into the picture is one small part 
of this problem. If memory can extend, could we have a unified science of extended 
memory, or must different types be dealt with as part of different domains with 
different frameworks? If so, what happens to interdisciplinary collaboration? I hope 
that answers to such questions will be one consequence of the work I begin here. 
 
In the next section I will focus on changes over time in the concepts of target 
phenomena. This is closely related to changes in the questions asked about a domain, 
because here I am interested in the question “what is memory?” and the concept of 
memory involved in asking and answering it. 
 
Conceptual development 
According to the dynamic framework account, what question a science chooses to 
investigate at a particular time depends on the needs of the society at the time, and 
on current theory and practice in the science. However, choosing which questions to 
ask does not by itself determine the investigation that science embarks on. 
Importantly, not only do scientists need to decide on a question, they need to have 
some idea of what sort of answer to the question would be acceptable. I have already 
discussed one aspect of this, namely standards for what counts as an observation, or 
what counts as a good explanation. I now want to address another aspect, namely the 
concept of the phenomenon under investigation. I will therefore now move on to talk 
about the process I call conceptual development. This is the most important part of 
the scientific process for my purposes, and will further justify my focus on the 
concept of memory. 
 
According to the dynamic framework account, as scientists go through the process of 
choosing to ask a particular question and seeking an answer to it, the meaning of the 
question itself changes. This is because the scientists’ concept of what they are 
investigating develops as the investigation proceeds. As well as choosing to ask the 
question “what is x?”; scientists must develop a concept of x that shapes the meaning 
of the question, and therefore what will count as an acceptable answer at any point 
49 
 
during the enquiry. This means that scientists already have an embryonic idea of 
what x is when they ask the question. This embryonic idea is defined by the 
constraints or pressures applied to the concept by other elements of the framework. 
To push the analogy further, there is a “space” left in the framework for the concept 
to fill. 
 
To describe this “space”, I will borrow some terminology from Paul Griffiths and 
Karola Stotz, and call it the epistemic niche of the concept. Although Griffiths and 
Stotz do not talk in terms of frameworks, they define the epistemic niche as the 
needs the group of scientists have in their investigation. Over time, changing needs 
lead to diversification in the concept. ‘As a result of such conceptual evolution, what 
was originally a shared concept between two or more communities of researchers 
can become a range of related but distinct concepts.’ (Griffiths and Stotz, 2008: 508). 
This is like the variation we see in MEMORY. Different groups of scientists with 
different concepts of memory are working with different (although often 
substantially overlapping) frameworks, creating different epistemic niches for 
MEMORY to fill. 
 
It is changes in the epistemic niche that guide conceptual development, and it is the 
process of the development of MEMORY in response to its epistemic niches in 
various subdisciplines that I will be interested in investigating because I believe it is 
at a particularly interesting stage that is of crucial importance for the situated 
cognition question. 
 
The idea that there are constraints on what would count as an answer to a question 
like “what is memory?” is of course not a completely novel one. For example, Ingo 
Brigandt and Alan Love talk about criteria of adequacy associated with a problem 
agenda, (or a complex explanandum or epistemic goal in Brigandt’s preferred 
terminology, 2010a: 299) in their research on interdisciplinary work in biology 
(Love, 2008; Brigandt, 2010a; Brigandt and Love, 2010). A problem agenda is ‘a 
“list” of interrelated questions (both empirical and conceptual) that are united by 
some connection to natural phenomena’ (Love, 2008: 877). The criteria of adequacy 




Shapere expresses a view even closer to mine in the following quotation: 
 
Thus far I have been speaking of theories as answers to questions. While there is a point to 
this, it should be remembered that those questions themselves, in the cases considered, 
involve a general idea of what their answer will be like. In this sense – and it is a sense 
which seems prima facie to fit a great many cases in the history of science – a theory is 
gradually developed by a process of increasingly precise and detailed statement of the initial 
vague idea; there is then no single point in time at which one can say unambiguously that the 
theory has been arrived at…Theory development would then be more appropriately 
describable, in some cases at least, as a process of convergence from generality to (relative) 
precision than as a precisely datable event like answering a question. (Shapere, 1977a: 553, 
note 54). 
 
For Shapere, something like Brigandt and Love’s criteria of adequacy are contained 
in the question that the science asks, because asking a question like “what is 
memory?” already involves certain expectations about what an answer to the 
question would look like. I locate these expectations in the epistemic niche for the 
concept, in this case for MEMORY. The epistemic niche is the aspects of the 
framework that apply pressure to the concept, or constrain it. As research progresses, 
these constraints may become tighter, and this is the process whereby the range of 
answers that would be accepted to the question become narrower, which often causes 
the concept to become more precise. 
 
According to Shapere, it is important to analyse the patterns of reasoning leading to 
our expectations, whether or not they are met by the answer given to the question 
(Shapere, 1977a: 522). Unsurprisingly, since my view of asking questions in science 
is similar to Shapere’s, I share a similar conception of the work that we should do in 
analysing the situation. I will therefore return to Shapere’s work in chapter 5 when I 
outline my methods for investigating the sciences of memory. 
 
When I talk about conceptual development, it is important to make clear that 
developing a concept of x is more than just ruling certain entities, processes, events 
etc. into the concept and ruling others out. That picture would imply that the 
question at issue is purely terminological; a question about to which things in the 
world we attach the label “x”. This would of course change what answer to the 
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question is appropriate, but according to the framework account, there is something 
more substantive at issue in conceptual development. The world isn’t divided up into 
entities, events etc. that can be ruled in or out of a concept until we so divide it by 
developing our concepts. If a portion of the world comes to be seen as x, that portion 
becomes a separate entity or event, where before it may not have been so separated. 
This is not to say that anything goes and we could make up whatever theories and 
categories we like, but once a part of the world is delineated by a concept, 
investigation of it will proceed in a certain way that it would not have done had the 
concept been drawn differently or not at all. Our concepts are tied to other aspects of 
the frameworks of which they are a part, and changes in concepts will affect other 
aspects of the framework, changing the theories and practices of the science in 
question and perhaps redrawing the boundaries of the domain of investigation. This 
will affect what is seen as significant in the future, and change the future course of 
investigation (compare Kitcher’s significance graphs, Kitcher 2003). 
 
Conceptual development doesn’t only affect which theories or practices or 
explanations of a phenomenon are accepted or engaged in, but also what sort of thing 
counts as an explanation or observation or as a good theory or an appropriate 
experiment. As discussed above, these things are also important aspects of the 
relevant frameworks.  
 
Conceptual development is therefore a very important process. The concepts 
scientists have affect what they take themselves to be trying to investigate, the kind 
of thing that would count as an explanation or an appropriate investigative practice, 
the specific goals they pursue, and the domains of investigation. The aspects of 
investigation discussed so far all affect one another, and the concept of the 
phenomenon being investigated is a central part of this. 
 
I will now briefly illustrate the process of conceptual development for the concepts 
of water and of the gene, then discuss a project (the Cognitive Atlas project) which 






The answer to the question “what is water?” seems to be “water is H2O”. However, 
investigation has not been as simple as asking the question and giving this answer, 
and in fact it is not even a strictly correct answer in very modern science. 
 
Hasok Chang’s (2012) book “Is water H2O?” details the history of the scientific 
investigation of water. Water was initially seen as an element and only gradually 
came to be seen as a compound of hydrogen and oxygen. At that point many 
chemists gave it the formula HO, only later settling on H2O. Since then, water has 
come to be seen, not as a pure molecular substance, but as a ‘complex and dynamic 
congeries of different molecular species, in which there is a constant dissociation of 
individual molecules, re-association of ions, and formation, growth and dissociation 
of oligomers.’ (Hendry, 2008: 523, quoted in Chang, 2012: 248). As Chang says, 
‘[i]f we had a simple heap of H2O molecules, it would not be recognizable as water’ 
(2012: xvi). 
 
According to the dynamic framework account, this process is more than just a search 
for the answer to a fixed question: “what is water?” As research takes place, what 
would constitute an acceptable answer changes because the epistemic niche for 
WATER, and therefore the concept responding to that niche, change. When water was 
considered to be one of four elements, “water is H2O” would have been meaningless. 
It would not have been an acceptable answer to the question, because the concept of 
water did not describe a molecular substance before the development of modern 
atomic theory, and did not describe a compound until even later.  
 
There is no reason to think the process is complete; the meaning of the question and 
our best answer to it are likely to continue to change. Chang’s discussion brings out 
this point through his account of the Chemical Revolution and the demise of 
phlogiston, via the electrolysis of water and different interpretations of it, and 
various systems of atomic theory and counting atoms, leading to the adoption of the 
H2O formula. In terms of what I have been saying here, each of the different theories 
and practices he talks about had a different epistemic niche for WATER to fill. At any 
point in this process of conceptual development, the concept was embedded in a 
framework of theories, practices and other concepts that helped to shape the kind of 
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thing scientists were looking for when they asked the question “what is water?” 
Factors external to the science also had their part to play, as famously discussed for 




In the case of water, conceptual development can be glossed as a move from 
disagreement towards consensus (although the real story is much less neat and tidy). 
As a pluralist, Chang argues that this should not be the case; more avenues of 
research should be kept open rather than trying to force agreement on a single one. 
This is compatible with my view, although whether multiple avenues are productive 
enough to be kept open is something which must be judged on a case-by-case basis. I 
will not judge this issue here for the case of WATER, but it will be an important part 
of my analysis of MEMORY. For the gene concept there seems to be more divergence 
than consensus, and this is one of the reasons it is illuminating. 
 
The gene 
The idea of the gene is usually taken to have been proposed by Gregor Mendel in the 
1860s. Mendel did not use the term “gene”, but proposed a hypothetical unit of 
heredity to account for the results of his experiments on inheritance. The word 
“gene” was coined by the Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909 to describe 
these Mendelian units of heredity (National Human Genome Research Institute, 
2013, Online Education Kit). Looking for something to fill this hypothetical role, 
scientists eventually settled on DNA. This is the standard story of classical genetics. 
A Nature article on the subject of genes says: 
 
In classical genetics, a gene was an abstract concept — a unit of inheritance that ferried a 
characteristic from parent to child. As biochemistry came into its own, those characteristics 
were associated with enzymes or proteins, one for each gene. And with the advent of 
molecular biology, genes became real, physical things — sequences of DNA which when 
converted into strands of so-called messenger RNA could be used as the basis for building 
their associated protein piece by piece. The great coiled DNA molecules of the chromosomes 
were seen as long strings on which gene sequences sat like discrete beads. (Pearson, 2006: 
399). 
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Genes began as functionally defined, moving towards a definition in terms of 
substance, first proteins, then DNA. In other words, not only the answer but the type 
of answer changed over time as surrounding theory and practices changed. 
 
Increasingly, the classical picture of the gene is breaking down. Results, for example 
those showing the involvement of RNA, and extragenomic modes of inheritance 
(epigenetics), are making it increasingly untenable. The problems this is causing are 
worth quoting at some length because they are to some extent paralleled in research 
on memory:  
 
[D]oes it matter that many scientists not directly concerned with molecular mechanisms 
continue to think of genetics in simpler terms? [the classical picture]. Some geneticists say 
yes. They worry that researchers working with an oversimplistic idea of the gene could 
discard important results that don’t fit. A medical researcher, for example, might gloss over 
the many different transcripts generated by a sequence at one location. And the lack of a 
clear idea of what a gene is might also hinder collaboration. “I find it sometimes very 
difficult to tell what someone means when they talk about genes because we don’t share the 
same definition,” says developmental geneticist William Gelbert of Harvard University in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Without a clear definition of a gene, life is also difficult for bioinformaticians who want to 
use computer programs to spot landmark sequences in DNA that signal where one gene ends 
and the next begins. But reaching a consensus over the definition is virtually impossible, as 
Karen Eilbeck can attest. Eilbeck, who works at the University of California in Berkeley, is a 
coordinator of the Sequence Ontology consortium. This defines labels for landmarks within 
genetic-sequence databases of organisms, such as the mouse and fly, so that the databases 
can be more easily compared. The consortium tries, for example, to decide whether a 
protein-coding sequence should always include the triplet of DNA bases that mark its end.  
 
Eilbeck says that it took 25 scientists the better part of two days to reach a definition of a 
gene that they could all work with. “We had several meetings that went on for hours and 
everyone screamed at each other,” she says. The group finally settled on a loose definition 
that could accommodate everyone’s demands. (Since you ask: “A locatable region of 
genomic sequence, corresponding to a unit of inheritance, which is associated with 





This quotation shows the problems encountered when scientists with different but 
overlapping frameworks try to find a concept that will fit all of their differing 
epistemic niches. 
 
One attempt by scientists to begin to deal with this sort of problem (not for the gene 
concept itself but for gene products) is the Gene Ontology project (Gene Ontology 
Consortium, 2000). To quote from their website,  
 
Biologists currently waste a lot of time and effort in searching for all of the available 
information about each small area of research. This is hampered further by the wide 
variations in terminology that may be common usage at any given time, which inhibit 
effective searching by both computers and people…The Gene Ontology (GO) project is a 
collaborative effort to address the need for consistent descriptions of gene products in 
different databases. (Gene Ontology, 1999, documentation). 
 
The large size of this project relative to its narrow scope (restricted to gene products 
in a cellular context) indicates the magnitude of the problem in the biological 
sciences. The ontology project itself does not determine which concepts should be 
adopted however. This is a feature of such big data approaches that I will return to in 
the next sub-section. 
 
One possible solution to the variation in definitions is splitting the concept: 
 
Rather than striving to reach a single definition — and coming to blows in the process — 
most geneticists are instead incorporating less ambiguous words into their vocabulary such 
as transcripts and exons. When it is used, the word ‘gene’ is frequently preceded by 
‘proteincoding’ or another descriptor. “We almost have to add an adjective every time we 
use that noun,” says Francis Collins, director of the National Human Genome Research 
Institute at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. (Pearson, 2006: 401). 
 
The splitting solution is also suggested by the work of Paul Griffiths and Karola 
Stotz. It is from Griffiths and Stotz that I take the term “epistemic niche”. They 
identify three different concepts of the gene – “instrumental”, “nominal”, and 
56 
 
“postgenomic” – developed in response to three different epistemic niches (Griffiths 




The instrumental gene is similar to the original concept of the gene as a factor in a 
model of heredity. Genes in this sense are described as being akin to centres of mass 
in terms of their instrumental role in a model (Griffiths and Stotz, 2006: 499). 
Nominal genes are specific named DNA sequences. ‘Many but not all instrumental 
genes correspond to nominal molecular genes (and lend them their names), and 
many but not all nominal molecular genes correspond to instrumental genes.’ 
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2006: 500). Griffiths and Stotz use the term ‘postgenomic gene’ 
to refer to ‘collections of DNA elements that play the role of the gene as envisaged 
in early molecular biology – acting as templates for the synthesis of gene products – 
but which are not “nominal” genes, because the way in which DNA is used in the 
production of the relevant gene products does not fit the traditional stereotype.’ 
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2006: 500). 
 
Griffiths and Stotz (2008) discuss how these different concepts best fit the epistemic 
niches for different research. For fields like medical genetics and population 
genetics, the instrumental Mendelian gene concept is the best fit. It allows scientists 
to talk about the “gene for” a particular disorder, meaning the ‘sections of 
chromosome whose pattern of inheritance explains the phenotypic differences 
observed in patients’ (Griffiths and Stotz, 2008: 516). This may not play a role in the 
development of the abnormality, i.e. it may not be a molecular gene (Griffiths and 
Stotz, 2008: 516–517). When the development of the abnormality is researched, the 
epistemic niche is different and the molecular gene concept may be of more use. In 
my terms, these different epistemic niches consist of differences in the surrounding 
frameworks for the subdisciplines carrying out the different kinds of research. 
 
The interesting thing about the divergence here is that Griffiths and Stoz’s three gene 
concepts, or three answers to the question “what is a gene?”, are not even similar in 
kind. They do not, for example, all refer to substances. There has therefore been a 
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divergence in what would count as an answer to the question (substance, functional, 
etc.), not purely in the answers themselves. It is an open possibility that a similar 
conceptual splitting could happen for the concept of memory, given that there is no 
consensus on whether science is looking to answer the question “what is memory?” 
in terms of a substance, a functional role etc. I am not assuming that there must be a 
single correct answer here, but there are still criteria for what counts as (an) adequate 
answer(s). 
 
An example from cognitive science 
This example is more speculative because these sciences are less mature (see next 
chapter), but I include it because it concerns a subdiscipline that investigates 
memory, namely cognitive neuroscience. The Cognitive Atlas project (Poldrack, 
n.d.) seems to be investigating something like conceptual development for cognitive 
neuroscience (albeit in a way very different from my approach). 
 
The Cognitive Atlas project is an open collaborative project to map the current 
ontology of cognitive neuroscience, where an ontology is ‘an “explicit specification 
of a conceptualization,” [Gruber, 1993] or a structured knowledge base meant to 
support the sharing of knowledge as well as automated reasoning about that 
knowledge.’ (Poldrack et al., 2011: 2). In this way, it is similar to the Gene Ontology 
project referred to in the section on genes above, and Poldrack et al. explicitly 
compare the two projects.  
 
The Atlas is divided into concepts and tasks. ‘A mental concept is a latent 
unobservable construct postulated by a psychological theory… Some potential kinds 
of mental concepts include (but are not limited to) mental representations and mental 
processes.’ (Poldrack et al., 2011: 3). ‘A mental task is a prescribed activity meant to 
engage or manipulate mental function in an effort to gain insight into the underlying 
mental processes.’ (Poldrack et al., 2011: 3). Various relations between these terms 
(e.g. is-a, part-of, measured-by) are also included. A page for each concept gives a 
definition of the concept, its relations to other concepts, tasks used to measure the 
concept, links to databases containing any associated fMRI images (e.g. NeuroSynth, 
see Yarkoni et al., 2011), a section for discussion, and a bibliography of relevant 
papers. Note the centrality of concepts here, showing further consensus that 
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problems in science can be addressed at this level. There are also collections of 
concepts and tasks. One type of collection is task batteries; these are collections of 
tasks. Another type of collection is theories. These theories are lists of assertions, the 
assertions being made up of concepts, tasks and their relations. 
 
When the project began, ‘[a]n initial vocabulary of more than 800 terms was 
identified manually through analysis of a broad set of publications on cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience and curated by three of the authors (Russell 
A. Poldrack, Robert M. Bilder, Fred W. Sabb).’ (Poldrack et al., 2011: 3). 
Subsequently, anyone approved by the authors as a contributor can make changes 
and additions. Discussion of these changes is encouraged first, and there is space 
incorporated for this. 
 
This project collects scientists’ concepts as its data, but wants to get at an ontology 
that captures the world. The fMRI data is seen as a way to do this. One of the 
problems the project was set up to overcome is the failure of current neural data to 
match current psychological categories. That is to say that, for most psychological 
categories, multiple brain areas seem to be involved; also each brain area is involved 
in several psychological states or processes. Neuroscience and psychology have 
different but overlapping frameworks creating different niches for their concepts. As 
they attempt to collaborate, tensions emerge because of these different frameworks. 
 
There are also other tensions, including disagreement over the mental concepts 
themselves. For example Poldrack et al. give three different definitions of working 
memory, all of which are found within cognitive neuroscience (Poldrack et al., 2011: 
1). These definitions apply to distinct processes that occupy different roles in 
investigation, or places in different frameworks. 
 
There is also a problem of equating tasks with mental constructs (Poldrack et al., 
2011: 2). Poldrack et al. detail several problems this causes, one of which being the 
assumption that each task measures a specific construct. They give the example of 
‘the “Sternberg item recognition task”…often referred to as the “Sternberg working 
memory task”, which implies that it measures a specific mental construct (“working 
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memory”)’ (Poldrack et al., 2011: 2). Not only is there ambiguity in what “working 
memory” means, but also 
 
any link between tasks and constructs reflects a particular theory about how the task is 
performed; thus, equating tasks with constructs makes theoretical assumptions that may not 
be shared throughout the community (and further, those community assumptions may be 
incorrect). (Poldrack et al., 2011: 2). 
 
In the terms I have been using here, the task and mental construct are part of 
different frameworks for different members of the community. Task and construct 
are related to one another and to other aspects of theory and practice in different 
ways in these different frameworks. 
 
These tensions have arisen as the aims of the sciences involved have changed, for 
example by becoming more collaborative. One important change is that the 
frameworks of psychology and neuroscience used to attempt to account for different 
data, but now both want to account for the fMRI data. There might be several 
possible ways to achieve this, but one is to change the psychological categories.
13
 
This process would have to take place by mutual readjustment between the concepts 
and the rest of the framework, because the current concepts are embedded in the 
other aspects of that framework and cannot be changed without profoundly affecting 
it. 
 
The Cognitive Atlas project maps the current situation in cognitive neuroscience and 
will continue to map its changes over time, i.e. to map what I have called conceptual 
development, as the sciences involved attempt to resolve the tensions I have 
mentioned. However, the Atlas project, like the Gene Ontology project, does not in 
itself determine what concepts should be adopted. Whether the discussion pages 
involved in compiling the Atlas are helpful in doing this remains to be seen. This 
kind of big data approach is a new method that is being tried out in a fairly 
speculative manner. Relatively neat examples of conceptual development like the 
story of water are not available for the cognitive sciences, largely because they are 
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 At least change them within cognitive neuroscience. Whether this should affect our folk 
psychological categories is an interesting question, but one I set aside here. 
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In this project, I assume that science is aiming to find one or more full or partial 
accounts of the world that allow prediction, explanation, and useful practical 
applications, rather than aiming to find a single true account of the world. 
 
I have outlined a picture of scientific investigation that I call the dynamic framework 
account. The framework is a network of theories and practices that mutually 
influence and constrain one another. Such aspects of theory and practice include 
goals, methods, concepts, criteria for what counts as an observation, criteria for what 
counts as a good explanation, etc. Scientific communities can be construed at 
different levels, which share frameworks at different levels of grain. For example 
those in the same research group share a more fine-grained framework than those in 
different research groups, but the same subdiscipline. 
 
Frameworks change over time. I am particularly interested in the change in concepts 
(conceptual development) but this is constrained by surrounding aspects of the 
framework, so cannot be looked at in isolation. I am calling these aspects of the 
framework that constrain or apply pressure to a particular concept the epistemic 
niche of that concept. When a question such as “what is memory?” is asked, the 
epistemic niche for the concept of memory affects what kinds of answer will be 
acceptable. 
 
Different subdisciplines studying memory have different but overlapping 
frameworks, which may result in different concepts of memory. On a pluralist 
picture, more than one of these concepts may function equally well as investigative 
kinds (see chapter 1). My project here is to investigate whether any situated 
cognition concepts of memory are functioning in this way. 
 
I have illustrated the dynamic framework account and the notion of the epistemic 
niche by discussing the conceptual development of WATER, GENE, and mental 
concepts in cognitive neuroscience. This final example begins to bring out the 
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difficulties of working with immature disciplines like many of the sciences of 




3. The Sciences of Memory as Immature Sciences 
 
Introduction 
Many of the sciences of memory are often described as “immature sciences”, both by 
philosophers of science and by the scientists themselves. This applies in particular to 
each of the cognitive and social sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology), but also to the 
interdisciplinary venture of cognitive science. While some of the disciplines falling 
under the umbrella of cognitive science might not typically be considered immature 
(for example philosophy), the collaborative multi-discipline is relatively new and is 
often so described. In terms of what I said in the previous chapter, we should expect 
many of the central concepts in these sciences to be at an early stage of conceptual 
development. This seems to be borne out by the disunified nature of these sciences. 
What exactly is the link between disunity and immaturity, and what role does 
conceptual development play? These are the questions that this chapter attempts to 
address. 
 
I will offer my own account of what it is for a science to be immature to help clarify 
the situation in which many of the sciences of memory find themselves, and explain 
why it is particularly difficult but particularly interesting to study them in the way I 
intend to at this point in their development.  
 
The received view 
Whatever immaturity is, it doesn’t seem that it can just be a matter of time, given 
that the mind and social behaviour have been studied since the ancient Greeks if not 
before. Even taking the dates of the foundation of scientific disciplines in the modern 
sense, and for example dating the founding of psychology to the time of the 
establishment of Wundt’s lab in 1879, some newer disciplines such as genetics aren’t 
usually taken to be as immature as psychology (Rand & Ilardi, 2005: 9). 
 
Talk about immaturity often cites Kuhn, in particular the Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1970, 1996). According to the Kuhnian account, the cognitive and 
social sciences are immature because they are pre-paradigmatic. For Kuhn 
‘[a]cquisition of a paradigm is a sign of maturity in the development of any given 
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scientific field’ (Kuhn, 1996: 11).14 The cognitive and social sciences are seen as 
preparadigmatic in the sense that their research is still largely based around the 
accumulation of data and observations without the guidance of a unifying theory, as 
Rand and Ilardi say about psychology here: 
 
From its inception as a distinct discipline, psychology has been characterized by conceptual 
disarray (Henriques, 2004) and relatively slow scientific progress (Meehl, 1978). This is not 
to suggest any shortage of psychological research, as the field generates a massive empirical 
literature each year. Rather, we note that psychology’s myriad and diverse programs of 
research are, as a rule, neither coherently connected to one another nor meaningfully linked 
to relevant lines of investigation in related scientific disciplines (Staats, 1999). The field has 
instead witnessed the relentless accumulation of assorted facts, findings, and theories that 
typically fail to find integration across rival research enclaves and theoretical factions (Ilardi 
& Feldman, 2001[…]; see also Miller, 1992; Staats, 1983). In short, psychology functions as 
an immature science (Kuhn, 1970). (Rand and Ilardi, 2005: 7). 
 
Poldrack et al. begin their paper about the Cognitive Atlas project in cognitive 
neuroscience (discussed in chapter 2) with a quote from Rutherford B. Rogers saying 
that “[w]e’re drowning in information and starving for knowledge”, expressing a 
similar view. 
 
As the quote from Rand and Ilardi reveals, it is “conceptual disarray” and the failure 
to integrate “programs of research…facts, findings, and theories” that are at issue. In 
other words, sciences like psychology have a plurality of disunified frameworks in 
play, in the sense of framework introduced in the last chapter (recall that frameworks 
consist of concepts, theories, practices, methods, etc.). Because a framework is 
similar to a Kuhnian paradigm, my terminology captures the received view, but 
without carrying any implications about the rest of the Kuhnian machinery of the 
scientific process. This seems to provide the main account of what it means for a 
science to be immature on the received view. In a slogan: immaturity is disunity. 
 
On this view, in order for a science to mature, it must become more unified. Arthur 
Staats is one figure who holds this view about psychology. Staats says: 
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 Kuhn’s position may not be this simple (see von Eckhardt, 1993) but this is how his view is usually 
presented in discussions of immaturity. 
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[M]y own philosophy of science states as a fundamental principle that all sciences begin in 
disunity and only advance toward unification by dint of hard and lengthy scientific 
achievement…Psychology is very much a science, but it is a science early in its career. 
Psychology is what I call a modern disunified science, with a plethora of diverse and 
unrelated scientific products but with little investment in unifying those products. The 
resulting disorganization of knowledge leads people such as Toulmin (1972) to consider 
psychology a “would-be science.” (Staats, 2004: 273). 
 
In Kuhnian terms, until a science is coherent and unified, it cannot be said to have a 
paradigm or to practice normal science. 
 
Whether or how this unification should happen is of great importance for my project. 
In the psychology literature in particular, talk about immaturity is coupled with the 
anxiety about the fragmentation of the discipline discussed in my introduction of the 
problem in chapter 1. At the root of this problem, I suggested, is the fact that 
different scientists studying ostensibly the same phenomenon have different concepts 
of that phenomenon embedded in different frameworks of theory and practice. The 
conceptual disunity at the root of my problem in answering the situated cognition 
question is the same disunity that identifies many of the sciences of memory as 
immature on the received view. 
 
In chapter 1, I suggested that the conceptual disunity in the sciences of memory 
makes it difficult to answer the situated cognition question. This is because, if there 
is variation in how memory is conceived, there could well be variation in whether a 
situated cognition perspective is acceptable or not. Taking this alongside the received 
view of immaturity, it might appear that we should wait for the relevant sciences to 
mature and become more unified about their concepts before questions like the 
situated cognition question can be decided. 
 
However, in chapter 1 I also stated that I take an open-minded approach to a kind of 
epistemic pluralism, assuming that we have no reason to think that there is only one 
true description of the world that science is converging on. This suggests that a 
plurality of disunified frameworks may be no bad thing. In the next subsection, this 
assumption will be explored further, leading me to abandon altogether the idea that 




Pluralism in the cognitive and social sciences 
In chapter 1, I said that we have no reason to think that there is only one true 
description of the world that science is converging on. In other words, it may be that 
there are multiple equally correct ways of describing the world. I left it open whether 
science is in practice converging on a single account (even though others are 
conceptually possible) or whether different parts of current science are making use of 
different accounts. I also noted that it may turn out to be most fruitful to work out the 
relationships between the different accounts and have them interact with one 
another.
15
 However, this interaction may not amount to unification of the kind 
required for maturity on the received view. 
 
What I referred to there as “accounts” can now be put more precisely as 
“frameworks”. On my view then, the plurality of disunified frameworks that 
signifies immaturity on the received view is not necessarily a bad thing. In this 
subsection I want to briefly review some literature that suggests it might in fact be a 
good thing. This will only be suggestive, but the rest of the chapter will illustrate the 
benefits of following this suggestion and developing a new account of immaturity. 
This will open up a new potential route to maturity, as well as explaining the 
prevalence of the received view. It will also have implications for how to go about 
answering the situated cognition question. 
 
Kellert, Longino and Waters (2006) distinguish usefully between plurality and 
pluralism, and I will make use of their distinction here. Plurality is a descriptive 
term, while pluralism is normative; it is a program one would advocate. The current 
situation in many of the sciences of memory is one of plurality; in this section I am 
looking at literature that advocates pluralism. In other words, literature that suggests 
that the current situation is no bad thing and that these sciences should, for one 
reason or another, be plural in nature. 
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 If this kind of integrative approach turns out to be the right way to approach pluralism, Rand and 
Ilardi’s notion of non-reductive consilience with the natural sciences may not be too far wide of the 
mark in the sense that finding out relationships between theories in psychology and in other sciences 
could be important. However, their picture still seeks a unified science of psychology (Rand and 
Ilardi, 2005: 14) where the discipline is a “harmonious whole” (Rand and Ilardi, 2005: 17). 
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There is no single account of pluralism in the literature, and perhaps this shouldn’t 
surprise us. As Goertzen and Smythe point out, ‘any attempt at a unified 
conceptualization of pluralism would be inimical to the very spirit of pluralism’ 
(Goertzen and Smythe, 2010)! Here I want to focus on the idea of plurality as 
disunity in the sense discussed in the last subsection, and pluralism as a program that 
advocates keeping this disunity. 
 
Pluralism is becoming an increasingly popular outlook in the philosophy of cognitive 
science (e.g. Dale, 2008) with several journal special issues being devoted to the 
topic (e.g. American Psychologist’s September 1991 issue containing a paper by 
Staats on “Unified Positivism and Unification Psychology”, and replies in a later 
issue (Staats, 1991; McNally, 1992; Kukla, 1992; Schneider, 1992; Green, 1992; 
Kunkel, 1992); and a New Ideas in Psychology special issue on “Theorizing 
Pluralism” (Lamiell et al., 2010)). Dale talks about diversity of theories (Dale, 2008: 
156), explanatory schemes (p.156), and theoretical frameworks (p.157). Staats talks 
about ‘many unrelated methods, findings, problems, theoretical languages, 
schismatic issues, and philosophical positions’ and ‘many unrelated elements of 
knowledge’ (Staats, 1991: 899), ‘[d]ifferences in method, theory, and phenomena 
studied’ (p. 900) and different theoretical languages built around separately treated 
phenomena (p. 900). Looking at a selection of authors from the New Ideas in 
Psychology special issue on pluralism, Goertzen mentions conceptual frameworks 
(Goertzen, 2010: 202), Watanabe talks about paradigms (Watanabe, 2010: 254), and 
Smythe and McKenzie about diversity of methodologies and theoretical orientations 
(Smythe and McKenzie, 2010: 227). It seems from these quotations that pluralism 
here is about a diverse range of frameworks in the sense introduced above. 
 
Pluralism about science in general is also an increasingly popular position (e.g. 
Chang, 2012).
16
 There are some reasons to think that the situation may be different in 
the so-called “special sciences” from how it is in physics. Metaphysics based on the 
special sciences is more likely to advocate pluralism (e.g. based on Dupré’s 
promiscuous realism (Dupré, 1993)). Accounts of natural kinds used in the 
philosophy of these sciences are often based on Boyd’s Homeostatic Property 
                                                          
16
 Although it is not a new position, see e.g. Suppes, 1978. 
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Cluster (HPC) account (e.g. Boyd, 1991). As discussed in the section on natural 
kinds in chapter 1, this can be interpreted in a pluralist manner and is interpreted this 
way in the literature (Boyd, 1999a; Wilson, 2005b; Craver, 2009). One feature which 
might distinguish the special sciences is causal complexity. According to this view, 
the cognitive and social sciences study so many causal chains with such complex 
interconnections (what Wimsatt, 1994 refers to as “causal thickets”) that there can be 
no unified “theory of everything” in their domains. Alternatively, it may be that all 
sciences are amenable to pluralism (Cartwright’s “dappled world” where laws apply 
only locally (Cartwright, 1999)) is a metaphysics based on pluralism that takes many 
of its examples from physics). 
 
Pluralism is not just an increasingly popular position; it is also a fruitful one. One 
reason to advocate keeping plurality is that pluralist theorizing about science has 
beneficial implications. For example, there is an argument in the feminist philosophy 
of science that theories and models are partial and goal-directed according to the 
interests of particular groups. According to pluralism, many of these theories and 
models should be pursued, thus allowing traditionally marginalised voices to be 
heard (Longino, 1996: 275–277). This suggests that pluralism is not only 
increasingly popular (as I argued above), but also leads to advantages. 
 
Although some degree of interaction or integration between frameworks may be 
advantageous according to some pluralist accounts, this falls short of unification. If 
these accounts are correct and pluralism is the best approach for the cognitive and 
social sciences to take, either these sciences should remain immature, or immaturity 
cannot be disunity. The former option is unappealing, so it seems we need a new 
account of immaturity.  
 
A new account of immaturity 
Introducing Shapere’s internal/external distinction 
My account of what it is for a science to be immature will focus on ideas developed 
by Dudley Shapere, particularly in his 1986 paper “External and Internal Factors in 
the Development of Science”. The account will build on Shapere’s claim quoted in 
chapter 1 that some domains are important but not ready. I discussed the importance 
of the sciences of memory in chapter 1, and the present chapter can be seen as my 
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elaboration of what it means to not be ready. My discussion will be in terms of the 
notion of a framework introduced in chapter 2, my interpretation of which was 
inspired by Shapere’s work. 
 
As quoted in the previous chapter, Shapere sees theory development as a gradual 
process of ‘convergence from generality to (relative) precision [rather] than as a 
precisely datable event like answering a question.’ (Shapere, 1977a: 553, note 54). 
Shapere talks about internal and external considerations which shape various aspects 
of science. To put this in terms of my dynamic framework account, particular 
theories, methods, goals, criteria for what counts as an observation etc. (in other 
words all the aspects of frameworks) can be internalised into the science, or can be 
external to it. Any particular one of these nodes in the framework (e.g. a theory, or a 
concept) is shaped by surrounding nodes, some of which are internal and some 
external to the science in question. 
 
The debate over internal and external factors in theory choice is an old one in the 
philosophy and sociology of science, linked to the debate over realism and 
relativism. While much of the literature has moved on from this distinction (see e.g. 
Shapin, 1992), I think there is still a lot to be gained from Shapere’s discussion. If 
Shapin is right, the distinction was largely abandoned because the internalist and 
externalist positions were not drawn or argued for coherently, not because the 
existence of a distinction was shown to be worthless. A position based on Shapere’s 
more subtle version of the distinction may well therefore still be worth considering, 
and I think the work it allows me to do here demonstrates one reason to do so. I will 
first roughly and very briefly outline the traditional debate, so we can see what 
Shapere’s version is not. 
 
External considerations (e.g. social and political context) are sometimes seen as the 
territory of sociologists of science, while internal considerations (e.g. epistemic 
factors) are the territory of philosophers. Sociologists of scientific knowledge draw a 
distinction between the strong and weak programs. On the weak program, scientific 
theories are shaped by external factors only when something goes wrong; good 
theories are shaped only by internal factors. According to the strong program, 
external factors shape all science. The strong program appears to lead to relativism 
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about science because the results depend only on the social and political context of 
the time. Shapere argues that neither the strong nor the weak view is correct. While 
he does not deny the theory-ladenness of observation or the importance of context, 
he argues that ‘internal factors are generally sufficient to guide science in its 
inquiries…and that that sufficiency has, as a matter of contingent fact rather than a 
necessity of logic, tended to increase over the history of science’ (Shapere, 1986a: 
2). In order to draw this conclusion, he reinterprets the boundary between internal 
and external considerations in a way that goes beyond the outdated view of the 
debate just outlined, and will be useful for my methods here.  
 
On Shapere’s view, there is no distinction between the internal and external that can 
be laid down from a meta-scientific perspective, for example by philosophy or 
sociology. The distinction must emerge over time from the practice of the science 
itself; ‘it is a distinction which has been forged in the very process of investigation of 
nature, not laid down in some edict from heaven or philosophy which determines 
what counts as scientific and what does not.’ (Shapere, 1986a: 6). Which 
considerations are internal and which are external is therefore subject to gradual 
change over time as the science develops. In Shapere’s words,  
 
[c]larification with regard to these four aspects of inquiry—what to study, what was relevant 
to the study, the appropriate methods for that study, and the character of an explanatory 
conclusion to the study—required learning how to learn about nature. (Shapere, 1986a: 3, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Here we see a move beyond the outdated focus on theory choice to talk about many 
different aspects of science (different parts of frameworks in my terms). 
 
To say that considerations are “internalised” means that they become part of the 
background that the science can rely on. This builds on Shapere’s (1984) work on 
objectivity and rationality of reasons in science. ‘[…T]he problem is to show how 
the employment of some “background beliefs” (rather than others) can be described 
convincingly as the use of background information, serving as reasons’ (Shapere, 
1984a: 640). Beliefs which have proved themselves become internalised – become 
part of the background information – and this background information is the basis of 
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what science counts as reasons in its deliberations (Shapere, 1984a: 645).
17
 External 
considerations don’t count as reasons (Shapere, 1984a: 648). This use of the word 
“reasons” refers not just to the causes of particular beliefs being accepted into the 
body of background information, but to rationality. A science is rational to the extent 
that it has internalised the considerations on which it relies (Shapere, 1984a: 654). 
What does it mean for beliefs to “prove themselves”? Something will come to be 
taken for granted as background if reliance on it results in success. As Shapere puts it 
in his 1986 paper, ‘[t]hose considerations become internal, scientific, which have 
been found, as a matter of contingent fact, to be doubt-free (successful and coherent) 
and relevant to the domain under investigation. All other considerations become 
external, non-scientific’ (Shapere, 1986a: 6–7). It is through this process that the 
internal/external distinction emerges from the investigation of nature, i.e. from the 
practice of science. This account gives a notion of progress for a science, in terms of 
the increasing sufficiency of internal factors to guide science as the distinction 
emerges (Shapere, 1986a: 2). 
 
A few points about Shapere’s account and my interpretation of it are important by 
way of clarification. 
 
Firstly, what is meant by “success” here is something like providing accurate 
predictions, good explanations, and useful practical applications. It is impossible to 
be more precise than this while talking in abstract terms, because the criteria 
something must meet in order to be accurate, good, or useful vary between different 
frameworks, and change over time. In line with what I have said about realism and 
epistemic pluralism, although what it means to be successful is relative to a 
framework, we do not have unrestricted proliferation of theories and practices, or 
proliferation restricted only by social and political whims.
18
 
                                                          
17
 This notion of reasons is a little restrictive. Shapere does say that ideas, methods etc. which have 
not yet been fully accepted as background knowledge but were constructed based on such knowledge 
and function in the same ways can be called “reasons” in a derivative sense (Shapere, 1984a:  649). 
18
 The meaning of “success” being relative to the details of the particular case is a familiar notion 
from ordinary language. As Chang says, ‘…I think it is futile to attempt to define “success” in any 
one-dimensional way – we don’t try to do that with life in general, and it’s not clear to me that we 
should try it in science. The “success of science” can only really mean the achievement of whatever 
we value in science – Kuhn (1977, 322), van Fraassen (1980, 87), Lycan (1998, 341) and others give 
a long and diverse list of epistemic desiderara’ (Chang, 2012: 230). Since what we value varies, any 




Secondly, it is important to emphasise that relying more on internal considerations 
and less on external ones does not mean that science should become increasingly 
isolated from society. Part of the motivation for tackling a particular research 
question rather than another will still often come from outside the science; there will 
still be wars, epidemics, technological fashions and so on, and they will still bring 
with them a demand for certain types of research to be prioritised over others. Part of 
what it is to be successful is to provide the kinds of predictions, explanations and 
practical applications that are useful to the society at the time. There is nothing 
irrational about this context-embeddedness of science. It does not amount to 
dependence on external considerations in Shapere’s sense unless it provides criteria 
which a science relies on as reasons that determine its theories and practices in a way 
that does not lead to success (religious considerations today are one example of this, 
see below). 
 
Thirdly, one might wonder what is distinctive about Shapere’s account. Most 
philosophers of science would recommend retaining successful theories and 
practices. What more does Shapere give us? Most philosophers of science would 
recommend retaining successful theories because they are likely to be true. 
Shapere’s account gives us more than this straightforward demand for success in 
terms of accurately describing the world. It respects the fact that what would count 
as doing this is variable. It tells us that by looking at the history of a scientific 
framework, we can see what has been internalised, and thus get concrete 
recommendations for how the science should or should not proceed. This is of more 
use to both scientists and philosophers than a general instruction to keep successful 
theories because they are likely to be true. The project I am engaged in in the 
following chapters will demonstrate one kind of concrete recommendation that can 
be made. 
 
A fourth important point is the contingency of what is internalised; we cannot predict 
or decide in advance of doing the scientific research which features will be 
                                                                                                                                             
“system of practice”): ‘Any real-life success is a limited, relative, and provisional thing. Even if the 
truth of a statement within a system of practice is quite precise and assured, our affirmation of that 
truth should be only as definitive as our acceptance of the system itself, which is in turn only 
warranted if the system continues to be successful.’ (Chang, 2012: 214). 
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internalised as it progresses. This is part of a more general thesis of Shapere’s which 
he calls the Principle of Rejections of Anticipations of Nature, according to which 
‘[t]he results of scientific investigation could not have been anticipated by common 
sense, by the suggestions of everyday experience, or by pure reason’ (Shapere, 1987: 
1). This is also an important part of his rejection of a meta-scientific perspective 
from which science can be judged. 
 
Finally, another important note is that it is not the case that once internalised, 
methods, concepts, theories etc. are no longer open to question (Shapere, 1986b: 22–
23). This is a familiar picture of what it means to accept something in science; it 
becomes part of the background that is relied upon for further research, but it is still 
possible to overturn even the most entrenched parts of the science under the right 
circumstances. 
 
I will now give some more concrete examples to flesh out this theoretical skeleton. 
Important examples discussed by Shapere include religious considerations, the 
compositional approach, and unification. I will briefly outline these cases here, 
largely by way of illustration of the view, rather than as arguments for it. To present 
the cases as arguments would involve too much historical detail, taking me too far 
from my aims in this chapter. The usefulness of the view for my project as a whole is 
the only argument I will give for it. 
 
Turning first to religious considerations, we can see that these used to be an 
important part of the background according to which scientific theories, results etc. 
were judged. Newtonian theory needed God to intervene every so often in the 
motions of the planets, and this was not seen as dependence on something external to 
science at the time, while it would be today (Shapere, 1986a: 4–5). Shapere argues 
that religious considerations came to be seen as external because purely internal 
considerations became sufficient. In his words, ‘such considerations were external to 
science precisely because the laws of science had been shown (even if as yet 
imperfectly and incompletely) to be sufficient to account for certain phenomena 
which had previously seemed to require divine intervention’ (Shapere, 1986a: 5). 
Religious considerations did not establish the track record of success required for 
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internalisation into science, so it would now be considered irrational to treat them as 
reasons. 
 
Turning to my second example, the compositional approach in chemistry
19
 – 
thinking about material substances in terms of their constituents and the forces 
between them – is at the foundation of the modern discipline. However, we did not 
always look for compositionalist explanations; the alchemists sought “perfectionist” 
explanations, based on the idea that material substances were elements in varying 
degrees of perfection. The compositional standard for what constitutes a good 
explanation in chemistry came to be internalised because it resulted in success in 
various ways. For example, it allowed order to be imposed on the large numbers of 
new substances discovered in the later middle ages and early modern period, 
resulting ultimately in the periodic table (see Shapere, 1984b for a more detailed 
analysis). To provide an explanation in compositionalist terms is now considered 
rational and this standard is internal to the science, whereas to credit something as a 
good explanation according to the perfectionist standards used by the alchemists 




The other example I will give here, unification, is of particular relevance for my 
project. Unification between different domains was not always seen as important. 
However, the unification of electricity and magnetism and other similar cases were 
successful, so compatibility with theories in other domains was internalised as a 
                                                          
19
 I made reference to the rise of the compositional approach in chapter 2, when discussing the 
dynamic nature of the framework, and how its different aspects or nodes are interrelated. 
20
 Shapere focusses more on the chains of reasons for adopting new aspects of the compositional 
approach (e.g. positive weight as central to explanations, the idea that fire can break substances into 
their constituents) according to whether they are successful; he talks less about the reasons for 
dismissing their predecessors/competitors. There is perhaps an assumption of monism inherent in this 
view – a new approach takes over from an old one. Because of the openness to pluralism of my 
approach, careful attention should also be paid to reasons for abandoning a current approach and its 
becoming external; it might be that two approaches should be maintained at the same time, even if 
they are incompatible. In other words, some space is opened up between reasons for the 
compositional approach being internalised, and the perfectionist approach becoming external. For the 
view that both oxygenist and phlogistonist chemistry should have been maintained, based on their 
success, see Chang (2012). According to this view, ‘[s]uccess is a dynamic criterion, and judging 
relative to success is a game of ruling-in, not ruling-out; provisional success is a matter of being 
“good enough to stay in”.’ (Chang, 2012: 214). The issue is not so much with Shapere’s methods 
(internalisation based on success) but with the way they are applied in particular cases (with an 
implicit assumption of monism). 
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criterion for a good explanation. Such compatibility is now a reason for adopting a 
particular scientific theory. As Shapere puts it,  
 
[i]n addition to doubts based on its failures to account for its domain of responsibility, a 
theory can also be doubted on the ground that it fails to conform to a type of theory with 
which we believe it ought to conform—for example, because that type of theory has been 
successful in several other domains. (Shapere, 1986a: 6). 
 
I will now go on use this distinction between internal and external factors to 
construct a new account of what it means to be an immature science. 
 
Making use of the distinction 
Although Shapere does not use the phrase “immature science,” he does talk about the 
internal/external distinction with respect to sciences at an early point in their 
development. He says that at first, a science has internalised very little, or more 
precisely it does not have a firm internal/external distinction. This amounts to the 
same thing, because the distinction only emerges via the internalisation of 
considerations over time. An immature science therefore does not have much that it 
can rely on as reasons, because there has been no time for anything to establish a 
track record of success, so the science is forced to try out the unproven, or what 
Shapere in the following quotation calls “hypotheses”: 
 
In all these respects, what are naturally called “hypotheses” played a role; and there was, in 
earlier phases of science, little to go on in selecting these hypotheses. Or more exactly, the 
motivating considerations in selecting explanatory approaches might come from just about 
anywhere. Antagonism to Aristotelian forms, natures, and final causes, rather than the 
dictates of nature, entered into adoption of the mechanistic and atomistic approaches of the 
middle and late seventeenth century; Newton developed his theories of motion (and thus of 
space and time) at least partly in the light of theological considerations, objecting to 
Cartesian physics on such grounds just as his own views were deemed atheistic by Leibniz 
and his followers. And in general, the large gap between scientific ambition and scientific 
conclusion had to be filled, under such circumstances, by considerations which we today 
would consider non-scientific, external, though at the time there was little or no ground to so 
distinguish them. Indeed, even the ambitions of science at such stages were dictated, at least 
partly and perhaps largely, by considerations which would today be called external. For the 
distinction between the external and the internal to science was at best only rudimentary and 




Things are different for a more mature science like modern physics, and this gives a 
useful sense in which physics is more mature than psychology: It has established a 
firmer internal/external distinction, and has a greater body of internal factors that it 
can rely on as background knowledge. Psychology and the other cognitive and social 
sciences on the other hand still have relatively little to rationally go on. In my terms, 
much of their frameworks can be expected to be hypotheses, including not just their 
theories, but goals, criteria for what counts as an observation, standards for what 
constitutes a good explanation etc. 
 
For example, with reference to the Cognitive Atlas project discussed in chapter 2, it 
is not yet clear whether a good explanation in cognitive neuroscience should respect 
our folk mental categories, their refinements in use in cognitive psychology, the 
categories suggested by the fMRI data, or whether it must find some way to integrate 
these different categorizations. In general, where there are different frameworks in 
the cognitive and social sciences, it is not yet clear whether we should be aiming for 
reduction of higher level frameworks to lower level frameworks, establishing some 
non-reductionist relationship (for example Rand and Ilardi, 2005 talk about 
“consilience”), or whether the different frameworks concern sufficiently different 
subject matter that the relationship between them does not need to be (and perhaps 
cannot be) established. The lack of unifying theories in the cognitive and social 
sciences is thus partly explained by the fact that it is not clear what such theories 
should look like because there is a lack of internal criteria to measure them by. 
 
Does the account developed here therefore suggest that the cognitive and social 
sciences are irrational? It may be a consequence of Shapere’s view that psychology 
is less rational than physics, although this is not a derogatory description of 
psychology on this view. Inevitably a less mature science will have a less well-
developed internal/external distinction, so there is less of a body of internal 
considerations to rationally use as reasons. This is still somewhat unsatisfactory 
however, and in chapter 5, I will draw the distinction for my methods between 
relying on hypotheses when nothing else is available, and relying on external factors, 




On the account presented here, maturity does not necessarily correlate with age, 
because some sciences may continue to work with little or no internal/external 
distinction for a long time, while others may internalise criteria and develop this 
distinction more rapidly. Here, I hope to point out one criterion that the cognitive and 
social sciences are currently relying on as though it has been internalised, when in 
fact it has not gone through this process, and is being imposed from outside the 
science. By moving beyond doing this, a new route to maturing further is opened up. 
This illustrates the benefit of the new view, and also explains why the received view 
has been so prevalent. The criterion in question is unification. 
 
Specifically, I claim that unification has not been internalised in the cognitive and 
social sciences, although it has been in physics and chemistry.
21
 Defence of the 
success of unification leans heavily on examples from physics, chiefly the 
unification of the theories of electricity and of magnetism (Shapere, 1986a: 5). But 
there is no reason to assume that what works in one area of science should work in 
another, so there is no reason to assume that this strategy’s success in physics 
indicates that it will be successful in the cognitive and social sciences. In fact to 
assume that success in one part of science generalises in this way is to presuppose 
that unification is a consideration that will lead to success. Making such 
presuppositions is exactly what we shouldn’t do according to Shapere, given that 
which features will be internalised cannot be predicted in advance. 
 
I am not denying that cognitive and social scientists use unification with other 
domains as a criterion for shaping their theories, but when they do so, it is an 
external criterion. It is imposed from outside—from the physical sciences. It has not 
undergone the process of internalisation into the relevant subdisciplines by proving a 
track record of success in their domains. In fact it has been in use for some 
considerable time in the cognitive and social sciences without proving such a track 
record, indicating that it might be time it was abandoned. 
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 It might be significant that some very modern physical science shows increasing specialisation and 
disunity. This could suggest that the run of success had by unification in physics and chemistry is 
coming to an end. If this is right, and the change is rational, it is compatible with Shapere’s view that 
even the most entrenched parts of a science can be overturned. If those who advocate pluralism across 
the board are correct, it may be that unification should become an external consideration at a coarser 
level of grain. I take no view on this here, as doing so would involve detailed examination of cases in 




The use of unification as a criterion is the reason the received view of immaturity has 
been so prevalent; it has provided a standard that the cognitive and social sciences 
have been expected to live up to. Following the suggestion of the pluralist literature 
in the philosophy of science, it seems that these sciences might be unable to live up 
to this standard. Trying to do so thus constitutes a barrier preventing them from 
maturing further. Dismissing this standard as an external criterion removes the 
barrier by giving them the freedom to internalise pluralism instead, if doing so 
results in success. In Kuhnian terms, the disunity that seemed characteristic of the 
pre-paradigmatic phase may become the dominant paradigm in the mature science. 
 
What about instances where use of unification has proved successful? One might 
think that, for example, unifying psychology with neuroscience is proving to be so. It 
has allowed the development of various types of brain scanning techniques, and 
mental states can be “read off” these brain scans with some degree of accuracy, 
resulting in the possibility of various practical applications (e.g. see Shirer et al., 
2012). This seems to be fruitful science in that it allows some degree of prediction 
and explanation, and has practical uses. 
 
I acknowledge that there has been some degree of success using unification, but 
continued anxiety about disunity shows that the scientists themselves believe that it 
is not enough. The lack of neat unification with neuroscience is something that many 
psychologists find troubling (e.g. see Uttal, 2001). It is not only lack of unification 
with other subdisciplines that is an issue; within psychology, there is a high level of 
anxiety about the fragmentation of the discipline, and this anxiety is often coupled to 
immaturity talk (on the received view of immaturity). This anxiety about 
fragmentation was discussed in chapter 1. 
 
In fact, the very observations of disunity that led to the cognitive and social sciences 
being characterised as immature on the received view can now be seen to count 
against the internalisation of unification. Any degree of success that has been 
obtained through unification does not seem to be enough by the scientists’ own 
standards, so it certainly doesn’t yet seem enough to constitute the proven track 




Of course, philosophy is also external to most of the sciences of memory, so another 
worry might be that I am trying to impose a pluralist agenda on these sciences from 
outside. However, this is to misunderstand my conclusion. I am not arguing that a 
science like psychology should be pluralist, merely that it is too early to decide that it 
should not be, in line with the Principle of Rejections of Anticipations of Nature. All 
I assumed at the outset was that we have no reason to believe that there is only one 
best description of nature that science is converging on. My discussion of pluralism 
in this chapter goes further only in claiming that the current situation is one of 
plurality and that there are suggestive reasons to think it may stay that way. 
Following those suggestions cautions against imposing unification as a criterion at 
this stage; it does not insist on pluralism.  
 
It may be that unification will in the future prove itself in some or all of the cognitive 
and social sciences, and come to be internalised, or it may not. Perhaps the successes 
of the method so far are the beginnings of this process, but perhaps they are just 





Even if unification is internalised, it may be that unity is to be reached in a different 
way than it has been in physics. In the physical sciences, mathematics has played a 
big part in unification. For example Maxwell’s equations provide a mathematical 
unification of electricity and magnetism. However, this may not be the appropriate 
route in the cognitive sciences. Mathematization looks like another criterion which 
has proved itself in physics but not everywhere else. There are those that advocate 
mathematization of psychology, but given that there have also been successful 
qualitative methods in the history of the discipline, to insist on mathematization as a 
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 Would Shapere agree with my view of unification? He acknowledges that the internalisation of 
unification could have developed otherwise. He says that ‘[t]hings need not have turned out that way. 
Connections between things in nature might have been so tight that a piecemeal approach to inquiry 
would have failed; theories of different domains might not have been coherent with one another; and 
so on. The achievement of internalization is a contingent matter, not one of logical necessity or of the 
nature of science.’ (Shapere, 1986a: 7). However, he does seem to believe that unity has proved itself 
in general so, although we could not have predicted in advance that this would happen, science as a 
whole will approach unity over time. This is something I am denying here. On my view, it may well 
be the case that the connections between things in nature are different in more causally complex (or 
higher level) areas of science. We at least have no reason to suppose otherwise.  
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standard is to impose a criterion external to psychology; one which comes from the 
physical sciences, much like unification. 
 
A different possibility for unification in the cognitive and social sciences is so-called 
“big data” approaches. Rather than mathematization via laws in the form of 
equations, these approaches aim to collect data on the plurality of concepts, methods 
etc. into databases which can then be used in scientific research. The Cognitive Atlas 
project discussed in chapter 2 is one example of this.  
 
An alternative to seeing the big data approach used in The Cognitive Atlas project as 
a different kind of unification from the sort found in the physical sciences is to see 
the project as a way to capture pluralism. Currently, disagreements over concepts are 
built in to the project with space for discussion of disagreements over definitions. If 
there is sufficient disagreement a concept may fork, i.e. be split into several different 
definitions with a disambiguation page (Poldrack et al., 2011: 7–8). If this 
disagreement remains built in to the project, the science has internalised a means of 
coping with pluralism; if it is just a step towards finding consensus, it has 
internalised a new method for reaching unity. At this stage this project has not 
proved successful or unsuccessful, so it is too early to say whether big data 
approaches will be internalised; this is just one possibility. It is not yet clear where 
the internal/external distinction should fall. 
 
Other possible routes to unity mentioned in the literature may be something like 
Darden and Maull’s inter-field theories (Darden and Maull, 1977), or Bechtel and 
Hamilton’s mechanistic reduction (Bechtel and Hamilton, 2007), rather than the 
theory reduction often found in examples from physics. Pluralism is not the only 
possibility that would be opened up by avoiding importing unity as it has been used 
in physics. 
 
Even if unification eventually came to be internalised by all the sciences, there 
would be no reason to privilege it as a criterion of maturity, particularly not in 
advance of this internalisation happening. The cognitive and social sciences must 
find their own route to maturity, and this may be different to that taken by physics. 




The final part of this chapter will concern the sciences of memory and the situated 
cognition question in the light of this new account of immaturity, and its 
recommendation against imposing unification. 
 
Immature sciences and the situated cognition question 
On my view, most of the sciences of memory are immature in the sense that they 
have not yet developed a firm internal/external distinction. Many aspects of their 
frameworks – criteria for what counts as a good theory or method, what counts as an 
observation, etc. – can be expected to be hypotheses, rather than considerations 
internal to the science. How does this affect answering the situated cognition 
question for memory? If we consider MEMORY within the framework for an 
immature subdiscipline, we would expect to find that its epistemic niche contains 
few internal considerations. The subdiscipline is therefore at an early stage in 
conceptual development, i.e. it does not yet have sufficient internal considerations to 
constrain its concept of memory sufficiently to have decided on an extended, 
distributed, brainbound etc. concept. Worse still, we cannot anticipate in advance 
that it will ever do so. It is therefore not yet clear whether situated cognition concepts 
of memory are adequate in these sciences, or whether there is even a determinate 
answer to this question, because of their immaturity. 
 
Should we therefore just wait and see what science does? This does seem to be 
suggested by some in the extended cognition literature (e.g. Hurley, 2010). I think 
we can do better than that, even given what has been said in this chapter. It is 
important to try to do so because of the high pressure context in which the immature 
sciences of memory find themselves, as discussed in chapter 1.  
 
Although it is true that we cannot yet answer big questions like whether the 
cognitive and social sciences will internalise unity or whether they should remain 
pluralist, I think we can begin to answer more local questions, including the situated 
cognition question within particular subdisciplines. I will explain fully how I plan to 
do this in chapter 5, but it is clear from the work of this chapter that it must involve 
looking at the criteria that have been internalised, and whether they constrain 
MEMORY sufficiently to determine whether it should be a situated cognition concept, 
81 
 
and if so, which one. It is also clear that unification is not one of these internal 
criteria, at least for the cognitive and social sciences, so the answer may be different 
in different branches of memory research. 
 
Conclusion 
According to the received view of immaturity, immaturity is disunity. However, not 
only do many of the sciences of memory currently exhibit such disunity, there are 
reasons to think that they ought to stay that way. If that is right, either these sciences 
should remain immature, or immaturity is not disunity. The former option is 
unappealing, so immaturity cannot be disunity. 
 
I have therefore given a new account of what it is to be an immature science, based 
on Dudley Shapere’s distinction between internal and external considerations. 
According to this account, an immature science is one which does not yet have a 
clearly delineated internal/external distinction. In other words, not many aspects of 
its framework have been internalised so that they can rationally be relied on as 
reasons to shape other aspects of the framework. The cognitive and social sciences 
are less mature than physics in this sense. In Shapere’s words, they have not yet 
“learned how to learn” (Shapere, 1986a: 7). 
 
Applying the new account, we have seen that unification is one criterion which has 
not proved itself successful enough to be internalised into the cognitive and social 
sciences as a criterion for a good theory or explanation. Where unification with a 
neighbouring domain is applied as a criterion in these disciplines, it is as an external 
consideration in Shapere’s sense, based on its success elsewhere (in this case in 
physics). The inability of the cognitive and social sciences to live up to this criterion 
explains the prevalence of the received view of immaturity. Ceasing to rely on this 
external consideration by being open to the possibility of pluralism may accelerate 
the process of maturation for the cognitive and social sciences. 
  
Many of the sciences of memory are immature, so their concepts of memory are 
weakly constrained by internal factors. In other words, they are at an early stage in 
the process of conceptual development, so the epistemic niches for MEMORY found 
in the various subdisciplines can be expected to contain few internal considerations. 
82 
 
However it is important to try to begin to answer the situated cognition question 
because of the importance of memory research. Doing this must involve looking at 
the criteria that have been internalised, and whether they constrain MEMORY 
sufficiently to determine whether it should be a situated cognition concept, and if so, 
of which type. Unification is not one of these internal criteria, so the answer may be 
different in different branches of memory research. 
 
I will outline the methods that emerge from this idea fully in chapter 5, but first I 
will cover one more piece of preliminary background. This concerns the issue of 




4. A Theory of Scientific Concepts 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will talk more about how I construe scientific concepts.
23
 The 
account is not a metaphysical one about what concepts are, and it is not meant to be 
an account of anything consciously going on in the minds of scientists when they use 
concepts. Instead, my intention is to draw out the way of talking about concepts that 
is implicit in the dynamic framework account introduced in chapter 2, and justify it 
as useful for philosophers of science. The main justification is that the account 
allows the kind of investigation I intend to pursue in subsequent chapters to be 
carried out effectively. The non-metaphysical status of my account means that it 
does not necessarily preclude other accounts of concepts drawn from other 
perspectives or for other purposes. 
 
I will make use of the work of Ingo Brigandt (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2010b, 2011, 
2012) on scientific concepts. His account has a similar non-metaphysical status to 
mine; like me, he defends his account by pointing to its fruitfulness in the 
philosophical work it allows him to do (Brigandt, 2011; 2012: 98). I will build on 
Brigandt’s account – a variety of conceptual role semantics applied to philosophy of 
science – developing my own version which ties in with the dynamic framework 
account. My version offers certain advantages, some specific to the kind of project I 
am engaged in, and others based on features that Brigandt and I share, and I will be 
drawing out these advantages in support of my version. 
 
This chapter will further explain the role that concepts play in the framework for a 
subdiscipline, in particular the way that a concept is shaped by its epistemic niche in 
the surrounding framework. Once this has been explained, it will be clearer how 
scientific concepts should be studied, and this will pave the way for a detailed 
discussion of my methods in the next chapter. 
 
I will also compare the account I develop to the Theory Theory of concepts in 
psychology. Both my account and the Theory Theory appear to suffer from a similar 
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problem with concept individuation, and the main critical work of this chapter will 
be in dissolving this problem, making use of a solution offered by Muhammad Ali 
Khalidi to the problem as it confronts Theory Theory. 
 
In summary, this chapter will present an account of concepts in science that is 
derived from the dynamic framework account, and that is useful for research in 
philosophy of science like mine, and show why it does not suffer from the main 
problem that accounts of its kind are usually taken to suffer from. 
 
Conceptual role semantics and the dynamic framework account 
Conceptual role semantics is not a single theory, but a family of approaches 
according to which a concept’s content is defined by its functional role (the approach 
is also sometimes called functional role semantics). According to one prominent type 
of conceptual role semantics, a concept is defined by its inferential role, that is to say 
the inferences in which it appears. This inferential role semantics or inferentialism 
(e.g. Brandom, 1994, 2000, 2007) is the kind of approach on which Brigandt bases 
his theory. 
 
There are two major differences between Brigandt and the inferentialists. The first is 
that Brigandt talks about a concept’s explanatory role as well as its inferential role 
because he takes explanation to be central to science, and ‘[i]t is not obvious how 
explanation relates to standard models of inference making, so the inferential role of 
concepts need not encompass their explanatory role’ (Brigandt, 2004a: 3). The 
second difference is that Brigandt takes inferential role to be just one of three 
components of conceptual content, the other components being reference, and 
epistemic goal (2010b, 2011: 6) (The nature of these components will be explained 
below).  
 
I differ from Brigandt in both of these respects. With respect to the scope of the 
inferential role, I want to expand it beyond both inferences and explanations to 
include all aspects of the concept’s role in the framework. As I have said, the aspects 
of the framework that apply pressure to the concept constitute its epistemic niche 
(what the concept is needed to do for the science) and thus shape it. As a natural 
consequence of this, all of these aspects of the framework constitute the conceptual 
85 
 
role. Therefore, according to my version of conceptual role semantics, a concept is 
defined by its place in the dynamic framework, or its role within that framework, at 
the relevant level of grain (I will return to levels of grain below). I will therefore talk 
about conceptual role, rather than inferential role to reflect this breadth. 
 
With respect to reference and epistemic goal, I do not need these two extra separate 
components of conceptual content because of the way I have broadened conceptual 
role. The purposes for which Brigandt recruits reference and epistemic goal are 
already performed by the dynamic framework, in ways I will elaborate on below. My 
two differences from Brigandt are thus tightly connected: it is because I construe 
conceptual/inferential role broadly that I do not separate reference and epistemic 
goal as distinct components. Or to put this another way, I think it is because Brigandt 
construes inferential role narrowly that he is forced to invoke the distinct 
components. I will argue that reference and epistemic goal are already part of the 
conceptual role properly (i.e. most helpfully) construed, and that there are some 
disadvantages to separating them. 
 
First I want to clarify Brigandt’s view a little further. Then, in two subsections, I will 
address each of the two differences between my account and Brigandt’s introduced 
above. In each subsection, I will be looking at why Brigandt’s theory takes the form 
it does, or what those features enable him to do. These useful aspects of Brigandt’s 
account will set up desiderata that mine should meet. I will show how some of these 
can be met in the subsections themselves, but each of the two subsections will also 
give rise to a desideratum that I will measure my account against later on (in one 
case in the final section of this chapter, and in the other case in the next chapter). The 
final subsection will set out some advantages of my account over Brigandt’s. 
 
Brigandt can be seen as working in the tradition of theories following Frege (1948), 
which separate sense and reference. For Frege, reference is denotation, such that the 
term “a” (or concept A for our purposes) denotes or refers to the particular a. Sense is 
the “mode of presentation” of the referent. For example “the morning star” and “the 




Brigandt retains the Fregean notion of reference, and cashes out sense as inferential 
role (Brigandt, 2011: 12). Brigandt defines the inferential role as ‘the set of 
inferences and explanations in which the term figures and which it supports in virtue 
of its specific content. The inferential role broadly aligns with the definition of a 
scientific term.’ (Brigandt, 2011: 6).  
 
To reference and inferential role, Brigandt also adds a third component: epistemic 
goal. The epistemic goal is ‘the kinds of inferences and explanations that the concept 
is intended to support’ (Brigandt, 2010b: 8). Contrasting epistemic goal with 
inferential role, Brigandt says:  
 
In a nutshell, the epistemic goal pursued by a scientific concept’s use is the type of 
knowledge (certain kinds of inferences, explanations, discoveries) the concept is intended to 
deliver, given its usage by a research community. (The inferential role, in contrast, is the set 





The rationality of changes in reference and inferential role are judged according to 
how well they meet the epistemic goal(s) (which can also rationally change over 
time, provided it does so in a gradual fashion, see Brigandt, 2010b, section 2, esp. 
pp.17–19). 
 
The epistemic goal comes along with criteria for what would count as meeting it. 
These are not radically different from my notion of criteria for what counts as a good 
explanation, what counts as an observation, etc. Brigandt says ‘[a]ssociated with 
epistemic goals are standards of adequacy that specify what would count as meeting 
the epistemic goal—what method is suitable for an investigative goal, what 
evidential standards obtain for an inferential or inductive aim, or what criteria of 
explanatory adequacy underlie an explanatory goal.’ (Brigandt, 2012: 99).  
 
According to my account, these criteria depend on other aspects of the dynamic 
framework, such as background theories, aims, etc., and Brigandt also seems to 
accept something like this: 
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Any epistemic goal in science comes—given empirical background knowledge—with 
implicit criteria specifying what it involves to adequately (or more adequately) satisfy the 
goal. For instance, if the goal is to explain a certain phenomenon, then the particular 
scientific context specifies what makes one explanatory attempt better then another one. 
(Brigandt, 2010b: 9). 
 
Where we differ is that on my view, all of these things can be part of the conceptual 
role because they are all parts of the dynamic framework and thus can all figure in 
the epistemic niche for a concept. On my account, the conceptual role can include 
practice, goals (choices of what to explain, what practical applications to work 
towards), criteria for what counts as a good explanation or theory, etc. On the other 
hand, Brigandt’s definition of inferential role privileges the kinds of things that can 
be part of inferences and explanations, which would be semantic or linguistic, and 
therefore seem prima facie not to include practice.
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 He relegates goals, aims, and 
criteria for meeting them to a separate component (epistemic goal). 
 
I will now consider Brigandt’s reasons for developing his account in the way that he 
does, giving rise to desiderata that my account should meet. 
 
Why does Brigandt construe conceptual role narrowly? 
Why construe conceptual/inferential role narrowly, so that it only includes the kinds 
of things that can be part of inferences and explanations? One reason may be the 
Fregean tradition in which Brigandt is working. As I said above, for Brigandt, 
inferential role is effectively sense; sense is a semantic entity, not something that 
would include practice. However, it is a little ungenerous to Brigandt to suggest that 
he would be such a slavish follower of tradition against the best interests of his own 
philosophical approach to science. 
 
A more plausible candidate for the reason is that he wants to limit himself to talking 
about the public language of scientists: ‘I will define the notion of conceptual role 
based on public language, which fits with the fact that in the study of the historical 
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 It is not completely clear that inferences cannot include practice. It seems that they do in Brandom’s 
inferentialism for example (2000: 28–29; 2007: 657–658). Brigandt refers to practice throughout his 
work (see especially his 2012) but it is not clear that his focus on public language (see below) makes 
sufficient room for it. 
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episodes in science we have to rely on the verbal and written reports of scientists.’ 
(Brigandt, 2004c: 20). This approach lends itself to a view of conceptual role that 
focuses on linguistic inferences and explanations, rather than practice, aims, goals, 
etc.  
 
I will also be looking closely at the written reports of scientists. However, I want to 
emphasise that these reports are a way of finding out about not only inferences and 
explanations, but also experiments carried out, apparatus used, and practical 
applications that result, or are aimed at. These things are of just as much importance 
as, and play a similar role in shaping concepts to, inferences and explanations in 
which the concepts play a role. It is not clear how features such as the choice of 
apparatus or method could fit into Brigandt’s notion of inferential role. 
 
Why does Brigandt limit himself to public language? It seems to be to escape an 
objection from Fodor (1998) and Becker (1998) (see Brigandt, 2004a: 5, footnote 8). 
According to this objection, inferences cannot be used to individuate concepts 
because when two people with different concepts of x draw inferences involving x, 
they are thereby drawing different inferences. For example, consider the concept 
DOG. No two people will draw an identical set of inferences involving this concept –
for example inferences involving idiosyncratic experiences or particular dogs will 
obviously differ – so it seems that no two people have an identical concept. This 
seems to make communication impossible, and it also raises a circularity worry. The 
concern is that, if everyone has a different concept DOG, there is nothing to tie 
together all the dog-inferences. Conversely, if we can group together all the dog-
inferences as those involving the concept DOG, the concept cannot be defined by 
those inferences on pain of circularity. In general terms, if inferences are 
individuated by the concepts involved in them, the concepts cannot be individuated 
by the inferences. 
 
Brigandt replies to this objection by saying that his ‘definition of conceptual role is 
about inferential and explanatory relations between terms, words, and utterances’ 
(Brigandt, 2004a: 5, footnote 8) so that two people drawing an inference between the 
same terms are drawing the same inference, even if they have different concepts 




This reply to Fodor and Becker is not open to me, given that I do not want to limit 
myself to public language, so finding a non-circular way to individuate concepts is a 
challenge for my view, as is the related communication worry. Answering this 
challenge is the first desideratum for my account. It is a version of the main problem 
I will discuss in the last subsection of this chapter, so I will return to this issue there, 
showing how my account can address the problem. 
 
Why does Brigandt separate reference, inferential role, and epistemic goal as 
distinct components of conceptual content? 
One thing that follows from Brigandt construing conceptual role so narrowly is a 
need to find a place elsewhere for important features such as practice and the goals 
of science. This is where his three-part notion of concepts (reference, inferential role, 
and epistemic goal) comes in. He gives two reasons for separating the three 
components of conceptual content: 
 
There are two reasons for recognizing these three components. First, the different 
components of content (or different semantic properties of scientific terms) are ascribed for 
and fulfil different philosophical functions. Second, in the course of history a scientific 
concept may change in any of these components (and one component can change without the 
others). (Brigandt, 2011: 6). 
 
The second of these reasons does not give Brigandt’s account any advantage over 
mine. For me, different parts of the framework can change over time without other 
parts changing, and I can talk about that process without ruling some of them out of 
the conceptual role. Being able to talk about these independently changing features is 
therefore a desideratum that is easily met by my account. The first point is more 
interesting. I will discuss first reference, then epistemic goal, with respect to the 
distinctive philosophical roles they can play, and how my account can provide 
alternative means to fulfil those roles. 
 
Traditionally, the notion of reference has been part of conceptual content in order to 
provide a link between concepts and the world, and to make sense of conceptual 
change without incommensurability. The threat of incommensurability comes about 
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because, if a concept is defined purely by theories about it (or its inferential role, or 
sense), when those theories change over time, we seem to be unable to say that they 
were theories about the same thing at all. This leaves us unable to say that, for 
example, successive theories about electrons were successive theories about 
electrons (see e.g. Brigandt, 2012: 91). This makes comparing theories across time 
and talking of progress (or regress) problematic. Continuity of reference looks as 
though it would solve this problem. 
 
However, Brigandt recognises that some continuity can be preserved and 
incommensurability avoided even when reference changes (see his example of GENE, 
2011: 10–12; 2010b). Reference therefore cannot be what performs the function of 
maintaining continuity, since we can have conceptual continuity without referential 
continuity. It is this observation that leads Brigandt to invoke the notion of epistemic 
goal, as I will explain below. The only role left for reference on his account therefore 
seems to be to provide a link between concepts and the world. This seems to be what 
he means when he says that ‘the traditional conceptual components of reference and 
inferential role are needed…to account for how concepts make successful practice 
(verbal behaviour and interaction with the world) possible’ (Brigandt, 2011: 7). 
 
While he is right to invoke successful behaviour to emphasise the connection 
between scientific research and the world, invoking reference as a component 
separate from conceptual role in order to do this just seems to be mistaken. A 
connection to the way things are in the world is already built in to any adequate form 
of conceptual role semantics. In my version, it comes in via Shapere’s notion of 
success. In order to be internalised into a particular science, a component of the 
framework must be successful, as discussed in chapter 3. Any conceptual role 
semantics that did not have some notion like this would not be viable because it 
would allow anything to be part of any framework, with no requirement that the 
framework be responsive to the world. This link to the world permeates all aspects of 
the framework on my account, rather than being tacked on to concepts only, as they 
refer to token things. This is a better reflection of what goes on in science, because it 
allows me to talk about the link between practice (methods, apparatus, etc.) and the 
world; although these things are not obviously conceptual, they can be adopted due 




My account can therefore meet the desideratum of showing how concepts are linked 
to the world, and arguably does so better than Brigandt’s. I will return to this point 
when discussing the advantages of my account. I will now move on from reference 
to talk about epistemic goal. 
 
I have already mentioned that Brigandt invokes epistemic goal a) to bring in the idea 
that the goals and aims of science, and criteria for what would count as meeting 
those goals, are important for shaping concepts and b) to make sense of continuity 
and avoid incommensurability. I can obviously meet the first of these desiderata 
within the dynamic framework account, so I will now look at the second in more 
detail. 
 
Brigandt says ‘I introduce the novel notion of the epistemic goal of a concept 
precisely because it accounts for the rationality of semantic change and variation’ 
(Brigandt, 2011: 6, emphasis in original).  
 
Variation in a concept, for example between members of different subdisciplines, is 
judged as rational if it can be explained in terms of the different groups having 
different epistemic goals. However, unity can be provided by a more general 
epistemic goal that is shared (see the example of EVOLUTIONARY NOVELTY, 
Brigandt, 2012: 79–84). This is reminiscent of my notion of varying levels of grain 
at which frameworks can be viewed.
26
 In general, my account can talk about what is 
shared at various levels, be they goals, theory, methods etc. I can therefore 
understand what it is about the epistemic niche of a concept construed at a particular 
level of grain that unifies it into a single concept, while recognising more fine-
grained ways of talking that would explain rational conceptual variation. In fact I 
have already used the language of the dynamic framework account to talk about 
conceptual variation when I set up the problem of MEMORY. The levels approach 
means that, on both my account and Brigandt’s, there is no fact of the matter whether 
two concepts are “the same concept” because there is no unique way of individuating 
concepts (Brigandt, 2012: 87–88, footnote 6). 
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So much for variation. According to Brigandt, the rationality of conceptual change 
is judged according to how well the epistemic goal is met; it should be better met by 
the new concept than the old in order for change to be rational. Having epistemic 
goal as distinct from conceptual role allows the rationality of the concept to be 




Assessing the rationality of conceptual change is also important for my account, and 
this is another desideratum my account must meet. I will do so by looking at prior 
changes in the history of the framework, and this strategy will be explained in full in 
the next chapter. This will establish that my account does not lose the advantage of 
accounting for the rationality of conceptual change, despite not separating epistemic 
goal and conceptual role in the way that Brigandt does. 
 
I have so far examined the reasons for which Brigandt introduces his tripartite theory 
of conceptual content, and his narrowly construed conceptual role. This has brought 
out certain desiderata for an account of concepts, and I have shown that my account 
meets some of these as well as Brigandt’s does. These include: 
 Recognizing that different aspects of a concept can change independently 
over time. 
 Providing a link between concepts and the world. 
 Having a role for the goals and aims of science. 
 Accounting for the rationality of variation in a concept (e.g. that between 
different subdisciplines). 
 
There are also two desiderata I have not yet measured my account against: the 
problem of finding a non-circular way to individuate concepts, which I will address 
in the last section of this chapter, and providing a method for assessing the 
rationality of conceptual change, which I will address in the next chapter. 
 
Now I want to claim that my account also offers some distinct advantages. In 
particular, they are advantages according to the pragmatist terms that Brigandt and I 
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 In the case of GENE mentioned above, the epistemic goal also changes over time (so all three 
components change) but this is still rational because it takes place gradually (see Brigandt, 2010b). 
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share – pragmatist in the sense that we are both looking for an account that enables 
interesting philosophical work to be done. 
 
Advantages of my account 
The first advantage of my account is the fact that it distributes the link between 
concepts and the world throughout the framework, rather than invoking reference as 
a separate component. I already noted above that this means that my account brings 
in elements of practice such as methods and apparatus as things that shape concepts, 
in line with actual science. I now want to argue that I can also use this notion to 
provide a philosophy of science that could be of use to scientists themselves. 
 
Although Brigandt dispenses with the idea that sameness of reference is necessary 
for sameness of concept over time, he still talks about sameness of reference as a 
way to say that scientists are talking about the same thing. But if we think about 
concepts from the scientists’ own perspective, it is not clear how they are to know 
that they are talking about the same thing, if nothing else other than the referent is 
shared. When looking at the concepts from the scientists’ own perspective, reference 
cannot be accessed in isolation from role. There is therefore no motivation for saying 
that reference has stayed the same, other than as something that is inferred based on 
a similarity in role. From our perspective as philosophers, when we say that 
reference has remained the same, we are basing this claim on similarity in conceptual 
role from our own perspective, probably dependent on the role of the current 
scientific concept. This might be useful for some purposes, but we should be clear 
that this is what we are doing. 
 
My account says that some aspects of the framework in the epistemic niche of the 
concept must be the same in order for us to say the scientists are talking about the 
same thing – the concept must fit into theory and practice in a way that is similar in 
some respects, or we would have nothing on which to base our claim that the referent 
is the same. What this similarity consists in could be aims, goals, practices, etc., so 
could include the things that Brigandt groups under epistemic goal. I base claims 
about conceptual similarity directly on these similarities in theory and practice – 
similarities in what I am calling conceptual role – rather than inferring sameness of 
reference and using that as a criterion. Construing conceptual role broadly in this 
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way makes better sense of scientific practice than invoking reference as a separate 
component, because it is a construal that could be used by the scientists themselves, 
and takes their perspective seriously. 
 
Another advantage is that my talk of different levels of grain allows all aspects of the 
framework to be construed at different levels, rather than just the epistemic goal, as 
in Brigandt’s account. This point is important because it allows us to recognize that 
scientists sharing a more coarse-grained goal will also share coarser-grained theories, 
etc., which is an important part of accounting for their apparent sharing of concepts 
in some contexts and not others (see my example of sharing a framework at different 
levels in chapter 2). This is another way in which my account of variation in a 
concept between different subgroups makes more sense of scientific practice than 
Brigandt’s. 
 
If simplicity is taken to be an advantage for a philosophical theory, it is an also an 
advantage that on my account, all the aspects of the framework are given a definitive 
part in shaping the concept. All the aspects, including goals and criteria for what 
would count as meeting those goals, can be part of the epistemic niche which applies 
pressure to the concept. In particular, the framework already includes practice and a 
link to the world via the notion of success, so there is no need to bring in reference as 
a separate component. It also already includes goals, aims and criteria for what 
would count as meeting them, so there is no need to bring in epistemic goal as a 





My account also allows fruitful and diverse work to be done. All the aspects of the 
framework which apply pressure to the concept also apply pressure to one another, 
so goals and criteria are shaped by concepts, theories etc. as much as they shape 
them; I am only focussing on concepts because MEMORY is the subject of my 
investigation. This means that my methods would be amenable to studying different 
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 I would not want to place too much weight on this, as it would take further argument to show that 
this kind of simplicity is a virtue of a philosophical account (compare the work in chapter 3 on 
unification in the cognitive and social sciences). 
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aspects of the framework than concepts, and such a study should be commensurable 
with work undertaken on concepts, such as this thesis. 
 
In summary, my account has the same advantages as Brigandt’s plus some 
distinctive advantages of its own. 
 
In other respects, our approaches are quite similar; in particular they both seem to 
suffer from the same problem, namely that neither Brigandt nor I seem to have any 
way to demarcate that which is definitive of the concept from that which is not, 
leading to a sort of radical holism. This is a problem we both inherit from 
inferentialism, according to which all the correct inferences in which the concept 
plays a role seem to be definitive. The apparent virtue of expanding the account 
beyond inferential role if anything only makes the problem more acute for Brigandt 
and for me. Holism is problematic because no two scientists have quite the same 
inferential (and explanatory) network, or the same framework. Therefore it seems 
that no two scientists have the same concept, and it is not clear how they can 
communicate (Fodor and Lepore, 2007). This, and the related circularity worry, were 
introduced above: if concepts are used to individuate conceptual roles, it does not 
seem that conceptual roles can be used to individuate concepts. 
 
This problem of holism and concept individuation is the main one I want to address 
here, but first I will make a brief detour into the psychology of concepts, suggesting 
parallels between the account given in this section and the Theory Theory of 
concepts in psychology. I do this because the Theory Theory seems to suffer from a 
similar holism problem, and my solution will make use of Khalidi’s solution to the 
problem as it confronts Theory Theory. 
 
Concepts in psychology 
Brigandt (2004) discusses the close similarities between conceptual role semantics in 
philosophy and Theory Theory in psychology, and my version, like his, has much in 
common with the psychological theory. 
 
Theory Theory arose in the 1980s out of a dissatisfaction with the previously popular 
Prototype Theory. Prototype theory is concerned with the features or characteristics 
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something must have in order to fall under a particular concept, but instead of being 
necessary and sufficient conditions, the features in Prototype Theory form a 
probabilistic list. On this view, there may be no features which all members of a 
category possess (see e.g. Rosch and Mervis, 1975). This is similar to the 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance notion of a concept (1953) and Rosch and 
Mervis specifically acknowledge a debt to Wittgenstein (Rosch and Mervis, 1975: 
574–575), even describing their study as ‘an empirical confirmation of 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) argument that formal criteria are neither a logical nor 
psychological necessity’ (Rosch and Mervis, 1975: 603). 
 
The probabilistic list results in a graded model of categorization where some 
instances possess more features from the list than others, i.e. they are more 
prototypical of the category. For example, a robin is a more prototypical bird than a 
penguin because it has more of the typical bird features, such as “sings”, “has 
feathers”, “can fly” etc. (or possesses them to a higher degree for the kind of features 
that admit of degree). 
 
In the 1980s, psychologists began to suggest that Prototype Theory was inadequate 
because concepts cannot be made coherent without use of our background theories; 
similarity between instances of a concept alone is not enough to provide coherence 
(Murphey and Medin, 1985). There are also various features of our categorization 
behaviours, such as conceptual combination and conceptual change, that do not fit 
with the model of a self-contained feature list (see Keil 1989: 44 for a good brief 
summary). It may seem obvious to us that we use theories in categorization, but we 
overestimate ourselves in this regard (Keil 2005: 315–316) so our intuitions are not 
reliable here. The emergence of evidence to this effect was therefore crucial. 
 
In contrast to Prototype Theory, in Theory Theory each concept is not self-contained, 
but linked to other concepts and our relevant theories about them. These theories 
need not be (and often are not) fully worked out, rigorous theories. Murphey and 
Medin say: 
 
When we argue that concepts are organized by theories, we use theory to mean any of a host 
of mental “explanations”, rather than a complete, organized scientific account. For example, 
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causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts may contain an 
implicit theory of the entailment relations between mundane events; knowledge of rules 
embodies a theory of the relations between rule constituents; and book-learned, scientific 
knowledge certainly contains theories. Although it may seem to be glorifying some of these 
cases to call them theories, the term connotes a complex set of relations between concepts, 
usually with a causal basis. Furthermore, these examples are similar to theories used in 
scientific explanation (Achstein, 1968). (Murphey and Medin, 1985: 290). 
 
Machery separates two different types of Theory Theory in the literature (Machery, 
2009: 101). According to one of these, concepts are theories. According to the other, 
concepts are elements in theories; as Khalidi puts it, concepts are enmeshed in a 
theoretical network (Khalidi, 1995: 402). Machery notes that some psychologists, 
including Murphey and Medin quoted above, slide between these two versions 
(Murphy and Medin, 1985: 298, cited in Machery, 2009: 101). It is primarily the 
second of these varieties of Theory Theory that I am interested in here, where the 
“theoretical network” in which concepts are enmeshed is the framework. 
 
As I have said, all the elements of the framework surrounding the concept – that 
make up its epistemic niche – shape the concept. The concept is defined by its role in 
the framework. This seems to be very similar to Theory Theory, but it is often 
assumed that the psychology of concepts and the philosophy of concepts are engaged 
in different projects. For example, Machery claims that psychologists ‘are interested 
in the properties of the bodies of knowledge that are used by default in the processes 
underlying the higher cognitive competences’ (Machery, 2009: 34, see also Peacocke 
1992 cited here). By contrast, philosophers ‘are typically interested in what 
conditions have to be fulfilled for having attitudes about the objects of our attitudes.’ 
(Machery, 2009: 34–35). Khalidi says more succinctly that ‘[p]hilosophers discuss 
meaning, psychologists concepts. Psychologists experiment with subjects, 
philosophers speculate about agents.’ (Khalidi, 1995: 402).  
 
Philosophers are taken to be interested in the question of how meaning attaches to 
the world, and the correctness conditions for applying particular concepts, while 
psychologists are interested in the mechanisms behind actual instances of concept 
application. The philosophical project seems normative, where the psychological one 




Brigandt argues that both approaches agree on the structure of concepts and some 
basic goals of a theory of concepts—‘the explanation of behavior and conceptual 
performance, and the explanation of the change and development of concepts...’ 
(Brigandt, 2004a: 1). This seems right. It may be that philosophers are interested in 
an additional normative question about concepts that does not usually concern 
psychologists, but this does not mean they are not talking about the same thing. 
 
More than this, it seems that the two types of question are importantly related. I am 
interested in the normative question of concept application (when it is right or 
rational to apply a situated cognition concept of memory) but in order to address this 
question, we need to know something about where those norms come from. This 
involves knowing something about how concept application works. We need at least 
a plausible way of construing a mechanism before we can assess how well it is 
functioning. The descriptive question is therefore important for answering the 
normative one. 
 
In addition, it is not completely clear that psychologists are purely interested in 
mechanistic and not agential questions. Khalidi suggests that the Prototype Theory 
involves viewing the human cognizer from the design stance and treating them as 
designed to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances, while the Theory 
Theory involves taking the intentional stance and treating the human cognizer as an 
agent with rational beliefs (Khalidi, 1995). If he is right, psychologists employing 
the Theory Theory are not so different from philosophers in how they view the 




Khalidi also mentions the explicit Quinean influence on Theory Theory (Khalidi, 
1995: 411), and discusses links to holism. He uses a Quinean/Davidsonian strategy 
to get out of the holism and communication problem, further strengthening the link 
between Theory Theory and the philosophy of concepts. I will return to his strategy 
in the next section. 
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 If Khalidi is right, Theory Theory and Prototype Theory may be compatible. It is the main purpose 
of his (1995) paper to claim that they operate at different levels of explanation, so need not be in 




A further apparent difference between my work and that of most psychologists is 
that psychologists are typically interested in an individual’s concepts, whereas I am 
interested in the concepts of a scientific community. I think that this is the same 
problem, considered at different levels of grain. As I said in chapter 2, I am looking 
at the level of the scientific subdiscipline, and at the variation between these 
subdisciplines, but I could equally have chosen a different level of grain if my aims 
were different, including the level of the individual scientist. On the account I 
develop here, it makes sense to treat all these cases as examples of the same 
phenomenon. Therefore psychologists’ work on individuals’ concepts is very much 
relevant to my work on the concepts held by a scientific subdiscipline. I will say 
more about the comparison between individuals and groups in the next section. 
 
The important similarity between Theory Theory and conceptual role semantics for 
my purposes is that they both suffer from the problem of concept individuation. I put 
the problem of concept individuation for conceptual role semantics in terms of a kind 
of holism where no two scientists have quite the same framework. This seems to 
mean that conceptual roles, and therefore concepts, cannot be shared. Therefore it is 
not clear how the scientists can communicate. I also introduced the related circularity 
worry that if concepts are used to individuate conceptual roles, it does not seem that 
conceptual roles can be used to individuate concepts. 
 
Theory Theory also has a problem with specifying what constitutes the concept in a 
non-circular way. Keil says of Theory Theory that ‘concepts may only be understood 
in terms of the theories they are embedded in and theories only in terms of the 
concepts they embed’ (Keil 1989: 49). So many of our theories can potentially be 
involved in categorization, it becomes difficult to individuate the concept, 
particularly since there is no clear way of individuating theories (Fodor 1994: 110–
111). This also seems to threaten a kind of radical holism according to which 
concepts can never be shared because the whole network of theories can never be 
shared. 
 
I will consider both the literature on Theory Theory and on conceptual role 




The problem of concept individuation and communication 
It is usually thought that people need to share a concept of x in order to communicate 
about x. Therefore we seem to need a criterion for being-the-same-concept-as, i.e. 
for concept individuation, in order to say that two people have the same concept, and 
thus explain their successful communication. 
 
In terms of my theory, because of the interconnectedness of the framework, it seems 
that the whole framework must be shared for successful communication. This radical 
holism seems to make communication impossible. Worse still, even if it were 
somehow possible, it does not seem actual, because part of the problem I am 
interested in is the variation in MEMORY. As I have said, this variation does cause 
communication problems, but an account that says those problems are so severe that 
each subdiscipline (or even each individual) has a completely different concept of 
memory cannot be right. Communication, however problematic, does take place 
within and between the sciences of memory. 
 
There are three possible solutions to this problem: 
 
1) Holism: The concept is individuated by the whole framework. Bite the bullet 
and admit that no two scientists ever have the same concept, but argue that 
communication can still take place.  
2) Share part of the framework: Some particular part of the framework, or a 
sufficient amount of it, must be shared in order to say that two scientists have 
the same concept.  
3) There is no single answer as to how concepts are individuated or what it 
means to share a concept; it depends on the level of analysis.  
 
Solution 1 is strictly speaking not a solution, but a denial that the problem is a 
problem at all. It does raise the important issue that there is always something partial 
about communication – some level of grain at which important aspects of the 
framework are not shared – so there is always room for miscommunication. 
However, the purpose of concept individuation conditions is to allow us to say that 
two scientists debating the nature of some phenomenon such as memory are actually 
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having a debate and not talking past one another. Solution 1 does not help us to do 
that. If it is not sharing concepts that allows communication, what is it?  
 
Solution 2 is the solution taken by some proponents of Inferentialism. A certain sub-
set of the inferences are taken to be the meaning-constitutive ones – the ones that 
must be shared in order to say that the concept is shared. In the literature, it is widely 
agreed that this could work if there was an analytic-synthetic distinction; the 
meaning-constitutive inferences would be the analytic ones. However, it is also 
widely agreed that Quine (1976) has shown that there is no such distinction (Fodor 
and Lepore, 2007).  
 
In the absence of an analytic-synthetic distinction, Brandom says that concepts don’t 
need to be completely shared; similarity of inferences involved for each concept user 
is enough (Brandom, 2007: 665–666). This seems to be on the right track, and is 
applicable to my account. In order to share a concept, scientists’ frameworks must be 
similar enough. But by itself this is not very illuminating; we have just replaced one 
vague notion with another. 
 
In particular, the notion of similarity must be cashed out in a non-circular way. The 
problem is deciding which part of the framework, or how much of it, must be shared. 
We cannot just say that for two people to share the concept DOG, they must share the 
dog-inferences, or the theories or aspects of the framework relating to dogs, because 
we cannot define these independently of the concept. We also cannot say that what 
must be shared is the particular parts or the amount of the framework that needs to be 
shared to allow successful communication, because successful communication is 
what we are trying to explain. 
 
Solution 3 is my favoured solution, but it is not immediately obvious that it is a 
solution, so I will spend the rest of this section unpacking it. I will begin by 
considering Brigandt’s answer to the holism problem, which is also a variety of 
solution 3. My solution can be seen as an improved version of his work, and one 
which better fits my purposes in this thesis. My improvement on Brigandt’s 
approach will make use of Khalidi’s solution to the concept individuation problem 




Brigandt posits two levels of content for concepts. At the individual level, he 
embraces holism, but at the level of communities, he says that similarity of concepts 
is sufficient to say that concepts are shared. The major advantage of this strategy is 
that differing concepts at the individual level allow us to account for differing 
behaviours between individual scientists, whereas sharing at the level of 
communities allows us to account for communication between them.
30
 Whether we 
focus on the level of the individual or the community depends on whether we want 
to explain differing behaviours or successful communication. 
 
On the individual level, Brigandt says: ‘If two scientists have a different conception 
of genes and thus on my account associate a different meaning with the term “gene”, 
then due to their different conceptions they may make different theoretical claims 
and conduct different experiments.’ (Brigandt, 2004a: 4). In a sense, this is accepting 
a role for radical holism (solution 1 from my list). 
 
Despite embracing holism at this level, some aspects of conceptual role will be 
shared between two individuals, so similarities in behaviour can be explained as well 
as differences:  
 
[O]nly a certain part of the total conceptual role is important for a particular situation. A 
layman and a Drosophila geneticist have very different conceptions or ‘concepts’ of a fly. 
But when we explain how they succeed in catching a fly, we just need to make recourse to a 
few shared beliefs about flies that are sufficient to explain their behavior, such as the 
assumption that flies can fly. So holism and variation between the content of individuals 
does not prevent us from giving intentional explanations. The total conceptual role is an 
important resource for a whole range of different explanations. Any difference in individual 
content may feed into some explanation (Brigandt, 2004a: 4). 
 
Although the entire conceptual role individuates the concept so that no two 
individuals have the same concept, we can appeal to partial sharing for certain 
explanatory purposes. What must be shared is different depending on what those 
explanatory purposes are, so there is variation in what it is important to share. 
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 Brigandt’s is not the only theory positing two levels like this. Galison, in his work on pidgin 
languages in science, talks about ‘representing meaning as locally convergent and globally divergent’ 




At the level of the community, Brigandt says:  
 
I view a concept as a cluster of similar individual meanings or conceptual roles. Taking a 
concept as a group-level entity abstracts from the inter-personal variation and focuses on the 
more substantial difference between different concepts. Thus I follow Harman (1973), Block 
(1986), and Jackman (1999) in assuming that merely similarity, not necessarily identity in 
conceptual role is sufficient to share the same concept. (Brigandt, 2004a: 4). 
 
This does not seem too dissimilar to the picture at the individual level in that we can 
choose to focus on certain similarities in conceptual role for certain explanatory 
purposes. However, at the community level, this difference in explanatory purposes 
corresponds to a difference in conditions for concept individuation: 
 
[F]or the study of conceptual change in science pragmatic and case by case criteria for the 
individuation of concepts can be used. I assume that two terms can be viewed as 
corresponding to two distinct concepts in case they make inferences or explanations possible 
that are relevantly dissimilar. What counts as relevant is dependent on the scientific 
standards of the given situation… The point of my approach is that while I stress that the 
variation of individual mental representations is real, the existence of clusters is real as well. 
And we can pragmatically pick out some clusters for a certain philosophical purpose, and 
compare these concepts and explain and assess the origin of these conceptual differences 
(Brigandt, 2004a: 5–6). 
 
It is not clear why similarities should constitute concept individuation conditions at 
the community level, but not at the individual level. I will aim to give a more unified 
account in this respect. 
 
Brigandt is also a little unclear in the above quotation as to whose interests the 
individuation conditions are dependent on. He says that ‘[w]hat counts as relevant is 
dependent on the scientific standards of the given situation’, but also that ‘we can 
pragmatically pick out some clusters for a certain philosophical purpose’ (my 
emphases). Is it our purposes as analysts that is important, or the scientists’ purposes 





I also need to show that the changes I have made to Brigandt’s account in the first 
section of this chapter – broadening conceptual role to include the whole framework, 
going beyond just public language to include practice, and including both goals and 
criteria and a link to the world as parts of the conceptual role, rather than having 
reference and epistemic goal as separate components of meaning – do not prevent 
me from using the main insight of Brigandt’s approach. We now have several 
desiderata for the solution to the concept individuation problem. The solution will 
involve referring back to my notion of levels of grain, and discussing Khalidi’s 
approach to the individuation problem. 
 
According to my account, a relatively coarse-grained framework needs to be shared 
between two scientists in different disciplines for them to count as sharing concepts. 
Two scientists in the same discipline need to share a finer-grained framework, and 
two in the same research team need to share a finer-grained framework still. Rather 
than just having two levels – individual and community – we have a continuum of 
progressively finer-grained sharing. 
 
Recall the example from chapter two of a psychologist who says “we have 
discovered that a rat’s memory for a maze is better after consuming caffeine” to both 
a colleague in her research team, and to a physicist friend. I said that the two 
psychologists share a framework at quite a fine-grained level. Working in the same 
research group, they have shared goals, knowledge of methods and practices, etc. 
The psychologist and the physicist however share a much coarser-grained 
framework. I said that my interest is at the level of subdisciplines, and at this level 
communication has succeeded in the first case because the framework is shared, but 
not in the second case. The psychologists can be said to have the same concept of 
memory, while the psychologist and physicist do not. However, working at a more 
coarse-grained level of analysis (for example science as a whole), the psychologist 
and physicist could be said to share a concept. Concept individuation conditions 
therefore vary with level of grain, and the relevant level is set by our aims as 
analysts. I want to find out about variation between subdisciplines in the sciences of 




It may look like this response hasn’t advanced things very much. There is no level at 
which an entire framework is shared. The interconnectedness of the nodes in the 
framework still seems to push us towards radical holism. However, this objection 
misunderstands my solution. 
 
Recall that a framework contains aims and goals for the science, (construed at the 
appropriate level of grain). What it is to share a framework at the relevant level of 
grain is to be able to employ the concepts, theories, methods etc. at that level to meet 
the goals specified at that level. There is no need to agree on all commitments 
construed at that level. Whether communication succeeds is therefore taken on the 
terms of the scientists communicating, but without allowing that anything goes. This 
completes the clarification of whose aims are relevant for concept individuation; it is 
the analyst’s aims that set the level of grain, but within that, it is the scientists’ own 
goals as actors according to which their concepts should be judged. This fits well 
with Shapere’s insight that we should not impose a metascientific standard on 
science. 
 
There is still a practical problem for the philosopher: How do we go about carrying 
out this judging, when we stand outside the framework? And how can we break out 
of the circularity using scientists’ goals, given that these are composed of concepts, 
are theory-laden, etc.? This is where Khalidi’s work comes in. 
 
As I said above, Khalidi suggests that the Prototype Theory involves viewing the 
human cognizer from the design stance, while the Theory Theory involves taking the 
intentional stance and treating the human cognizer as an agent with rational beliefs. 
When it comes to the Theory Theory’s problem with individuating concepts in a 
non-circular way, Khalidi makes use of this idea that we are treating the subject as a 
rational agent. Inspired by Quine and Davidson, Khalidi ‘locates the notions of 
meaning and belief in the process of translation or interpretation’ (Khalidi, 1995: 
411).
31
 He draws on the Quinean and Davidsonian idea of radical interpretation, 
                                                          
31
 Brandom also makes an appeal to Davidsonian interpretation (Brandom, 1994). Fodor and Lepore, 
in their review of Brandom, say that ‘[t]here is…considerable irony in the spectacle of Brandom, the 
arch-inferentialist, appealing to Davidson, the arch-Tarskian, in hopes of saving his bacon. Brandom’s 
appeal to Davidson here sounds to us a lot like panic.’ (Fodor and Lepore, 2007: 192, footnote 13). 
There is something importantly different about inferentialist versus Tarskian semantics, but I see no 
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according to which translation between two frameworks can come about by adopting 
a principle of charity or similar (see Khalidi, 1995: 411, footnote 7) and assuming 
that your informant is at least minimally rational. This involves assuming a certain 
fit between the informant’s meanings and beliefs into a coherent whole. Then, as 
Khalidi says: 
 
We aim at constructing a mapping between our respective vocabularies that exhibits a certain 
overall fit. This overall fit concerns a term’s position in the linguistic practice of the agent 
being interpreted, in short, its place in that person’s entire corpus of beliefs and intentional 
actions (Khalidi, 1995: 412). 
 
This approach provides a way of interpreting a scientific framework from the 
outside, even if only by finding our way inside. By taking the intentional stance to 
scientists (as, if Khalidi is right, we do when adopting the Theory Theory of their 
concepts), we try to make sense of them as rational agents, and can therefore find a 
way in to understanding their goals, concepts, theories etc. despite holism. In 
Khalidi’s words: 
 
The interpretation is not being driven by the presence of a requisite set of beliefs or features 
but by the need to make overall sense of the informant in an intentionalistic idiom. In other 
words, the ascription of concepts is subordinated to the need to make sense of the rational 
agent; the agent is not viewed merely as a complex feature detector, as on the design stance 
(Khalidi, 1995: 413). 
 
We must become acquainted with many aspects of the framework and begin to see 




In fact, our job is considerably easier than that of the radical interpreter. There will 
be a (relatively coarse-grained) level on which we share a framework with the 
                                                                                                                                             
reason why this should stop an inferentialist making use of the idea of interpretation. Doing so need 
not import any other commitments of Davidson’s. 
32
 This interpretive solution is not dissimilar to Galison’s notion of a “Trading Zone” (Galison, 1997), 
and in fact Khalidi uses the analogy of an economy, where interpretation is compared to working out 
both the exchange rate and the value of particular goods, with nothing to go on other than an 
assumption that there is a coherent economic system at work (Khalidi, 1995: 415–416). A key 
difference is that, in a Trading Zone, two groups of scientists are interpreting each other in order to 
work together, whereas in mine and Khalidi’s version, we are interpreting the community (in my case 
the scientists) from the outside as analysts. 
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scientists we are interpreting, and we can make that sharing somewhat finer-grained 
by further study. It is appeal to this coarser-grained sharing that gets a principle of 
charity off the ground for us. The reason we can treat scientists as minimally rational 
is that we share some idea of what it is to be rational. We thus already share enough 
to quite adeptly take the intentional stance to scientists and come to understand their 
frameworks well enough for our purposes. 
 
There are several advantages to the interpretationist way of thinking. One is that we 
have no need to share Brigandt’s assumption that we are dealing purely with public 
language. Practices are as much open to interpretation as concepts and theories. The 
advantages of expanding the conceptual role beyond just inference and explanation 
can therefore be had without the cost of exacerbating the holism problem, as I 
suggested in the first section of this chapter. 
 
Another advantage is that the interpretationist strategy makes sense of how goals, 
criteria and fit with the world can also be brought in as part of the conceptual role, 
rather than being added as extra components (Brigandt’s epistemic goal and 
reference). Consider for example Quine’s radical interpretee pointing at a rabbit. 
While what he is pointing at is radically underdetermined, the coherence of the 
overall picture that emerges on further interactions with the interpretee must fit with 
the world. To put it simply, the pointing brings the world into the picture. Other 
things than pointing, such as apparatus and experiment, can perform the same 




A major objection to this way of thinking might be that it assumes what philosophers 
of science are often trying to assess, namely the rationality of the scientists under 
study. If this is right, it would make the method inapplicable for my project (and 
many others). 
 
                                                          
33
 Some empirical work (Goldstone and Rogosky, 2002) suggests that translation between two 
conceptual systems can be achieved based only on within-system relations, not extrinsic information 
about the world. However, this work also found that translation is much easier when both intrinsic, 
within-system information and extrinsic information are used. Brigandt cites this work in a footnote, 
saying it shows ‘the fact that basing concepts on similarities of syntactic entities is possible’ 
(Brigandt, 2004a: 5, footnote 8). It may also offer support to the interpretationist strategy. Much more 
would need to be done in order to cite this as evidence, but it is interesting and suggestive. 
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I do not think this is an insurmountable problem. What we assume is a fairly 
minimal kind of rationality; just enough to allow us to make sense of the subject 
from the intentional stance. This does not mean that every individual decision or 
research direction taken must be the most rational it could be, and therefore immune 
to criticism. 
 
In fact, there is an important sense in which we must assume scientists have some 
level of rationality at the outset. Shapere points out that terms such as “rational” (and 
“knowledge”) have a use. A major part of that use is in describing science. Shapere 
offers this point as part of a general criticism of relativism. He says: 
 
Those relativistic views [held by the critics of logical empiricism] have, I believe, been 
effectively criticized; and, standing above all the criticisms, is the point that science is, after 
all, a paradigm case of the knowledge-acquiring process. To deny that science and its 
development can be rational – a denial that seems to be the conclusion of the relativist 
position – fails to recognize that the terms “rational” and “knowledge” have a use. It is a 
condition of the adequacy of any philosophy of science that it show how rational change in 
science is possible, and a philosophy of science which, after asking whether scientific change 
can be rational, denies that it can be, must be rejected (Shapere, 1977b: 200). 
 
For Shapere, what we mean by “rational” is something that has grown out of 
scientific development (one of our paradigmatic rational processes) and has changed 
over time as science has changed.  
 
In my framework language, there is a standard for rationality which has emerged 
from the coarse-grained framework of epistemic enquiry that we all share (and of 
which science is a major part). The world and our means of epistemic engagement 
with it have allowed a conceptual role for rationality, and therefore a concept of 
rationality, to emerge. In a sense, this is the most fundamental step in Shapere’s 
learning how to learn (see chapter 3). It may be that the concept of rationality could 
have been otherwise, it may not be completely precise,  and it may change, but given 
the position we are in, it is available for us to appeal to, and so we can get a principle 
of charity off the ground. In practice, in most (perhaps all) cases, much more will be 
available to us than this, because we will share a more fine-grained framework with 
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those we are trying to interpret than that found at the level of epistemic enquiry in 
general. 
 
We cannot lay down a standard of rationality from a metascientific perspective, and 
then check science against that. However we can make use of the standard that has 
emerged out of science itself, along with any more fine-grained aspects of the 
framework that we share, to examine on their own terms the factors shaping a 
particular concept. It is the examination of these factors according to the scientists’ 
own terms that I intend to carry out in this thesis, but with the focus of the analysis 




I have presented a version of conceptual role semantics in keeping with the view of 
science laid out in chapter 2. According to my view, a concept is defined by its place 
in the dynamic framework, or its role within that framework, at the relevant level of 
grain. 
 
I have compared this account to Ingo Brigandt’s version of conceptual role semantics 
in philosophy of science, arguing that my account is better because it allows all of 
the important aspects of the scientific enterprise to shape the concept (to be part of 
its epistemic niche in my terms), rather than being limited to inferential and 
explanatory role. This means we have no need to separate reference and epistemic 
goal as additional components of conceptual content as Brigandt does. 
 
The middle section of this chapter briefly introduced the psychology of concepts, in 
particular the Theory Theory, and its similarity to conceptual role semantics. The 
importance of the Theory Theory for my purposes is that it seems to suffer from the 
same problem of radical holism and impossible communication as conceptual role 
semantics. This problem is the major challenge facing accounts such as mine. 
 
I have argued that there is no single solution to the problem, but that how concepts 
are individuated depends on the level of analysis. In particular, the level of grain at 
which the framework is viewed depends on the analyst’s aims, but whether 
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communication at that level succeeds depends on the scientists’ aims. Concept 
application in science is therefore to be judged on the scientists’ own terms, in line 
with Shapere’s rejection of imposing metascientific standards. 
 
Khalidi’s interpretationist strategy to the concept individuation problem for the 
Theory Theory explains how we can analyse concepts despite standing outside the 
framework. This strategy involves treating the concept users as intentional agents, 
and assuming they have a minimal level of rationality. I have argued that the concept 
of rationality involved in doing this has arisen from epistemic enquiry, particularly 
scientific enquiry, and is therefore a concept we share with scientists at this coarse 
level of grain. 
 
Now that I have given a way of talking about science (the dynamic framework 
account) and the place of concepts within that account (my version of conceptual 
role semantics), I have the vocabulary and background needed to explain my 
intended methods in detail, and this will be the job of the next chapter. This will 
explain how, given the tools I now have, I can assess case studies to see whether any 
of them are employing a situated cognition concept of memory, and if so, whether it 
is functioning as an investigative kind (and is therefore a legitimate concept). My 
methods for identifying such legitimate concepts will refer back to this chapter, 
making use of the interpretationist strategy, and fulfilling the task I deferred above of 
accounting for conceptual change as rational. This will allow me to make normative 







I said in chapter 1 that I would be using a historically situated case-study-based 
conceptual ecology to analyse the concept(s) of memory that scientists employ in 
their research. I set out my intention to look for situated cognition concepts of 
memory that are in use in current practice, and assess the extent to which they are 
legitimate, i.e. whether they are functioning as investigative kinds (an 
epistemological question about how the concepts function in scientific theory and 
practice). In this chapter, I will describe my methods for doing this in detail, before 
going on to apply those methods in the next three chapters. 
 
I will be making use of the dynamic framework account introduced in chapter 2, but 
introducing a way of making normative assessments of frameworks. Recall that the 
framework is a network of theories and practices (e.g. goals, methods, concepts, 
criteria for what counts as an observation, criteria for what counts as a good 
explanation, etc.) that mutually influence and constrain one another. Scientists can be 
grouped at different levels, sharing frameworks at different levels of grain. I will 
predominantly be interested in the level of the subdiscipline. 
 
Frameworks change over time. I am particularly interested in the change in MEMORY 
(its conceptual development) but this is constrained by surrounding aspects of the 
framework, so cannot be looked at in isolation. I am calling those aspects of the 
framework that constrain or apply pressure to a particular concept the epistemic 
niche of that concept. These aspects of the framework define the concept according 
to a variety of conceptual role semantics (see chapter 4). 
 
As I said in chapter 2, different subdisciplines studying memory have different but 
overlapping frameworks, which may well result in different concepts of memory. 
More than one of these concepts may function equally well as investigative kinds, so 
my methods must be open to the possibility of finding this. In chapter 3, I offered 
some support for the likelihood of this pluralist outcome, arguing that the sciences of 





This was part of a more general discussion in chapter 3, concerning the fact that 
many of the sciences of memory are immature. I will be returning in this chapter to 
the picture of immaturity I outlined there, according to which an immature science is 
one which does not yet have a clearly delineated internal/external distinction, in 
Dudley Shapere’s sense of that distinction. The concepts of memory in many of 
these sciences are weakly constrained by internal factors. In other words, they are at 
an early stage in the process of conceptual development, so the epistemic niches for 
MEMORY found in the various subdisciplines can be expected to contain few internal 
considerations and many untried hypotheses. Despite this, I said that it is important 
to try to begin to answer the situated cognition question because of the importance of 
memory research, and that doing this must involve looking at the criteria that have 
been internalised, and whether they constrain MEMORY sufficiently to determine 
whether it should be a situated cognition concept, and if so, of which type. I will 
flesh out that idea further here. 
 
My methods for identifying legitimate concepts will also refer back to chapter 4, 
making use of the interpretationist strategy it introduced, and fulfilling the task I 
deferred there of showing how we can account for conceptual change as rational. In 
particular I will be interested in any situated cognition concepts I find, and whether 
the conceptual change involved in adopting them was rational. This will link the 
interpretationist strategy to Shapere’s work on rationality and the internal/external 
distinction, leading me to advocate using historical analysis of the epistemic niches 
for MEMORY in particular subdisciplines. 
 
Investigating the sciences of memory: Descriptive and normative projects 
My project can be divided into a descriptive project and a normative one, where the 
descriptive project is to find out what concepts are in use in particular pieces of 
research in the sciences of memory, and the normative project is to find out whether 
these concepts are legitimate, and make recommendations for scientific practice 
accordingly. The descriptive project is therefore the search for situated cognition 
concepts of memory, and the normative project is to assess whether any such 
concepts I find are functioning as investigative kinds. 
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Recall that the question of whether a concept is functioning as an investigative kind 
is the question of whether it can support fruitful science, a question about how the 
concept functions in scientific theory and practice (e.g. in giving explanations). As 
we have seen, the criteria for what counts as fruitful theory and practice (e.g. criteria 
for what counts as a good explanation) are also part of the framework, and emerge 
from the scientific research as the framework changes over time. Answering both the 
descriptive and normative questions will therefore involve some consideration of the 
framework more broadly. 
 
In the next section, I will discuss two possible ways of tackling the descriptive 
question: experimental philosophy, and a case study approach. I will advocate the 
second of these. In the following section, I will introduce the normative question in 
more detail, and propose an historical approach to answering it. This will involve 
looking at how the framework (in particular the parts of it forming the epistemic 
niche of MEMORY) has developed over time. In my ways of tackling both the 
descriptive and normative questions, I will be treating the scientists as rational 
intentional agents, and trying to understand the frameworks on their own terms, in 
the manner of the intepretationist strategy introduced in chapter 4. 
 
The descriptive project 
Experimental philosophy 
Experimental philosophy is a burgeoning field which now encompasses a variety of 
techniques including citation analysis of papers, observation of participants’ 
behaviour in a laboratory, and analysis of questionnaires. It is this last method I will 
focus on here because it has been used already by Stotz, Griffiths and Knight 
(hereafter SGK) (2004) to study the variation in GENE, a similar problem to our issue 
with MEMORY. They refer to their method as a variety of “conceptual ecology”. 
 
The essence of this method is testing participants’ responses to vignettes designed to 
probe a particular concept, and comparing those responses to various demographic 
data about the participants. Correlations can then be sought to see whether, for 
example, there are typically differences in concepts possessed by people of different 




This kind of experimental philosophy can be used to survey a range of subjects to 
find out whether there are significant disagreements between their concepts, so it 
seems to be ideal for the kind of variation found in the cases of GENE and MEMORY. 
For the version of this approach practiced by SGK, scientists from a range of 
backgrounds were presented with a range of examples in a questionnaire, and had to 
decide which of them conformed to their concept of gene and which did not, or 
which of several examples best conformed. A large number of scientists’ concepts 
were probed and correlated with data about the subdisciplines in which they were 
trained and in which they worked. Other information such as age and gender were 
also collected to build up a full picture of the variation. 
 
Importantly, SGK say that a scientist’s implicit concept (the concept he actually 
uses) may be different from his explicit one (the concept he thinks he uses). Their 
questionnaire is very carefully designed to account for this. As well as “direct” 
questions about the definition and function of the gene and the methodological value 
of the concept, the survey contains “indirect” questions. Here, the scientists are 
required to actually apply their concept of the gene, rather than just answer questions 
about it. 
 
As well as describing the variation in the concept, SGK’s work explains this 
variation in terms of the epistemic niche inhabited by the concept. It is from this 
paper and other work by Griffiths and Stotz that I took the term “epistemic niche”; 
for them the epistemic niche is the needs the group of scientists have in their 
investigation (Griffiths and Stotz, 2008: 508), although they do not share my 
framework account of how to cash out what the concept is needed to do. 
 
Here, I will argue that there are some problems with the experimental method, the 
biggest of which being the risk of artefacts of the method contaminating the results. 
The problem, in short, is that scientists answering questionnaires know that they are 
being tested.
34
 The situation of answering a questionnaire is very different from the 
situation of designing and carrying out an experiment. In fact the situations are 
different enough to constitute partially different epistemic niches; we should 
                                                          
34
 This is a general problem for questionnaire-based experimental philosophy. I do not think it is a 
fatal one, but something that should always be borne in mind in this kind of work. 
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therefore suspect that different concepts may be most appropriate in each case. This 
is the very phenomenon we set out to investigate in the first place. 
 
Using the language of frameworks, we can expect fine-grained variation in the 
framework when context changes. Although the coarse-grained framework remains 
the same, there will be fine-grained differences in the epistemic niche between the 
case where the scientist confronts a vignette in the questionnaire, and a case where 
she encounters exactly the same situation in real life.
35
 These differences will 
prevent us from clearly seeing the differences between concepts for members of 
different subdisciplines (or genders, or ages, etc.) Therefore another way of putting 
the problem with the experimental method is that it does not allow us to isolate 
variations at a particular level of grain. 
 
This objection, and the idea of levels of grain that it draws on, take the notion of the 
epistemic niche beyond that discussed by SGK. In their work, conceptual variation is 
based on an evolutionary model of divergence over time from a common conceptual 
ancestor. On the view I am advocating here, concepts may also vary with their 
context of application, and we can see why when we look at the epistemic niches for 
those concepts at a fine enough level of grain. 
 
If this is right, then it is a serious concern that the questionnaire context is not the 
same as the normal context of research. The epistemic niche may be different in two 
ways. For one thing, all the factors that are part of the niche in scientific research 
will not be fully replicated in the questionnaire context. The needs of scientists 
employing the concept (the niche) are partly constituted by a wider research context, 
not just the narrow issue at hand on an occasion of concept application. A question in 
a questionnaire cannot entirely replicate this because it is not part of a wider research 
project. Secondly, there may be extra factors in the niche in the questionnaire 
context, such as giving a particular impression to the experimenter assessing the 
answers. Those who chose to fill in the questionnaire must have had some 
motivation for doing so, and this may well have been a factor in shaping how they 
                                                          
35
 In fact, the epistemic niche will also vary in different real-life cases where the scientist confronts 
the case from the perspective of involvement in different research projects. See the case discussed in 
chapter 2 for the kinds of factors that might vary from one research project to another. 
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answered; on this occasion they needed the concept to help them communicate a 
certain idea about their field of research. 
 
I am arguing that we shouldn’t necessarily expect a single scientist’s concept to be 
stable across different contexts. Others do raise worries about ecological validity 
with respect to experimental philosophy (e.g. Knobe and Samuels, 2013: 84). 
However, it is not clear whether they have in mind something like this contextual 
variation resulting in multiple concepts, or a somewhat different worry that the 
experimental setting does not allow us to adequately capture a single concept. 
 
SGK’s acknowledgement that a scientist’s implicit concept may be different from his 
explicit one seems to show that they accept that when a scientist is asked a direct 
question, he may at least apply his concept differently from when he is applying the 
concept in his work. I am arguing that he may in fact be applying a different concept 
when the individuation conditions are considered at a fine enough level of grain 
(compare chapter 4 on the topic of concept individuation). In other words, the very 
fact of answering a questionnaire may be enough to cause the concept to vary from 
that usually applied in scientific work.  
 
It is taking seriously the experimental philosophers’ own idea of the epistemic niche 
that brings this issue into focus. In particular, it is considering what this niche is 
made up of. I have argued that it is composed of aspects of the framework. These 
vary with context, so the pressures that the scientists’ concepts respond to will also 
vary. 
 
There is another disadvantage of experimental philosophy that affects its application 
to my project specifically, namely that it does not allow one to do the detailed 
historical work that I will advocate. I will argue later in this chapter that such work is 
necessary for the normative project. 
 
All this is not to say that the experimental approach is useless. One important thing 
to come out of SGK’s work is the distinction between implicit and explicit concepts. 
It is true that a scientist’s concept need not be what he thinks it is, and in the case 
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study method I advocate in the next section, I will discuss how to get at the implicit 
concepts. 
 
Experimental conceptual ecology provides results that are very suggestive of the 
extent of conceptual variation and the factors that cause it. It has been very valuable 
work in the case of GENE, where such variation needed to be demonstrated. 
However, for MEMORY, it is widely known and hard to deny that there is such 
variation. What we want is a more detailed analysis of that variation, and there are 
reasons to think that the results of the experimental approach may not be an accurate 
reflection of the variation in actual scientific practice at the finer level of grain 
required for this. The case study method aims to get around this problem. 
 
Case studies 
In this section, I will discuss a case study approach that allows us to look at current 
concepts in use in science. In the next section I will recommend improving upon it 
by taking an historical approach, which will allow me to carry out the normative 
project. 
 
The case study method involves looking closely at particular pieces of current or 
recent research. One way to do this is by interdisciplinary collaboration with 
scientists; another is by detailed study of published papers. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration between philosophers and cognitive scientists is beginning to be 
carried out in the study of memory, so this is perhaps an appropriate method here 
(see Sutton 2004, 2007; Craver, 2002; Barnier and Sutton, 2008). But for 
collaborative work, in order to understand and analyse concept use, the philosopher 
needs to become proficient in the vocabulary and practices of the sciences in 
question. In Harry Collins’ terms, she needs to develop contributory expertise in the 
science (Collins and Evans, 2002). 
 
The high level of expertise required of the philosopher is a huge challenge when 
studying MEMORY because of the sheer diversity of disciplines. The question at issue 
is best addressed by comparing and contrasting a variety of subdisciplines in search 
of situated cognition concepts. The philosopher would therefore need a high level of 
expertise in a range of contrasting sciences. She would need to be fluent at shifting 
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between the languages and concept use in different subdisciplines in order to 
understand the similarities and differences between them. This is a very tall order 
although, if there are any individuals with such expertise, this kind of active 
interdisciplinary collaboration is a very good way to find out what concepts different 
groups of scientists are using. The research being done in such an interdisciplinary 
vein is promising, suggesting such expertise is possible through collaboration, 
although probably no single individual could develop enough expertise in all of the 
sciences of memory to carry out a full survey. 
 
Here I will be taking the second option of looking closely at published papers. While 
this still requires a good understanding of the work being studied, it does not require 
the same level of expertise because there is no need for the philosopher to actively 
participate in the research. The reduced need for depth of understanding allows for 
more breadth of understanding which is an advantage given that the nature of the 
project means getting familiar with various different research frameworks. 
 
Case study work can be done within the broader methodology of conceptual ecology, 
and SGK do mention the possibility of carrying out conceptual ecology by looking at 
published work from different scientific fields (SGK, 2004: 648). The emphasis on 
the epistemic niche can be retained, giving us a way to talk about the reasons for 
scientists having the concepts that they do. This is the approach I advocate because it 
retains the advantages of the experimental work discussed in the previous section 
(the idea of the epistemic niche, and separating implicit and explicit concepts), while 
improving on it in an important respect, namely that it studies the use of concepts in 
the normal course of scientific practice rather than in a questionnaire setting. It 
studies scientists “in the wild” to borrow Edwin Hutchins (1995) phrase. This means 
that the concepts identified are closer to those actually used by scientists. The 
epistemic niche is the one we intend to study, not one constructed by philosophers. 
 
The distinction between implicit and explicit concepts drawn by the experimentalists 
works slightly differently for the case study method. The distinction is between any 
explicit definitions of a term given in a paper in a case study (the explicit concept), 
and how the concept is being employed in the rest of the research of which the 
written paper is a part (the implicit concept). It is primarily implicit concepts I will 
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be interested in drawing out for my project, since situated cognition perspectives are 
rarely explicitly adopted. Getting at these implicit concepts using the case study 
method involves careful reading to identify the role the concept plays in the theory 
and practice underlying the research being described. The implicit concept may be 
revealed in any experiments or apparatus chosen, or the background theories 
invoked, as well as specific uses of the concept in the paper itself. The paper is 
therefore functioning as an integral part of the scientific research – it is not simply a 
factual record of research produced after the actual work is done – but also as a 
source of clues to other parts of the research, including those that may not be 
explicitly documented. 
 
There are some apparent downsides of the case-study method. Three of these are 
mentioned by Machery and Cohen (2012), and I will discuss ways to alleviate these 
problems here. While the case study method is not perfect, I argue that it is not as 
bad as critiques from experimentalists make out. 
 
The first problem is that the sample size is much smaller for a case study approach 
than for an experimental method and ‘[a]s a result, this method is not optimally 
tailored to examine whether different subgroups… endorse different norms, 
methods, or assumptions.’ (Machery and Cohen, 2012: 186). 
 
This is not a particular problem for my project because my question is just whether 
there are any instances of situated cognition concepts, and then whether those 
instances are legitimate. Just one instance would answer my question of whether 
there are any, so a sample of statistically significant size is not required. 
 
In addition, the historical approach I advocate in the next section involves looking at 
how the framework in use in a particular research project evolved from prior 
research, particularly focussing on the subdiscipline level of grain. I will therefore be 
looking at a wide range of research over time, often looking at how a subdiscipline 
arose and developed. There is still something to be said from this work about 
differences between the subgroups considered, even without surveying a wide range 




The second problem identified by Machery and Cohen is that ‘it might also be 
problematic to extrapolate from these few alleged paradigmatic articles to a whole 
field since the research commonly done in a scientific field can substantially differ 
from the research done in the articles singled out by philosophers’ (Machery and 
Cohen, 2012: 186). Machery and Cohen are quite right that we should avoid 
extrapolating to a whole field of research; however, more local results can still have 
value, even if we cannot generalise them with much certainty beyond the case 
studies we are looking at. Again, this is not a criticism that particularly affects the 
kind of project I am engaged in. If one did want to find out more about whole fields 
and the variation between them, this is a good place for experimental and case study 
methods to work together. The experimental approach can uncover the possible 
extent of variation and suggest what kind of case studies might be appropriate, and 
the case study approach can give detailed and in-depth analysis of contrasting 
concepts in play.  
 
The third problem mentioned by Machery and Cohen is that philosophers tend to 
focus on paradigmatic articles and books that defined the relevant field, so more 
recent changes in the field can be ignored (Machery and Cohen, 2012: 186). This is 
an excellent point about philosophers in general, but again, for my project, any 
instance of a situated cognition concept would be relevant, paradigmatic or not. Even 
for other projects than mine, once we are aware of this problem, we can relatively 
easily avoid it by selecting a broad range of case studies, both in terms of their age, 
and how central they are to the field. For MEMORY, the problem of focussing on 
paradigmatic articles is not too severe in any case given that there is no paradigm as 
such – that is part of the reason why the conceptual diversity is so great. 
 
The case study method is therefore a better approach than its critics suggest, in 
particular for a project such as mine that does not require statistically significant 
sample sizes. In some cases, it can fruitfully be used alongside an experimental 
approach. However, for my project specifically, the experimental approach is 
problematic, and the case study method avoids these problems, while retaining the 





To close this section, I will give some brief guidance on how to choose case studies 
for research on MEMORY. Because I am looking for situated cognition concepts, I 
want to select cases where it seems prima facie most plausible that such concepts 
would be found. Because I am interested in variation between subdisciplines, my 
case studies will focus on debates over memory, where it seems that contrasting 
concepts may be being employed on different sides of the debate. Each case study 
will feature two contrasting subdisciplines or groups of subdisciplines. I will 
introduce the specific cases I have chosen in a short section at the end of this chapter. 
 
The case studies should be analysed carefully to determine the type of concept of 
memory in play in each case. These concepts should then be looked at alongside the 
epistemic niche in which the researchers were employing the concept in each case. 
This will involve looking at the wider dynamic framework in which the concept is 
embedded. In this way, we will be able to get some idea of how the niche applies 
pressure to scientists’ concepts, or in other words why the scientists have the 
concepts that they do. 
 
The normative project 
It may appear that conceptual ecology is a purely descriptive tool, but this is not the 
case; there is also a normative dimension. I will be advocating a second and broader 
kind of normative work, but first it is worth looking at that already inherent in the 
conceptual ecologists’ work. What they have to say on this topic refers explicitly to 
the experimental approach, but applies to conceptual ecology generally, i.e. to both 
the experimental and case study methods. 
 
Normative force on a concept is provided by the surrounding framework of theories 
and practices – the concept should be the best tool for the job it does. There is 
conceptual change and diversification over time as the role the concept is needed to 
play (the epistemic niche) changes. The concept should change in response to this 
pressure, but it may not do so. This leaves room for the conceptual ecologist to 
recommend a way of improving the fit between concept and niche. 
 
As Griffiths and Stotz say ‘[experimental conceptual ecology] allows philosophers to 
embrace and study conceptual diversity, and hence to gain new insights into the 
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process of science... It can provide insights for normative work in philosophy of 
science – scientists may be using conceptual tools that are not well suited to the job 
in hand.’ (Griffiths and Stotz, 2008: 518, emphasis in original). In his review of 
Beurton et al.’s (2000) book The Concept of the Gene in Development and 
Evolution: Historical and Epistemological Perspectives, Griffiths argues that his 
approach ‘…can suggest better ways to conceptualize the subject matter and even 
diagnose a persistent conceptual problem in a scientific tradition…’ because 





Conceptual ecology would allow us to analyse the extent of the variation in 
MEMORY and to explain it by using the notion of the epistemic niche, and I have 
argued that the case study approach is the best way of doing this. It could also 
suggest improvements to the concept or resolve confusions by analysing fit between 
concept and niche. However, I think there is still room for improvement on this 
method. This introduces the need for the broader kind of normative work I 
mentioned above. 
 
While the method I have discussed so far allows us to analyse fit with the epistemic 
niche, it says nothing about whether the niche is appropriate in the first place. It may 
be that a concept is perfectly adapted to its epistemic niche, but the factors 
constituting the niche are not those that would produce the best science. Arguably 
Lysenkoist science furnishes us with an example of this. The name refers to the work 
of Trofim Lysenko, a Soviet biologist and agronomist whose work is widely decried 
as pseudoscience, but which was endorsed by the Stalinist regime for political 
purposes. At one stage, Lysenko’s theories were the only theories allowed to be 
taught. 
 
The epistemic niche for a particular concept used in Lysenko’s work (for example 
INHERITANCE) includes factors such as supporting the political regime, and 
suppressing alternative work. The concept may be perfectly adapted to this niche (let 
us say so for the sake of argument) but we still want to say that something has gone 
                                                          
36
 This is a discussion of what Griffiths calls “conceptual archaeology”. This seems to be a general 
term encompassing experimental conceptual ecology and more historical approaches. 
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wrong. We want to be able to criticize factors in the epistemic niche, not just the fit 
between concept and niche. This is where the truly normative part of my project 
comes in. 
 
We need a means of deciding what constitutes a good reason for having a particular 
concept, where a “good” reason is one that produces fruitful science, as this notion 
has emerged from the rest of the relevant framework. Because what it means to be 
successful or fruitful science is something that emerges over time, we need to look at 
the history of the framework, in particular the development of the epistemic niche for 
the concept in question. In other words, we should study the evolution of the 
environment in which current concepts are employed.  
 
I have already discussed an approach in the philosophy of science that allows us to 
assess a framework in terms of its historical development – Shapere’s 
internal/external distinction – and I propose making use of it again here. We need to 
take an historical approach to see whether the considerations shaping the concept are 
of a kind that the science has internalised. Recall from chapter 3 that this will involve 
seeing whether they have a track record of success that entitles the scientists to rely 
on them as background information. This approach leaves open the possibility that 
the science could have internalised different considerations, and so captures the 
contingency required by both my openness to the possibility of pluralism, and 
Shapere’s “Rejection of Anticipations of Nature” (see chapter 3), while still giving 
us a basis for making normative claims. 
 
We can now begin to see that the problem with something like the Lysenko case is 
that it arose in a climate where suppressing opposition and having the results of 
science be dictated by political regime were external considerations. They should 
therefore not have been treated as legitimate parts of the framework, being allowed 
to shape concepts, etc. Showing this in detail here would require too long a 
diversion; it would need the kind of in-depth analysis I undertake in my case study 
work in chapters 6, 7, and 8. However, I can outline the shape such an analysis 




Taking a concept such as INHERITANCE in the Lysenkoist framework,
37
 one would 
need to analyse the epistemic niche to find out the dominant factors shaping the 
concept. These would include suppressing opposition, and having the results of 
science be dictated by the political regime, amongst other things. One would then 
need to look at the history of science to show the process by which these factors had 
already been found not to result in successful science. This might include showing 
the internalisation of factors in direct conflict with these, such as the exposure of 
scientific theories to opposing views, and attempts to isolate scientific methods and 
results (although not necessarily aims or choice of projects) from political concerns. 
The employment of all these factors would need to be measured against the evolving 
standards for successful science for the relevant frameworks. These could be the 
frameworks for the disciplines concerned (biology and agronomy), or the coarser-
grained framework of science in general. In this case, assessment at either level of 
grain would show that the relevant factors were external. 
 
Assessing concepts in this way requires the interpretationist strategy I discussed in 
chapter 4; to assess the factors in the epistemic niche involves getting into the 
framework in order to judge it on its own terms. One could thereby show that, by the 
time Lysenkoism came along, the dominant factors in the epistemic niche for 
INHERITANCE in that framework had already been demarcated as external at a 
coarser level of grain than that of the research program.
 
We could then conclude that 




In subsequent chapters I will carry out this kind of analysis, examining the epistemic 
niches for particular concepts of memory described by my case studies. As well as 
needing much more detail than I can give here of the Lysenkoist case, there is a 
further methodological complication: There are three possibilities for any factor in 
                                                          
37
 I phrase my criticism here in terms of identifying a problematic concept, but the method could be 
applied to any other aspect of the framework, in terms of pressure from external factors in the 
surrounding parts of the framework. 
38
 This is necessarily (given constraints of space) a schematic analysis. A deeper analysis may reveal 
that some of my speculations here are wrong, but I think the form of the argument is right. For some 
details on Lysenko’s work in relation to the scientific and socio-political climate of its time, which 
gives an idea of the complexity of the epistemic niche one would need to discuss in order to tell the 
full story, see Roll-Hansen, 1985. 
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the epistemic niche: it may be internal, an untried hypothesis, or problematically 
external: 
 
 Internal factors are those that have been internalised due to a track-record of 
success. 
 
 Untried hypotheses are things that have not yet had chance to acquire a 
track-record of success, but are just being tentatively tried out by the science 
in question. Because many of the sciences of memory are immature sciences 
and do not yet have a firm internal/external distinction, we might expect to 
find many of these factors (see chapter 3). Note that this is not the usual sense 
of “hypothesis”, such as might be used to talk about a “scientific hypothesis”. 
It refers to any factor in the epistemic niche which has not yet been 
sufficiently tested to be either internal or external (see chapter 3). 
 
Recall the case of the Cognitive Atlas project discussed in chapter 2. The big 
data approach in use there has not been internalised into cognitive 
neuroscience, and in fact is being employed partly because of a similar 
method in biology (in the Gene Ontology project) so may look like it is being 
imposed from biology as an external factor. However, it is not being 
systematically and unquestioningly used, it is merely being tested to see 
whether it leads to fruitful scientific research. If it does so, it will be 
internalised; if not, scientists should stop using it. It is therefore an 
hypothesis in the sense in which I am using the term here. 
 
In fact, it is sensible to employ techniques that have been successful in 
neighbouring disciplines, provided that they are treated as hypotheses, not 
relied upon as though they had been internalised. 
 
 It is only problematically external factors that it is irrational to rely on. 
These are considerations that are being treated by the science as though they 
are internal – they are being relied upon and taken for granted as background 
information – despite the fact that they have been tried out without acquiring 
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a track-record of success. In chapter 3, I argued that unification is one such 
factor in the cognitive and social sciences. Suppression of conflicting 
research in the Lysenkoist case briefly discussed above would be another 
example. 
 
A third example is journal publications. Just because a particular approach is 
more likely to get published than another, this does not make it a better 
approach for producing fruitful science. Brigandt and Love talk about this 
factor and its leading to a focus on the concept NOVELTY in evolutionary and 
developmental biology: ‘…workshop participants drew attention to the 
possibility that the invocation of evolutionary novelty serves more as a 
rhetorical device in the process of grant writing than as an important 
biological concept.’ This is because such invocation tends to result in 
publication in high impact journals (Brigandt and Love, 2010: 7). This factor 
is external, not because it is a “sociological” factor, but because its 
employment has not resulted in a track-record of producing successful 
science. 
 
I can now spell out my search for legitimate concepts – those functioning as 
investigative kinds – in these terms: To the extent that a concept is shaped by 
internal factors, I will consider it to be a legitimate concept of memory, and to the 
extent that it is shaped by hypotheses and external factors, I will consider it to be 
non-legitimate. I have chosen this term rather than “illegitimate” to reflect the fact 
that untried hypotheses and external factors have not been legitimated, but that 
doesn’t mean they never could be.39 
 
To the extent that a concept is shaped by internal factors and hypotheses, it is 
rational, and to the extent that it is shaped by external factors, it is irrational. 
Hopefully a schematic representation will make this clearer: 
 
                                                          
39
 This is true even of external factors. Although such factors lack a history of success, we cannot 
demonstrate that they will always lack such a history in all circumstances. To do so would be to prove 
a negative claim about an infinite domain. The problem is in scientists’ reliance on these factors as 
though they were internal, despite their lacking the right history of success. 
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Internal Hypothesis External 
Legitimate Non-legitimate Non-legitimate 
Rational Rational Irrational 
 
Any epistemic niche is likely to contain a mixture of the three types of factor, so a 
concept is not simply legitimate or non-legitimate, but is legitimate to some degree – 
the degree to which its niche is made up of internal factors.
 
It is also rational to some 
degree – the degree to which its niche is made up of internal factors and/or untried 
hypotheses. 
 
Note that this is a rather special sense of “legitimate”. A concept that is held 
primarily as a result of untried hypotheses is not irrational to hold (what else could 
the scientists do in the absence of more internal factors?) but it does not count as 
legitimate in the sense I am interested in here. This special notion is important for 
distinguishing concepts that are held as a result of accepted background information 
that has a track-record of success. These legitimate concepts pick out investigative 
kinds. To see this recall that investigative kinds are those that support fruitful 
scientific theory and practice, i.e. which have the kind of successful track-record that 
is necessary for internalisation. Concepts without such a track-record have not been 
legitimated in this way. 
 
My work will hopefully allow a conclusion to be drawn as to whether any situated 
cognition concepts of memory that I find are legitimate. On my view, finding 
situated cognition concepts in this category would be the nearest thing we could have 
to an answer saying that the situated cognition perspective is correct. Finding 
situated cognition concepts that are rational but non-legitimate would mean that we 
cannot yet say whether the perspective is correct, but that there is nothing wrong 
with the scientific practice employing it. This seems to be the right thing to say, 
given that such concepts would largely be the result of untried hypotheses. Finding 
situated cognition concepts that are shaped primarily by external factors would 
indicate that something has gone wrong with the scientific practice, and that these 




I can now complete the task I deferred in the last chapter, of giving a way to account 
for conceptual change as rational.
40
 A change is rational to the extent that it comes 
about as a result of pressures from internal factors and/or untried hypotheses, and 
irrational to the extent that it comes about as a result of pressures from external 
factors. Although I am looking at case studies to determine whether their concepts 
are rational (or legitimate) at a particular time, it is important to remember that the 
framework is dynamic and, according to the historical approach, it is a chain of good 
reasons for conceptual change over time that leads to a particular concept being 
rational at a time. I have therefore been able to give a way to account for the 
rationality of conceptual change without reference to an extra component of the 
concept outside of its conceptual role (such as Brigandt’s epistemic goal), but instead 
have used the conceptual role’s own history. 
 
Before closing this section, I want to deal with two kinds of case that might be used 
to object to the method I have outlined here: coherent Lysenkoist cases and 
Swampman cases. I will treat each in turn, arguing that raising these kinds of cases 
misunderstands the approach I am taking here. 
 
Coherent Lysenkoist cases 
What I am referring to as “coherent Lysenkoist cases” are frameworks that are 
completely internally coherent, i.e. successful according to their own standards, but 
which have aspects that we would not want to endorse for social or political reasons. 
These are like the Lysenko case introduced above, except that we assume that 
suppressing opposition and being subservient to political aims have allowed the 
science to be successful on its own terms, and have therefore been internalised. This 
perhaps does not seem implausible, since the same political factors that resulted in 
this kind of science coming into being also shape what counts as success for that 
science. The practice of suppressing alternatives then increases the success of a 
theory on its own terms, so it might seem that it should be internalised according to 
what I have said here. 
 
                                                          
40
 The challenge was to do this without separating conceptual role and epistemic goal as different 
components of conceptual content as Brigandt does (see chapter 4). 
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This case gets at worries that relativism is inherent in the idea of judging a 
framework on its own terms; but such worries misunderstand what it means to judge 
a framework in this way. Frameworks are not isolated, incommensurable systems. 
The historical approach I am advocating involves looking at how a framework 
developed and how its criteria came to be internalised. There is a pre-existing 
context for this process; the new framework does not emerge in a vacuum. We 
should not let the possibility of treating the framework for a research project as a 
relatively discrete entity for some methodological purposes blind us to its 
connections to the frameworks of other research projects. It is part of the same 
framework as them when viewed at a coarser level of grain, and some criteria have 
emerged as external considerations at this coarser-grained level. When we consider 
the Lysenkoist case, suppressing conflicting research is one such criterion. Even at 
the very coarse level of grain that is epistemic enquiry in general, this is an external 
consideration. It would therefore never even be a candidate for internalisation into 
the Lysenkoist research programme. 
 
This is the picture I drew on in the last chapter, when I noted that interpreting a 
scientific framework is never truly radical interpretation in the sense that Davidson 
and Quine discuss. If frameworks were entirely isolated and did not draw on other 
frameworks at their inception, each new research project would start with a “blank 
canvas” where anything might or might not turn out to be internal. Research under 
these circumstances would be impossibly slow. 
 
The problem with something like the Lysenkoist approach then, is that it arose in a 
climate where factors like suppressing opposition were already external 
considerations. They may never have been used as criteria by this particular 
framework when viewed at the research project level of grain, and so may look like 
untried hypotheses (and thus at least candidates for internalisation) from this point of 
view. However, they have been demarcated as external considerations across the 
subdisciplines (at a coarser level of grain), and therefore in similar research projects. 
According to what I am saying here, it would be irrational to rely on such criteria. 
This is why the distinction between untried hypotheses and problematically external 





It may be that even the coarse-grained framework of human epistemic enquiry could 
have developed otherwise. In other words, it may be that nothing about the world 
would have prohibited the development of a kind of enquiry according to which 
coherent Lysenko cases could be rational and successful sciences. We have no way 
of knowing whether this is the case without re-running most of human history, to see 
whether the world would ever allow such frameworks to develop. If they did, they 
would look so radically different from anything we can envisage now, including 
having very different meanings for the terms “rational” and “successful”, that it is 
hard to know what purpose understanding them could serve for us here and now. 
 
Swampman cases 
Swampman cases are scientific frameworks that spring into life fully formed, but are 
nonetheless completely correct and successful. Like Davidson’s Swampman in the 
philosophy of mind (Davidson, 1987) after which they are named, they lack the 
relevant history, but have the appropriate present-day characteristics enabling them 
to go on appropriately in the future. 
 
As might already be clear from my response to the coherent Lysenkoist case, from 
the perspective I have taken so far in this thesis, there is something wrong with 
trying to set up such cases. Terms like “correct” and “successful” get their meaning 
in part from what emerges from the framework over time, so it does not make sense 
to say that a framework that has no history is correct or successful. It does not yet 
have internal criteria for what it is to be successful, so there is no way to judge it on 
its own terms. We cannot say exactly how it would have to go on in order to count as 
successful, except in very coarse-grained terms, for example that it should allow 
good explanations, predictions and practical applications. The only reason we can 
say even these things is by assuming that the Swampman research project’s 
framework is part of coarser-grained frameworks which do have a history, for 
example at the levels of science, or epistemic enquiry in general. It is only through 
investigation at these levels that we have learned that anything we could call 
“successful enquiry” was possible at all; it might have been the case that the world 




To see the difficulty, try setting up a Swampman case in more detail. Perhaps it 
seems that a research project to find a drug to cure cancer which works with the first 
randomly chosen substance it tries could serve as an example. But this cannot work. 
What cancer is, what would count as curing it, and what a drug treatment is, are all 
things that have long histories, and the research project could only be considered 
successful in the light of these things. 
 
Perhaps we can try a more outlandish case, where not only the project, but all the 
scientists, and the society of which they are a part are Swamp-creatures. Imagine a 
planet that comes into existence with a race of beings, some of whom (the Swamp-
scientists) give pills to others (the Swamp-patients). The Swamp-patients survive, 
but without the pills, they would die. The Swamp-scientists can give what look to us 
exactly like explanations of how this happens, and make predictions about it, as soon 
as they emerge from the swamp. 
 
Here we genuinely have a case where no part of the framework has a history, but this 
is not a successful science by its own standards, because it does not have any 
standards for success; all we can say is that it is successful according to our 
standards. Because our standards are not those of the research project in question, 
they do not count as standards for success in the sense I am interested in. (If they did, 
our history would be the Swamp-science’s history, and once again we would not 
really have a framework without a history). 
 
The Swamp-scientists may stipulate standards that they call “standards for successful 
science”, but according to the perspective I am taking here, they cannot really be 
such standards. A notion of success is something that can only emerge over time, 
through prolonged contact with the world. 
 
Although a science with no history could not be successful, it would not necessarily 
therefore be irrational, because the considerations it employed would fall in the 
untried hypotheses category, rather than the problematically external one. As I said 
in chapter 3, it is possible for a science to mature very quickly, so a long history is 
not necessarily required. However, nothing can demonstrate a history of success 
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when it has no history at all, so the framework of our Swampman science has no 
internal factors.  
 
To both the Swampman and coherent Lysenko problems, the answer is that the cases 
cannot be set up. According to my account, there is no such thing as a successful 
Swampman science, and no such thing as a coherent Lysenkoist science. 
 
 
To summarize what I have said about the normative project: in order to find out 
whether any particular factor in the epistemic niche for a concept is internal, 
hypothesis, or external, its history must be traced to see whether it has established a 
track-record of success. Therefore, when good case studies have been identified and 
the epistemic niches of their contrasting concepts investigated, the history of those 
niches should be traced. The factors that make up the niches can be assessed in terms 
of how they came to be seen as important by the scientists in question, and therefore 
whether they are internal factors, untried hypotheses, or problematically external. 
 
If there are internal considerations shaping multiple different concepts of memory, I 
take this as an indication that memory science should retain its current plurality, 
because multiple concepts are legitimate. If there are multiple different rational 
concepts of memory, even if these are not all legitimate (because they are held as a 
result of untried hypotheses), memory science should still retain its plurality for the 
time being. We cannot predict that it should continue to do so when the hypotheses 
are given fair trial, but nor can we predict that it should not. If there is only one 
legitimate concept of memory, the science should be monist and adopt that concept. 
In this way, it is possible to make a local investigation into whether plurality in the 
sciences of memory is a good thing (local to whether MEMORY should admit of 
situated cognition concepts), although we cannot draw conclusions about whether 
any of the particular scientific subdisciplines within memory science should 
internalise unity or pluralism. This is a way around the immaturity of the sciences of 
memory discussed in chapter 3; although a particular subdiscipline may not have 
sufficient internal criteria to answer the question of whether it should be pluralist or 





One might ask just how revisionary the upshot of such work could be. To what 
extent can the work I undertake here recommend changes to scientific concepts? 
Some philosophers taking a similarly pragmatic approach to concepts recommend 
conceptual engineering. For example, in her work on KNOWLEDGE Sally Haslanger, 
somewhat like I have done here, suggests that it is our purposes in using the concept 
that are important, and that we need to ask whether those purposes are legitimate 
(Haslanger, 1999: 468). Haslanger says that the best way to go about her project ‘is 
first to consider what the point is in having a concept of knowledge: what work does 
it, or (better) could it, do for us? And second, to consider what concept would best 
accomplish this work’ (Haslanger, 1999: 467). The role the concept plays is primary 
here. For Haslanger, it is this role that we should look for first, then think about the 
concept that could fill that role. To put her approach in SGK’s terms, we should 
design the epistemic niche first, then find a concept that adequately fits that niche. 
 
My project is similar to Haslanger’s in spirit, although I am looking at current 
concepts and the roles they play, before seeing whether they are the roles they should 
play. Haslanger, on the other hand, recommends beginning with working out what 
role a concept should play, then seeing what could fill that role. In Fisher’s (2006) 
terms, I am looking at “tried-and-true” ways that past employment of a concept has 
regularly delivered benefits, while Haslanger advocates looking for “novel” ways of 
delivering benefits by engineering our concepts for future use (Fisher, 2006: 96–97). 
But could I go further and recommend conceptual engineering? 
 
In a sense I am recommending some degree of engineering – we should let go of 
problematically external criteria, and let concepts be shaped only by internal criteria 
and, where these fall short, untried hypotheses. This allows some scope to alter 
science, for example if its goals are judged morally suspect. However, we cannot 
change concepts in any way we like. Consider the Lysenko case again: our criticisms 
of the epistemic niche must arise from practice over time. Even the very idea that 
science should be responsive to moral concerns is something that we have learned 
and internalised. To go beyond this in our engineering would be to problematically 
anticipate nature in the way that Shapere schools us against. We cannot engineer 




With this in mind, my aim is not to radically change the practices of the memory 
sciences according to philosophical goals, but only to look for ways that the 
unfolding of the disciplines might run smoother. The point is not to impose a situated 
cognition perspective, but to see whether or not the time is ripe for one. 
 
I will now go on to say a brief word about how to choose case studies for the 
approach I have outlined here. 
 
Choosing case studies 
I have said that I will be looking at cases that seem prima facie most likely to 
involve situated cognition concepts. I have also said that it is useful to choose cases 
where we would expect to find contrasting concepts of memory in order to get the 
most out of this method. What choices of case studies can meet these criteria? 
 
The first case study I will look at concerns memory in locked-in syndrome patients. I 
will be contrasting neuroscience and neurology with philosophy. Prima facie, we 
would expect neuroscientists and neurologists to have a brainbound concept of 
memory. The philosophers I consider in this case study are directly discussing, and 
in some cases endorsing, various situated cognition perspectives. If their implicit 
concepts match their explicit ones, we might therefore expect them to have situated 
cognition concepts. 
 
My second case study concerns analyses of memories of two political scandals. Here 
I will be contrasting cognitive psychology with discursive psychology. Unlike in the 
first case study, both sides here are good places to look for situated cognition 
concepts of memory. The cognitive psychologist whose work I will be looking at is 
Ulric Neisser. Neisser argued that cognition in the laboratory is often very different 
to real world cognition and that laboratory-based experiments therefore lacked 
ecological validity. This is an important idea in embedded, extended and enacted 
cognition approaches. 
 
The link between discursive psychology and situated cognition is more obvious. 
Discursive psychologists see something like a memory as being constructed through 
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discourse. For them, discourse is therefore more than merely an input or output to 
cognitive processes, it is part of such processes. This parallels Clark’s arguments for 
extended cognition, where external processes are seen as part of cognitive processes, 
not merely as inputs and outputs to them. 
 
Despite both Neisser and the discursive psychologists having possible situated 
cognition readings in common, there is still a contrast in concepts here. Prima facie, 
we would expect cognitive psychologists to have a very individualist concept of 
memory, while discursive psychology sees memory as constructed between 
participants in a discourse, and thus involving multiple people, perhaps in the 
manner of distributed cognition.  
 
My third case study concerns Transactive Memory Systems – a kind of system for 
which memory is a property of a group. I will be contrasting cognitive and social 
psychologists with researchers in communication studies. This case is a good place 
to look for situated cognition concepts of kinds where memory is extended or 
distributed over multiple people, rather than in physical tools. There is an expected 
contrast between the two disciplines because psychologists are interested in 
individual cognition and how it gives rise to group phenomena, while those in 
communication studies are interested in how the communication between group 
members meets the aims of the group. This difference is expected to lead to a 
different way of construing group memory. 
 
In subsequent chapters, I will apply the methods discussed here to these case studies. 
 
Conclusion 
The method for my project can be divided into descriptive and normative 
components. The descriptive part will involve a case study-based conceptual 
ecology, to determine what concepts are in play in various examples of memory 
science, and what the epistemic niches for those concepts are. The normative part 
will involve finding out whether those concepts are legitimate – whether they are 





To the extent that a niche is made up of internal factors, the concept it shapes is 
legitimate, and to the extent that it is made up of internal factors and untried 




6. Locked-In Syndrome and Brain-Computer Interfaces: A Case Study 
 
Introduction 
This case study compares neuropsychologists and neurologists to philosophers. It 
focuses directly on the various situated cognition perspectives, because the 
philosophical papers on one side of the comparison discuss these perspectives 
explicitly. Specifically, they discuss whether brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) being 
used by Locked-In Syndrome (LIS) patients should count as instances of situated 
cognition, in particular extended or enacted cognition. The neuropsychologists and 
neurologists do not discuss this issue explicitly, but they provide a different 
perspective to the philosophers on the use of BCIs in LIS. We might prima facie 
expect them to have a brainbound concept of memory, which should provide a 
contrast to the philosophers. 
 
I will first explain the details of the case study, then try to tease out the implicit 
concepts of memory in play. Note that the contrast I have highlighted above is only a 
prima facie one which makes this case study a promising place to start; whether the 
implicit concepts match this initial suspicion still remains to be seen. This is the case 
even with the philosophical papers, where we might expect the authors to be clearer 
about the concepts they are using. It is important to remember that the concepts 
being used are not necessarily the concepts that the authors think they are using and 
explicitly endorse.  
 
When the implicit concepts of memory have been identified, I will use conceptual 
ecology, in particular the idea of the epistemic niche, to explain why the different 
subgroups have the concepts that they do, and attempt to determine which features of 
the relevant epistemic niches are internal considerations, which are untried 
hypotheses, and which are external, by looking at the niches in their historical 
context. This will allow me to make a claim about which of the concepts in play are 
legitimate, i.e. which are functioning as investigative kinds. Obviously I will not be 
able to consider all the aspects of theory and practice that make up the epistemic 
niche here, but I will try to identify those that are most important in determining 




The case study 
Locked-in syndrome (LIS) is a rare condition caused by brain damage to the ventral 
pons, usually caused by a stroke or degenerative disease like motor neuron disease, 
but also occasionally by trauma. Patients are paralysed and unable to speak, but 
consciousness is preserved. LIS is usually classified into three categories: 
 
1. In classic LIS, patients retain vertical eye movement and/or eyelid movement. 
2. In incomplete LIS, some other voluntary movement is preserved. 
3. In total LIS, there is no ability to move or communicate at all. 
 
In all cases consciousness is preserved and there appears to be a high level of 
cognitive functioning, although testing cognitive functioning will be the topic of the 
papers discussed below. (For a good brief overview of the condition, see Smith and 
Delargy, 2005). 
 
A brain-computer interface (BCI) is a device that allows brain activity normally 
resulting in movement of the body to be read and translated into other outcomes such 
as the movement of a robot arm or a cursor on a screen. This exploits brain plasticity, 
as the BCI 
 
attempts to assign to cortical neurons the role normally performed by spinal motoneurons. 
Thus, a BCI requires that the many CNS areas involved in producing normal motor actions 
change their roles so as to optimize the control of cortical neurons rather than spinal 
motoneurons. The disconcerting variability of BCI performance may stem in large part from 
the challenge presented by the need for this unnatural adaptation (Wolpaw, 2007, quoted in 
Fenton and Alpert, 2008: 122). 
 
BCIs can be used for various applications including movement of a robot arm, and 
control of an avatar. However, the most developed application and that which has 
received the most attention is communication. Research has focussed here because 
patients report that the inability to communicate is the most traumatic and frustrating 
aspect of LIS (Fenton and Alpert, 2008: 127) and because of the obvious clinical 




As the above quote suggests, outcomes are variable, but one of the most successful 
methods for communication is to use a virtual keyboard. Electrodes, usually placed 
on the scalp, are used to detect electrophysiological and chemical activity of the 
brain. The user imagines bodily movements in order to move the cursor, for example 
imagining moving the right hand to move to the right and the left hand to move to 
the left. Letters are selected by imagining another movement, for example squeezing 
the hand. In this way, words can be spelled out and communication is possible 
(Heersmink, 2013: 209). 
 
Older communication methods exploit the preserved eye movement in classic LIS. In 
the simplest versions, an interlocutor holds an alphabet board with the letters of the 
alphabet, often in order from most commonly used to least. The interlocutor reads 
out the letters one by one and the patient blinks when the desired letter is reached. A 
version using a similar set-up but not requiring an interlocutor has also been 
developed. In this version, the patient focusses on the desired letter and a sensor 
detects the gaze (León-Carrión et al., 2002, review: 565). Unlike the BCI, neither of 
these older methods offers hope for the patient with total LIS. 
 
These methods of communication look at first glance like good examples of 
extended cognition since the vehicles of cognition seem to be partly in the world 
outside the head. Their relevance to the concept of memory will be made clear 
below. 
 
For this chapter, I focus on a series of papers that appeared in the journal 
Neuroethics from 2008–2013, and three papers by a combination of neurologists and 
neuropsychologists that focus on similar issues. Two of these three papers are cited 
by the debate in Neuroethics, and the third (Allain et al.) is cited by both of the other 
two. The papers from Neuroethics are all written by philosophers, or authors with a 
philosophical background, and they constitute a debate over the status of BCIs for 
LIS patients. 
 
The first paper in this debate (Fenton and Alpert, hereafter F&A, 2008) claims that 
BCIs can be seen as examples of extended cognition in action, and that they 
extended the selves of LIS patients. The next paper (Walter, 2010) disputes this, 
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claiming that F&A’s claim about extended selves is unfounded because the extended 
cognition framework is not typically applied to selves, but to classically cognitive 
processes (of which memory is one example). When it comes to the impact of BCIs 
on such cognitive processes, the capacities enhanced by BCIs are all bodily, not 
cognitive, so BCIs are not an example of extended cognition. He suggests that 
enacted cognition is a better framework for understanding the value of BCIs. Kyselo 
(2013) then responds, agreeing that the enactive approach is the best way of thinking 
about BCIs and their effect on the self, but arguing that BCIs can be seen as vehicles 
of certain extended cognitive processes. Finally, Heersmink (2013) claims that BCIs 
are not yet able to extend cognitive processes, but with technological improvements, 
they could do so. 
 
In contrast to these papers, I consider the following: 
 
Allain et al. (1998) from the journal Cortex: This is a paper about the testing of 
cognitive functioning in LIS patients, with a specific focus on testing memory. 
 
Schnakers et al. (2008) from the Journal of Neurology: This paper is concerned with 
neuropsychological testing of cognitive functions (including memory) in LIS 
patients. 
 
León-Carrión et al. (2002, survey) from the journal Brain Injury: This paper is a 
questionnaire survey of patients with LIS, collecting data (including some on 
cognitive functions such as memory) with the hope of improving diagnosis and 
rehabilitation. 
 
There is a contrast here between papers which test for memory to answer the 
question of whether cognition is intact in LIS patients, and papers for which the 
nature of cognition and therefore of memory is under question. Despite focussing 
primarily at the subdiscipline level of grain, I am not assuming that the philosophers 
share one concept of memory and the neuropsychologists and neurologists share 
another. There could be variation within groups, but for my purposes here, the most 
important contrast is that posited between the two groups. In the next section, I will 




Concepts of memory 
Neuropsychologists and neurologists 
Allain et al. 
Allain et al. is the oldest of the papers I consider here, and the technology for 
communicating with LIS patients has developed since it was written, but it is helpful 
for its explicit focus on memory. The authors tested two patients with incomplete 
LIS for both verbal and visual memory. Conventional psychometric tests were used, 
adapted for the unusual means of communication required. The tests administered 
were as follows:  
 
Verbal immediate memory was assessed using the digit forward and backward tasks of the 
Wechsler Memory Scale Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1991). Verbal learning was 
investigated using the Rey’s 15 words test (Rey, 1958) which requires free recall of a list of 
15 common words read out by the examiner. The task was repeated five times and the sum of 
the recalled words was the score for immediate memory. Verbal and visual paired associate 
learning were assessed with the subtests of the WMS-R (Wechsler, 1991). The score was the 
sum of the recalled pairs after the 3 first trials. Delayed verbal and visual recognition were 
tested using a subtest of the BEM 144 (Signoret, 1991), in which the patient is asked to 
remember 24 sentences and 24 figures presented one by one. After a delay, each stimulus is 
presented with 3 alternatives and the patient has to recognize the target. (Allain et al., 1998: 
632). 
 
Verbal abilities and general intelligence were also tested. 
 
The results showed both patients to be in the normal range for all memory tests, 
although they were at the bottom end of this range for the backward digit task, which 
the authors attribute to ‘the cumbersome procedure required by the communication 
aid system’ (Allain et al., 1998: 633). They conclude that there is no cognitive 
impairment of language, memory or intellectual functioning. 
 
The concept of memory here is revealed by the methods chosen to test it. The recall 
tasks are adapted from those used on able-bodied subjects, but when an able bodied 
subject tackles these tasks they are in a very specific setting. They are likely to be in 
a laboratory or perhaps a doctor’s surgery, probably alone apart from the 
experimenter, and if someone else is present they are likely to be acting only as an 
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observer. The subject does not use any external tools to aid memory, because for 
memory as it is being tested here, that would be cheating. The prospects for any kind 
of situated cognition are therefore none to very slight. The memory being tested here 
is a capacity of the brain. This should come as no surprise, since Allain et al.’s paper 
appears in the journal Cortex, and most of the authors are neuropsychologists (the 
remainder working in medicine and rehabilitation of brain injury patients). 
 
The use of the BCI here is for communication alone. Any part that communication 
may play in remembering for an able-bodied subject in an everyday context is 
“screened-off” by the testing situation for both LIS patient and able-bodied subject. 
There is no prospect of talking to oneself or another person, or writing or sketching 
to aid recall. Potential external vehicles for cognition are placed out of reach because 
the type of memory that has external vehicles is just not memory in this context. 
Imagine if Clark and Chalmers’ notebook-wielding amnesiac Otto (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998) were to be tested with this battery. Otto writes things down in his 
notebook, and later consults his notes to “remember”. In the context of these tests, 
that is cheating and Otto has not remembered. It is according to tests like these that 
he is described as an amnesiac in the first place. Any use of a BCI as a vehicle of 
memory rather than purely as a communication tool would similarly be deemed 
cheating. Allain et al. are employing a brainbound concept of memory. 
 
Schnakers et al. 
Schnakers et al. similarly set out to test cognitive abilities in LIS patients. They 
improved on the methods of Allain et al. because they used a simpler method of 
communication, relying on preserved eye movement. As the authors say:  
 
Our results also corroborate two case reports [one of which is Allain et al.] having 
investigated short- and long-term memory, language and general intelligence in LIS. 
However, the latter responded to the test using a sophisticated, cognitively demanding 
computerized communication aid. It is therefore not surprising that these patients showed no 
cognitive impairment as they were already selected based on their ability to comply with the 





Schnakers et al. tested long- and short-term memory, attention, executive 
functioning, phonological and semantic processing and verbal intelligence. Short-
term memory was tested using forward and backward digit spans, similarly to Allain 
et al. Long-term memory was tested using the Doors test from the “Doors and 
People” battery. This test measures non-verbal episodic memory. 
 
The Doors test consists in learning two lists of twelve photographs depicting different doors 
(lists A and B). The learning phase for each list is followed by a recognition phase where 12 
sheets are presented, containing one previously presented picture and three distractor 
pictures. The distractor pictures for the second list are more difficult to reject as they are 
more closely matched to the target picture (Schnakers et al., 2008: 324–325). 
 
The results showed some memory impairment in some patients, but in each case the 
experimenters were able to find something to attribute it to other than the lesion of 
the ventral pons. Such factors included: other lesions in areas of the brain known to 
be involved in memory, fatigability of subjects, other brain damage resulting in some 
uncontrolled motor activity which affected the communication method (Schnakers et 
al., 2008: 327). The authors conclude that it appears that patients with pure brainstem 
lesions can recover intact cognitive levels, including long- and short-term memory. 
 
As for Allain et al., the concept of memory in play is revealed by the methods chosen 
to test it. Again, a standard testing battery is used (with some necessary adaptations), 
such as would be used to assess the memory of able-bodied subjects in isolation 
from cognitive props that may support cognition. The kind of memory that is being 
tested here is an ability of the brain. 
 
This is brought out even more strongly in Schnakers et al. by their use of healthy 
controls who were asked to pretend they were in LIS and communicate using only 
eye movements (Schnakers et al., 2008: 324).
41
 The controls are not people in a 
normal everyday context with access to cognitive scaffolding in the form of physical 
tools and other people. The extended/embedded etc. aspects of memory that a BCI 
might be expected to replace are not present in the healthy controls either; they are 
not part of memory as it is being tested here. Again this should perhaps come as no 
                                                          
41
 For some tests, published data were used instead of these controls. 
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surprise as the paper was published in the Journal of Neurology and authored by a 
team of neuropsychologists and neurologists. 
 
León-Carrión et al. 
León-Carrión et al.’s paper appears in the journal Brain Injury, and the authors are 
neuropsychologists and those with a specific interest in the rehabilitation of brain 
injury patients.  
 
This paper is different to the previous two studies in that the testing procedure 
involved asking LIS patients to assess their own condition: 
 
A 36-item survey questionnaire…was specifically designed to be filled-out by the member of 
the family most directly living with the person affected by LIS. In most cases this person was 
the individual’s spouse, and the procedure was carried out in collaboration with the direct 
participation of the patient with LIS. (León-Carrión et al , 2002, survey: 572). 
 
The questionnaire asked about personal details (marital status, age, gender etc.), the 
cause of the LIS, treatment received, and about various features of the psychological 
and emotional state of the patient. Question 13 asked ‘Does the patient have memory 
problems?’ with simple yes/no tick boxes for the answer (León-Carrión et al., 2002, 
survey: appendix, 581). Only 18.6% of the 44 people surveyed answered “yes” 




The interesting thing about this paper in contrast to the other two is that it was left up 
to the patients to decide whether they felt that their memories were impaired, and 
therefore it was the patients’ concepts of memory, not the experimenters’, that were 
used in collecting results. Because of the method used to answer the questions, the 
main caregivers’ concepts of memory and opinions of the patients’ memory skills 
were also important. It may be that in some cases, a joint decision was reached 
between the patient and the caregiver over how to answer the question. Answers may 
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 Interestingly, ‘[w]hen one analysed for memory problems, it was found that, significantly (p < 
0.002), those subjects with LIS consequential to TBI [traumatic brain injury] were more likely to have 




therefore be a combination of whether the patients felt themselves to be memory-
impaired, and whether they appeared to be so to the main caregivers. 
 
The authors mention Allain et al. as a study in agreement with their own results on 
memory (León-Carrión et al., 2002, survey: 577–578). This suggests agreement with 
the brainbound concept of memory found in that paper. Further evidence that León-
Carrión et al. have a brainbound concept of memory can be found in a literature 
review article in the same journal issue as the survey I am looking at here. In this 
review article, they briefly discuss a study by Onofri et al. (1997), concerning 
measurement of cognitive event-related potentials. This is a measurement of brain 
activity, of which they say ‘it is possible to record ERPs [event-related potentials] in 
patients shortly following an acute ischemic lesion, and thereby to objectively assess 
cognitive activities.’ (León-Carrión et al., 2002, review: 558, my emphasis). 
Endorsement of this method as a measurement of cognitive activity strongly suggests 
brainbound concepts of cognitive processes like memory. 
 
However, the survey method used in the main article tells a more interesting story. 
The focus here is much more on memory in an everyday context; 63.6% of the 
patients tested lived at home. Because no special test of memory is performed, the 
answers to the questionnaire presumably reflect whether memory-impairment poses 
any problems in everyday life. If it does not, memory is likely to be rated as 
unimpaired. Any tools the patient has access to that are used to scaffold memory 
would probably therefore be included. Memory here is not necessarily an isolated 
brain state or process, and external vehicles could be involved to the extent that the 
patient has access to them. There seems to be at least openness to an embedded 
cognition perspective here, where the cognition still happens in the brain, but is 
partially dependent on the external world. 
 
As further evidence that it is memory in an everyday context that is being tested, 
question 23.10 in the survey asks the caregiver whether the patient ‘[r]eminds you of 
important things that are pending’ (again with yes/no tick boxes for answers) (León-
Carrión et al., 2002, survey: 582). The results for this question are not given, but the 
nature of the question reflects the role of memory in everyday family or social life, 
not the isolated experimental context seen in the previous two papers discussed. The 
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choice of question suggests that, not only were patients and caregivers answering the 
question with this everyday practical concept of memory in mind, but the 
experimenters were asking the questions using a similar concept. The concept of 
memory in play here therefore seems to be at least open to an embedded cognition 
perspective, although memory is still seen as a state or process in the brain. 
 
All three of the papers considered so far are interested in the question of whether 
cognitive states or processes like memory are impaired in LIS patients. The nature of 
these states or processes is not in question. I will now go on to consider some more 
philosophical papers, in which the nature of cognition, and therefore of memory, is 
the subject of the debate. 
 
Philosophers 
Fenton and Alpert (F&A) 
F&A (2008) discuss the idea that BCIs can be seen as examples of extended 
cognition in action, and that they extend the selves of LIS patients.  
 
The following claims can be extracted from their paper: 
 BCIs promise to enable individuals with conditions like LIS to re-engage 
with their physical and social worlds (F&A, 2008: 119). 
 Functionally integrated BCIs extend the minds of individuals with LIS 
beyond their bodies (F&A, 2008: 119). They extend their cognitive as well as 
physical capacities (F&A, 2008: 127). 
 From a perspective rooted in embodied theories of cognition, BCIs have the 
potential to change the individual users themselves (F&A, 2008: 124). 
 
These three claims are linked for the authors because they are writing about a view 
of cognition according to which ‘various physiological processes are implicated in 
human cognition. Additionally, the social contexts in which an individual matures 
can also profoundly affect how she cognitively develops and responds to her 
environment’ (F&A, 2008: 125). Re-engagement with their physical and social 
worlds therefore extends the cognitive abilities of the patients; if BCIs can facilitate 




F&A spend much of the paper on the topic of the embodiment or extension of the 
self, but my focus here is primarily on cognition, not self-hood.
43
 F&A say that they 
use the extended cognition framework of Clark and Chalmers (1998) merely as a 
heuristic, or ‘a lens through which we learn to re-see particular aspects of human 
cognitive engagement with the relevant physical or social environment’ (F&A, 2008: 
126). In defence of this, they say ‘[i]nstead of becoming embroiled in metaphysical 
debates about the nature, or extention [sic], of mind that might threaten to undo any 
possible philosophical advance arising from a re-seeing of mind as extended, we use 
extended mind theory heuristically.’ (F&A, 2008: 126, footnote 10).  
 
Note that this way of approaching the debate is very similar to that seen in much of 
the extended cognition literature. The benefits that can be drawn from using an 
extended cognition approach are all that some proponents argue for (a form of 
inference to the best explanation, see Clark and Chalmers, 1998: 14; Clark, 2008: 
80). Clark sometimes talks about using the extended cognition framework as just one 
perspective among many from which cognition can usefully be viewed for different 
purposes (Clark, 2008: 139).
44
 It is therefore not clear that F&A would need to do 
any more than they do in order to count as endorsing the extended cognition 
approach.
45
 However, the attitude they display in their claim to only use the 
perspective heuristically tells a more interesting story than simple implicit 
assumption of an extended cognition concept. To understand this story, it is useful to 
look at what they say about memory. 
 
There are two mentions of memory in F&A’s paper. In the first, the authors quote 
León-Carrión et al.’s study described above, stating that 18.6% of LIS patients report 
memory problems. Here they also quote a study (New and Thomas, 2005) 
suggesting cognitive deficits in LIS patients.  The other discussion of memory in the 
                                                          
43
 Extension or embodiment of the self may entail extension or embodiment of cognition for any 
cognitive processes involved in selfhood, see Walter (2010: 64, footnote 6). 
44
 For more on this, see my discussion of the epistemic strand of the extended cognition debate in 
chapter 1, subsection: “From natural kinds to investigative kinds”. 
45
 Walter (2010) doubts it is possible to use the extended mind thesis heuristically, because it is 
inherently a metaphysical claim about cognition. According to my reading of the extended cognition 
literature, only one strand of the debate is metaphysical. Another important strand, the one I focus on 
here, and which includes some of Clark’s own contributions, is not metaphysical but epistemic. See 
chapter 1, subsection: “From natural kinds to investigative kinds”. 
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paper is part of an explanation of extended cognition. They discuss examples due to 
Clark and Levy (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Levy, 2007) which claim that a 
notebook or personal digital assistant can be part of an extended cognitive 
mechanism (F&A, 2008: 125). They discuss the example of using a paper and pen to 
aid in a lengthy calculation, where ‘as a repository of our thought, the used paper 
seems to be relevantly similar to the neural repositories of other thoughts (i.e., 
memories) constitutive of the relevant calculation. The paper, that is, is an analogue 
to the neural sites implicated in explicit memory’ (F&A, 2008: 126). 
 
The authors discussed in these two passages (Clark and Levy, and León-Carrión et 
al.) do not have the same concepts of memory. Clark and Levy endorse an extended 
cognition approach, whereas León-Carrión et al. do not discuss any of the situated 
cognition perspectives directly. I have argued that they implicitly use an embedded 
cognition approach, where cognition is still something that happens in brains, albeit 
with the possibility of external scaffolding. It is therefore open to question whether 
the extended cognition framework can be used to account for the memory deficit 
experienced by 18.6% of patients in León-Carrión et al.’s survey. If cognition is 
extended, a cognitive process such as memory could be expected to be severely 
impaired by LIS. The percentage of patients reporting memory impairment could be 
expected to be much higher than 18.6%.
46
 What does the mention of these different 
perspectives tell us about F&A’s concept of memory, bearing in mind that they 
claimed not to endorse extended cognition, but only use it heuristically? 
 
It may suggest that they are just confused, in that they haven’t noticed the potential 
problem with taking data from a study that construes memory differently. 
Alternatively, their use of this data may just reinforce the idea that they see extended 
cognition as only one possible option, rather than assuming its truth across the board. 
Although these two options say different things about their explicit thinking, they 
both suggest that their implicit concept of a cognitive state or process like memory is 
flexible. A flexible concept of memory is one that is open to interpretation from 
different perspectives. This diagnosis fits with the overall aim of their paper, since it 
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 Note that 65.8% in this survey could communicate without technical aid, so it is possible that the 




is the nature of cognition that is up for debate. They do not implicitly assume any 
one of the positions on offer, because what the concept should be is what is in 
question. The best description of their implicit concept is therefore that it is flexible. 
 
Walter 
Sven Walter (2010) replies to F&A, arguing that F&A’s claim about extended selves 
is unfounded because the extended cognition framework is not typically applied to 
selves, but to classically cognitive processes (of which memory is one example). He 
writes that extended cognition ‘has so far been restricted to paradigmatically 
cognitive abilities like perception, memory, thought, and language’ (Walter, 2010: 
126). F&A’s use of the extended cognition framework to support their claim about 
the extension of selves is therefore problematic. 
 
Turning from selves to cognition, Walter explicitly endorses the extended mind 
hypothesis (Walter, 2010: 61), but when it comes to the particular case of the impact 
of BCIs on cognitive processes, he says that the capacities enhanced by BCIs are all 
bodily, not cognitive, so BCIs are not an example of extended cognition (Walter, 
2010: 67–68). He suggests that enacted cognition is a better framework for 
understanding the value of BCIs. This explicit endorsement of both extended and 
enacted cognition for different purposes suggests a flexible concept, but the implicit 
concepts do not quite line up with his explicit avowals. 
 
Despite his explicit support for extended cognition, the claim that BCIs cannot 
extend cognition because they only enhance bodily capacities shows that Walter’s 
implicit concept of cognition is not extended. For an extended cognition theorist, the 
capacities of the bodily parts contribute to an overall process which is cognitive. 
Walter seems to recognise this (Walter, 2010: 69), but still denies that it allows BCIs 
to extend cognition because the part of the process they replace is bodily, not 
cognitive. This misunderstands the extended cognition perspective. It is processes, 
not component parts of the underlying substrate of those processes, that can be said 
to be cognitive. We would not describe a neuron in the brain as cognitive, but 
enhancement of its activity could still contribute to a cognitive process. The same is 
true for bodily processes for the extended cognition theorist. As Clark says: ‘The 
question that needs to be addressed, then is: When is some physical object or process 
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acting as part of a larger cognitive routine? It is not the much murkier (probably 
unintelligible) question: When should we say of some such candidate part, such as a 
neuron or a notebook, that it is itself cognitive?’ (Clark, 2008: 87–88).47 
 
Walter also notes in passing some doubts ‘that the intimate couplings Clark appeals 
to so frequently are, all by themselves, sufficient to establish cognitive extension’ 
(Walter, 2010: 68). Walter’s implicit concept of memory therefore cannot be 
extended in Clark’s sense, which he finds too liberal (Walter, 2010: 68). He seems to 
have a view of cognition according to which bodily (and so presumably extrabodily) 
contributions to the process are mere inputs and outputs. This could be either a 
brainbound concept, or an embedded cognition concept. His explicit support for 
extended cognition makes the latter much more likely – even if he does not properly 
recognise the constitutive role of extra-neural scaffolding, he is sensitive to its 
importance. In a reversal of the stance adopted by F&A, who claim to use extended 
cognition only as a heuristic but implicitly endorse it, Walter claims to endorse it but 
does not really do so.  
 
Does the embedded cognition concept he uses here remain consistent throughout the 
paper? When he comes to discuss his favoured approach – enacted cognition48 – 
Walter begins to more explicitly question his concepts of cognitive states and 
processes. From the enacted perspective, as quoted in chapter 1, ‘[c]ognition is the 
relational process of sense-making that takes place between an autonomous system 
and its environment.’ There is a strong emphasis on the active nature of cognition, to 
the extent that proponents ‘seem committed to the view that in the absence of agency 
there can be no cognition’ (Walter, 2010: 69). This is a radical departure from the 
embedded cognition concept that Walter seemed to be implicitly employing when he 
was discussing extended cognition.  
 
                                                          
47
 A similar objection to Walter is also raised by Kyselo, and I will mention this in the next 
subsection. 
48
 It should be noted that Walter expresses doubt over whether his characterisation of the enacted 
cognition perspective is adequate (Walter, 2010: 66, footnote 12). This explicit doubt would not 
prevent Walter from implicitly making use of an enacted cognition concept, but it should make us 




Walter says something about concepts which may help us to figure out what is going 
on here, when he goes on to ask whether the enacted approach would require mere 
possession of sensorimotor skills, or the actual exercise of such skills for cognition 
to take place. In the latter case, LIS patients’ cognition would be seriously impeded 
or prevented altogether because they cannot exercise sensorimotor skills; testing LIS 
patients’ cognitive abilities could therefore answer his question. However, Walter 
goes on to note that such testing is only effective  
 
provided, of course, that the studies that test the cognitive capacities take into account what 
ENC [enacted cognition] says about cognition. That no cognitive impairments are found in 
LIS patients counts against ENC only if the notion of the “cognitive” underlying the 
experimental tests is the same as the notion appealed to by the enactivist. Moreover, the 
choice of which cognitive capacities to test may make a difference—a fact that may go 
unnoticed unless situated approaches to cognition, and in particular ENC, are taken into 
account. (Walter, 2010: 70). 
 
He refers to the experiments of Schnakers et al. discussed above, noting that the 
cognitive capacities tested ‘are more or less the sort of “offline” cognitive capacities 
at the focus of classical cognitivism’ (Walter, 2010: 70). Here, we see Walter 
conceding that how cognitive states are conceptualised varies in this debate, and how 
they should be conceptualised is what is in question.  
 
In light of this, the best way to see Walter’s implicit concept of memory is as 
flexible, or open to being viewed from different perspectives. As we found when 
discussing F&A’s concept, this flexibility of concept is important, because how to 
conceive of cognition is what is being debated.  
 
Kyselo 
Kyselo (2013), agrees with Walter that the enacted (enactive in her terminology) 
approach is the best way of thinking about BCIs and their effect on the self, but 
argues that BCIs can be seen as vehicles or realizers of certain extended cognitive 
processes. She argues effectively that, in his discussion of BCIs and extended 
cognition, Walter fails to realize that bodily processes are part of cognitive processes 
for an extended cognition advocate. This is similar to the point I made above, 
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although Kyselo goes about making it in a slightly different way (Kyselo, 2013: 
581). 
 
Here, she seems to be adopting a similar concept of cognition to the extended 
cognition theorist. This can be seen particularly in her example of a patient using the 
cursor of a BCI to draw a virtual mind map: 
 
The proponent of EXT [extended cognition] could hold that this is a case of extended 
cognition, where in order to perform a complex mental task movement of an external tool 
allows outsourcing parts of the memory process as well as of our abstraction capacities. 
Bringing items into a logical order, or conceptualizing a dynamic relationship clearly counts 
as cognitive. The only difference in the case of BCI is that it is partly externally realized. 
(Kyselo, 2013: 581). 
 
However, when she discusses the self, the approach advocated is an enacted one 
rather than extended, because extended cognition lacks a notion of what the self is 
(Kyselo, 2013: 582). Although I am interested in cognition rather than the self here, 
the enacted approach has no clear-cut separation of consciousness and cognition, and 
puts conscious experience at the heart of cognitive science (Kyselo, 2013: 588). This 
suggests that Kyselo would defend enacted cognition as well, and in fact there are a 
couple of hints that this is the case. 
 
Introducing the criticisms of Walter that I have already discussed, she says: ‘He has 
sought to clarify these distinctions [between the different situated cognition 
perspectives]; subsequently assigning the role of the appropriate situated approach to 
the enactive approach to cognition. […] Walter is right in this, but for the wrong 
reason.’ (Kyselo, 2013: 580, my emphasis). She also says in a footnote that it might 
be better to use a single unified framework ‘if explanatory efficiency matters’ 
(Kyselo, 2013: 584, footnote 6). This unity would make sense for an enactivist, 
particularly given the lack of separation between cognition and consciousness on the 
enacted perspective. Taken together, these things suggest that her defence of an 
enacted approach to the self is also implicitly a defence of enacted cognition. 
 
Again we see more than one kind of concept within a single paper – extended 
cognition and enacted cognition – because how to conceptualise cognitive states or 
153 
 
processes is part of what is in question. The best way to see Kyselo’s implicit 
concept is as flexible, or open to being viewed from different perspectives. 
 
Heersmink 
The final paper in this debate is Heersmink (2013). He focusses on the idea of tools 
used for extended cognition being trusted and transparent in use. Otto’s notebook 
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998) is like this. It can play the same functional role as 
biomemory in a healthy subject because it has become a transparent cognitive tool 
that is consulted without conscious thought. BCIs, due to the difficulty of using 
them, are not like this. 
 
They [BCIs] are difficult to use and only work in highly controlled laboratory settings; they 
require a long, complex training period and a high degree of concentration. They have 
furthermore very limited control options, a highly variable use-efficiency and effector 
motions are often slow, clumsy and sometimes unsuccessful. Because of these limitations, an 
agent cannot fully trust these systems to perform their function adequately and they are not 
experienced as transparent extensions of the human body. (Heersmink, 2013: 214). 
 
These limitations of BCIs could be overcome as technology improves. Heersmink 
endorses the extended cognition approach, so believes that this is a possibility. He 
discusses the use of pen and paper as an external memory store, arguing that another 
way in which it differs from a BCI is in the possibility for external manipulation of 
ideas (Heersmink, 2013: 217). Based on this observation, he suggests ways in which 
the interface of BCIs could be improved, for example a larger workspace where 
emerging text can be manipulated more easily (Heersmink, 2013: 218–219). 
 
Heersmink adopts an extended cognition concept of memory according to which 
vehicles of memory can be found spread across the brain, body and world. The 
external vehicles must be connected in a particular way to the controlling human, 
viz. they must be trusted and transparent in use. Heersmink’s implicit and explicit 
concepts are extended. Unlike the other philosophers considered here, the topic of 
the paper is not which perspective to use, but how BCIs can be made better vehicles 
for cognition on the extended cognition approach. Heersmink’s concept therefore, 




The four philosophical papers discussed above are all part of the same debate over 
the role BCIs play in cognition, but the debate is approached by questioning the 
conceptualisation of cognition itself, and therefore of specific cognitive states or 
processes like memory. It is therefore not surprising that in three cases out of four it 
has been impossible to pin a single kind of implicit concept on the authors. Reasons 
for this will become clearer in the next section. 
 
Summary 
Before moving on, it will be useful to summarize what I have said about the implicit 
concepts of memory in each paper: 
 
Neuropsychologists and  Allain et al. Brainbound 
neurologists Schnakers et al. Brainbound 
 León-Carrión et al. Embedded 
Philosophers Fenton & Alpert Flexible (extended) 
 Walter Flexible (embedded / enacted) 
 Kyselo Flexible (enacted / extended) 
 Heersmink Extended 
(Types of concept listed in brackets represent positions that seem to be held at some 
point in the text, see above for details.) 
 
The concept of memory has been shown to vary in terms of whether a situated 
cognition perspective is appropriate, and if so, which one. There are a number of 
possible positions on offer, as shown in this section, with the main contrast being 
between neuropsychologists and neurologists taking memory to be something that 
happens in brains, and philosophers having a concept that is more open to situated 
cognition perspectives, but is flexible between which of them should be used. I will 
now go on to explore how the epistemic niches for MEMORY shape the concepts, and 
whether those epistemic niches are composed of internal considerations, untried 
hypotheses, or external considerations. 
 
Identifying and assessing the epistemic niches 
Neuropsychologists and neurologists 
As outlined in previous chapters, the epistemic niche of a concept is constituted by 
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the surrounding parts of the framework which apply pressure to that concept, 
defining the role it is needed to play. Here I will examine some of the most important 
pressures on MEMORY for this case study, beginning with the neuropsychologists and 
neurologists. 
 
Focus on the brain 
The first three papers considered here (Allain et al., Schnakers et al., and León-
Carrión et al.) share the common idea of testing for cognitive impairment in LIS 
patients, and all include testing memory as part of this. They are all co-authored by a 
mixture of neuropsychologists and medical practitioners or researchers specialising 
in rehabilitation of brain injury patients. All three come from journals with a focus 
on the brain, or neurology more generally. There is therefore a pressure towards a 
neuro-centric concept of cognitive capacities like memory from both the training of 
the authors, and from the journals they are submitting to. Allain et al. and Schnakers 
et al. use standard psychological tests for memory. As neuropsychologists, they see 
these tests as tests of brain function, although the testing method is psychological. 
 
Is a focus on the brain an internal consideration for neuropsychology and neurology? 
It looks as though the answer to this is obviously “yes” because such a focus defines 
the fields. But this alone only makes it a presupposition, not necessarily an 
internalised criterion. Domain formation is connected to conceptual development and 
should also become increasingly dependent on internal factors. In light of this, the 
best approach here is to look at the development of these neuro-centric fields to find 
out and examine the reasons for their foundation. The important question is whether 
their domains were formed for internal reasons. 
 
The term “neuropsychology” ‘…is relatively new (Bruce, 1985), having gained 
currency only in the 1950s when it displaced older terms, e.g., psychoneurology 
(Bekhterev), brain pathology (Kleist).’ (Benton, 2000: 3). The 1950s was a time 
when behaviourism was still significant, but beginning to be challenged by 
cognitivism. The neurosciences grew out of this focus on the physical basis of the 
mental. I will consider two particularly important factors in the formation of these 




Localisation in the brain was of particular relevance for the development of the 
neuro-sciences, and this goes back at least to phrenology in the late 19
th
 century, and 
to discoveries that damage to particular brain areas resulted in particular pathologies 
(e.g. Broca’s discovery in 1861 of an area of the brain related to speech production). 
This idea is linked to a faculty view of psychology, and the theory that a particular 
brain area corresponds to a particular mental faculty. Traces of this view can be seen 
in the papers described here, with memory being used as an example cognitive 
capacity (a particular faculty) that is explicitly linked to the brain. Discoveries such 
as Broca’s represent successes because they have led to fruitful subsequent research 
and applications (e.g. for brain damaged patients). Therefore localisation to 
particular brain areas was internalised by the sciences of the mind (although as with 
everything else in science, this was a defeasible assumption).
49
 The new disciplines 
such as neuropsychology coalesced around this success.  
 
A second major factor in the formation of the domains of neuropsychology and 
neurology was the development of various technologies. I will look at whether this 
factor is internal to neuropsychology first, then move on to consider neurology. 
 
Neuropsychology is an interdisciplinary enterprise, therefore ‘the history of 
neuropsychology has been one of irregular progress as advances in one or another of 
its contributory disciplines were achieved and made an impact on thinking and 
practice in the field.’ (Benton, 2000: 4). Many of these advances have been 
technological, for example recent improvements in brain imaging techniques such as 
MRI and CAT scans. Shaping research in tandem with such technological 
improvements has been successful in terms of linking research into the mind with 
medical applications (see also Rand and Ilardi, 2005: 15–16). Following 
technological advancements in this way was therefore internalised into 
neuropsychology. 
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 The idea that particular areas of the brain are responsible for particular mental states or processes 
has not continued to be successful, and in fact the data suggests very strongly that this is not the case. 
Instead it now appears that each region of the brain is involved in several mental states and processes, 
and each mental state or process requires several brain regions. The response to this may be to change 
our categories to ones which fit the neural data more neatly, or to accept that mental states and 
processes are multiply realized at the neural level. Finding out which of these is the case is part of the 
motivation for the Cognitive Atlas project (see chapter 2), which includes fMRI data for each mental 




Neurology, unlike neuropsychology, is a branch of medicine.  
 
[T]he origins of the specialty in hospitals and universities can be located only in the mid-
nineteenth century and afterwards, a fact that makes it difficult to identify the way 
neurological knowledge was systematically acquired before this period (McHenry, 1969; 
DeJong, 1982). Moreover, the inclusion of neurology as a discipline recognized within the 
medical profession in terms of autonomous hospital departments, university teaching and 
professional certification occurred only around the period of World War I (Magoun, 1975). 
(Casper, 2010: 638). 
 
There were some social reasons, particularly linked to the war, that were important 
in neurology’s formation: 
 
Historians routinely associate the intellectual origins of American neurology with studies of 
wounded soldiers first conducted by Silas Weir Mitchell and William A. Hammond during 
the American Civil War…As these physicians began elaborating a set of practices that would 
trigger the local emergence of modern neurology throughout North America, a simultaneous 
convergence of social, economic and intellectual forces in the commercial and industrial 
milieu of the post-bellum United States made the formation of clinical specialties 
increasingly acceptable to the medical profession and the public. Thus, within a few years of 
the conflict of 1861–65, specialist organizations devoted to the diagnosis and treatment of 
nervous conditions began to decorate the American medical landscape. (Casper, 2010: 638). 
 
The history of neurology is closely tied to changing dissection techniques and 
results. Vesalius dissected out nerve tissue in the 16
th
 century, but he did not 
typically remove the brain from the skull. Later, this began to change: 
 
Perhaps Thomas Willis (1621–1675) was the founder of neurology… and the arterial circle 
at the base of the brain is one of Willis’ eponymous claims to fame…Willis removed the 
whole brain from the body instead of dissecting from above and the cerebral body thus 
removed was seen to contain important solid portions. Earlier workers had concentrated on 
the ventricles, perhaps echoing William Harvey’s emphasis on the solid portions of the heart 
rather than its cavities—the empty areas. Solid organs influenced the movement of fluids, the 
opposite view to that of early classical physiologists and Cartesians. We might think of a 
bottle turned upside down where the fluid drains, the fluid moving and the solid walls 
remaining unmoved. Here we have the solid portions of the body being the more active. 
Removal of the brain from the body liberated the theory of the humours of coldness, 
158 
 
moisture, dryness and heat. The cerebral body was part of the whole of man’s body, a body 
which was beginning to be anatomized. (Gardner-Thorpe, 2000: 2573–2574). 
 
In addition to changing dissection techniques, the invention of and subsequent 
improvements in microscopy were important. E. Purkinje (1787–1869) in 1837 gave 
the first description of neurones, a very early description of cells of any kind. 
Electricity was another relevant technology, from Galvani’s work in the 18th century 
on the effect of electricity on the muscles, to the use of electricity as a therapy (e.g. 
ECT). 
 
The development of neurology was therefore led by dissection techniques, 
microscopy and the use of electricity in the same way that the development of 
neuropsychology was led by technological advances. Following technology in this 
way was successful, resulting in the medical applications mentioned (brain scanning 
techniques, treating wounded soldiers) and to some degree of predictive success, e.g. 
predicting what a brain scan of a person will look like while they are doing a certain 
kind of task (e.g. a motor task), although more specific prediction (mind reading as 
the press would have it) has proved elusive. 
 
Shapere says of technology:  
 
[I]n particular, the instruments that particle physicists or astronomers or molecular biologists 
employ, while their detailed design and construction require an engineering expertise, are 
now almost invariably proposed and constructed in the light of some scientific theory in the 
area in which they are to be used. To that very great extent, technology has itself been 
“internalized” into the disciplines in which it is employed, affecting the problems and 
strategies of that discipline as the latter affects it. (Shapere, 1986b: 21). 
 
The same seems to have been the case for technology in neuropsychology and 
neurology, so this consideration is internal to those subdisciplines.  
 
The development of neuropsychology and neurology out of existing disciplines such 
as psychology and medicine followed a path at least largely dependent on 
internalised considerations – here I have looked at localization and technology. The 
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focus on the brain is therefore internal to these neuro-centric disciplines. 
 
Need for easy testability 
Another pressure on the neuropsychologists’ and neurologists’ concept of memory is 
the need for diagnostic criteria. The papers aim to investigate the assumption that 
LIS patients have unimpaired cognition and consciousness. This has never been an 
unquestioned assumption, but it is notoriously difficult to investigate, given the 
challenges in communicating with patients, the difficulties of differential diagnosis 
between LIS and minimally conscious state and persistent vegetative state, and the 
occurrence of additional brain damage that may result in cognitive impairment in 
some cases. Diagnosis is often slow (over two months on average, León-Carrión et 
al., 2002, survey: 573) and this is obviously traumatic for the patient and their 
friends and family. This creates a pressure to find clearer diagnostic criteria that can 
be easily and quickly applied. 
 
Given the aim of finding out exactly what state LIS patients are in, and how they 
should best be treated, there is pressure towards a concept of memory according to 
which it can easily be tested. Because LIS results from brain damage, it is natural to 
test for brain impairments. The need for easy testability therefore creates pressure 
towards a brainbound concept of memory. 
 
For neurology, because it is a branch of medicine, the biggest part of what it is to be 
successful is improved patient outcomes, and the differential diagnosis referred to 
here is an important part of that. For severely brain-damaged patients, other factors 
include establishing communication of some kind, and getting the patient into a 
stable enough condition that they can live at home. Focussing on easily testable 
measures has been internalised because it has led to these kinds of success. 
Neuropsychology on the other hand is a research discipline, not an applied medical 
one. Results that lead to improved patient outcomes are part of what it means to be 
successful, but prediction and explanation of the world is a larger component of 
success for a discipline of this sort. Pressure to design testing methods that are as 
quick as possible is an external pressure that comes from the applied medical 
disciplines, not one internal to neuropsychology itself. It is relied on as a criterion, 
but lacks the relevant history of success in neuropsychology, so for them, selecting a 
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testing method dependent on a purely brainbound concept just because it is quicker 
and easier to administer is an external consideration. 
 
This conflict between the two disciplines comes about because they have different 
histories, different aims and measures of success, and therefore have internalised 
different criteria. It highlights the problem of interdisciplinary collaboration; what 
considerations should be used when members of two disciplines work together?  
 
Brigandt and Love’s problem-centred approach to multidisciplinarity is useful here 
(Brigandt, 2010; Love, 2008; Brigandt and Love, 2010). “Multidisciplinarity” is the 
term used to describe disciplines transiently working together, while the term 
“interdisciplinarity” is reserved for new disciplinary units formed by the merging of 
existing disciplines (Love, 2008: 876, note 1). What we have here seems to be a 
multidisciplinary collaboration between neuropsychology and neurology (although 
this doesn’t rule out some stable new discipline forming from their collaboration in 
the future). 
 
According to the problem-centred approach, the contribution each discipline should 
make and which discipline(s) should be explanatorily fundamental varies with the 
problem at issue (Brigandt, 2010: 295). Each problem will have its own set of 
questions, or problem agenda (Love, 2008: 877). For Allain et al. and Schnakers et 
al., the project is to find out whether LIS patients have unimpaired cognition. This 
problem agenda is mostly research-based, rather than having directly medical aims 
(although of course there will be ultimate benefit for patients and this is one 
important motivation). Therefore it seems that the considerations internalised by 
neuropsychology should have more weight in this case.
50
 The pressure to use a 
purely brainbound concept of memory just because it is easier to test is an external 
consideration for the authors of these two papers; although it may serve the aim of a 
medical discipline, it does not serve the research aim.  
 
                                                          
50
 This is my own application of Brigandt and Love’s central idea, and is somewhat different from 
their own examples, which involve integrating approaches from subdisciplines working at different 
levels in biology. They do not use the notion of internalisation. 
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For León-Carrión et al., the main aim is slightly different: rehabilitation of the 
patient. This is a more directly medical aim, so neurology is more fundamental than 
neuropsychology in this case. Easy testability is therefore an internal factor for León-
Carrión et al. This factor therefore should be allowed to shape León-Carrión et al.’s 
concept, but not Allain et al.’s or Schnakers et al.’s. However, easy testability applies 
pressure towards a brainbound concept, and according to what I argued above, León-
Carrión et al.’s is the only paper to not employ such a concept. As I said above, 
León-Carrión et al.’s paper has at least some openness to an embedded cognition 
concept. So far I have only discussed factors that apply pressure towards a 
brainbound concept, so nothing I have said accounts for this. I will now attempt to 




Care and attempted rehabilitation of the patient after diagnosis is the major concern 
for León-Carrión et al. This includes more effective communication to improve 
quality of life, and a realistic understanding of the prognosis of patients. Doctors 
often offer little or no treatment in the belief that LIS patients have no prospect for 
recovery (47.1% of those surveyed in León-Carrión et al.’s study were not currently 
being treated). Challenging this is one aim of León-Carrión et al.’s work (León-
Carrión et al., 2002, review: 561–567). 
 
I have argued that León-Carrión et al. have an embedded cognition concept of 
memory that is at least open to the importance of external scaffolding. The aim of 
their paper is to survey patients to collect data which suggest diagnostics and 
rehabilitation procedures (León-Carrión et al., 2002, survey: 571). While all the 
papers I am looking at are interested in diagnostics and rehabilitation, León-Carrión 
et al. differ in their focus on the patients’ point of view. The tests applied by Allain 
et al. and Schnakers et al. are to be administered by a specialist experimenter who 
will decide, based on the results, whether memory is impaired. León-Carrión et al.’s 
method of asking the patients means that the judgement of impairment is left to the 
patients themselves. The patients do not need a concept of memory that can be tested 
using a neuropsychological battery, or one that measures the extent and type of their 
brain injury; they need one that represents how they remember in their everyday 
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lives. Therefore, there is no pressure to exclude external scaffolding for memory, and 
some pressure to include whatever they may have access to via technology such as a 
BCI, or communication with other people. 
 
While the authors are from the same subdisciplines as those of the previous two 
papers discussed, what counts as success for them is different (or rather, while the 
same factors are important for success, the emphasis placed on them is different). 
Brigandt and Love’s problem-centred approach can be used again to clarify this. As I 
said in the last subsection, the problem agenda is different for León-Carrión et al., so 
the weights given to the contributions of the different subdisciplines will be different 
too, with neurology having priority over neuropsychology. Of the factors 
internalised by the relevant subdisciplines, the important ones are those that were 
internalised due to past successes relative to the aims that León-Carrión et al.’s 
research emphasizes. In this case, that means factors that led to improved diagnostics 
and rehabilitation procedures. Patient-centred care is one such factor. 
 
Taking patients’ own views seriously (and the views of their friends and families) is 
an important component of patient-centred care. This is an approach that has proved 
important in the treatment of LIS patients, for example in management of 
anaesthesia. Yoo et al. (2012) report how the use of a bispectral monitor can help to 
determine whether a patient is awake or not, and therefore allow an appropriate level 
of anaesthesia during an operation and better post-operative care. This is particularly 
important because, as they demonstrate in their paper, an LIS patient can be awake 
while his eyes are closed, even if he has preserved eyelid movement and at other 
times opens his eyes when awake. Because the LIS patient can neither move nor 
speak, he has no way of communicating that he is awake, so this monitoring is of 
crucial importance during and after an operation. In the case Yoo et al. describe, it 
was initially used because the wife of the patient raised concerns that nurses were 
treating him as though he was asleep when his eyes were closed. She claimed to be 
able to tell that sometimes he was awake in these situations, and expressed concerns 
about pain management for an upcoming operation for a pressure ulcer. 
 
Yoo et al. provide a list of ‘[p]atient-centred concerns for locked-in syndrome (LIS)’, 
the first of which being ‘[p]atient-centred care focuses on the patient and family 
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concerns and needs throughout the hospitalization.’ (Yoo et al., 2012: 7, table 2). 
Taking the patient’s point of view and his wife’s concerns seriously in this case 
contributed to the aim of improved patient care. Before, during and after the 
operation, the surgical team and nurses were able to tell when the patient was awake 
and when he was asleep, and treat him accordingly. 
 
More widely, patient-centred care has proved effective for chronic conditions. In the 
introduction to a theme issue of the British Medical Journal on managing chronic 
diseases, Edward Wagner says: 
 
Despite the clinical differences across these chronic conditions, each illness confronts 
patients and their families with the same spectrum of needs: to alter their behaviour; to deal 
with the social and emotional impacts of symptoms, disabilities, and approaching death; to 
take medicines; and to interact with medical care over time. In return, healthcare must ensure 
that patients receive the best treatment regimens to control disease and mitigate symptoms, 
as well as the information and support needed effectively to self manage their health and, in 
many instances, their death. (Wagner, 2002). 
 
The introduction is subtitled “The efficacy of coordinated and patient centred care is 
established, but now is the time to test its effectiveness”. The points made in the 
passage just quoted make this efficacy unsurprising, and they are very much 
applicable to LIS. LIS patients and their families, like sufferers of other chronic 
conditions, must adjust to a new way of life.  
 
Recognising this has led to improved patient care, and in some cases evidence 
suggests it can improve physical health. For example, Wagner cites Norris et al.’s 
study (2002) on the use of self management education (a form of patient-centred 
care) for type 2 diabetes. The conclusion of Norris et al.’s study is that ‘[s]elf-
management education improves GHb levels at immediate follow-up, and increased 
contact time increases the effect.’ (Norris et al., 2002).51 Taking patients’ and their 
families’ concerns and points of view seriously is a consideration which has been 
internalised due to past success, both in terms of physical outcomes and patient 
experience. 
                                                          
51
 Although the conclusion continues ‘[t]he benefit declines 1–3 months after the intervention ceases, 
however, suggesting that learned behaviors change over time. Further research is needed to develop 




This is the context of the consideration of the patient’s point of view that I have 
argued pushes León-Carrión et al.’s concept of memory in the direction of being 
open to external scaffolding. Their implicit embedded cognition concept of memory 
is therefore legitimate to the extent that it is shaped by this factor. 
 
Summary 
In summary of what I have said about the epistemic niche for the neuropsychologists 
and neurologists: 
Factor applying 
pressure to concept 
Concept encouraged by 
this pressure 
Internal / Hypothesis / 
External 
Brain focus Brainbound Internal 
Testability Brainbound External for Allain et al. and 
Schnakers et al.; 
Internal for León-Carrión et al. 
Patient-centred care 
(mainly affects  
León-Carrión et al.) 
Embedded Internal 
 
For Allain et al. and Schnakers et al., focus on the brain is an internal factor, and 
easy testability is an external factor. Both of these factors apply pressure towards a 
brainbound concept. 
 
Recalling that a concept is both legitimate and rational to the extent it is shaped by 
internal factors, the brainbound concepts of memory found here are legitimate and 
rational to the extent that they arise as a next step in the history of successful brain-
focussed subdisciplines, but non-legitimate and irrational to the extent that they are 
shaped by the need for a concept which makes memory easily testable. Therefore, 
although holding a brainbound concept may well be legitimate for the time being, in 
the event of new factors applying pressure towards a situated cognition concept 
becoming relevant, these authors and others like them are at risk of holding too 
tightly to a brainbound concept in response to the external pressure towards easy 
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testability. One such new factor may be patient-centred care, for example if they 
were to undertake a project like León-Carrión et al.’s. 
 
For León-Carrión et al., all the factors considered here are internal. Focussing on the 
brain, and easy testability apply pressure towards a brainbound concept, while 
patient-centred care (taking patients’ own views seriously) applies pressure towards 
an embedded cognition concept. Here we see a tension between two aims focussed 
on patient welfare: the aim to diagnose patients as quickly as possible (best 
facilitated by a brainbound concept) and the aim to aid their recovery (best facilitated 
by a situated cognition concept). This is perhaps why León-Carrión et al. are using 
an embedded cognition concept, rather than a “stronger” (i.e. less brainbound) 
situated cognition perspective such as extended cognition. To the extent that it is 
shaped by the pressures considered here, this concept is legitimate and rational. It is 
impossible to say more than this for sure here, but the tension discovered suggests 
that different kinds of concept will be applicable in projects that have different aims, 
so there is no way to stipulate a single type of concept that neuropsychologists and 
neurologists should be using. I will return to this point in the conclusion to this 
chapter. 
 
There is some evidence here that both brainbound and embedded cognition concepts 
are currently functioning as investigative kinds in neuropsychology and neurology, 
although there are some tensions in the epistemic niches such that we cannot 
conclude that both kinds of concept should continue to be used in future projects in 




The philosophers I am looking at here are all working within a part of philosophy 
that falls under the interdisciplinary banner “cognitive science”. They also all fall 
under the banner of ethics – the papers were all published in the journal Neuroethics. 
Much of what I say here is perhaps only applicable to this particular subset of 
philosophers. Talking about philosophy more broadly would require an argument 
that my Shaperean methods can be applied outside the sciences broadly construed, as 
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well as much more discussion of the diverse aims and standards for success in 
philosophy as such. 
 
When compared to the neurologists and neuropsychologists, the epistemic niche for 
the philosophers’ concept is very different. While the philosophers are interested in 
rehabilitation and the quality of life of patients, their interest is from the point of 
view of philosophical ethics, rather than immediate bedside care. None of the authors 
are medical practitioners, so the demands on them are very different. The most 




The philosophers are open to questioning their concepts of cognitive states or 
processes like memory, and this openness to questioning creates a pressure towards 
having flexible concepts. Questioning their concepts of important phenomena is a 
major part of what philosophers are trained to do. In the context of the situated 
cognition debates, what cognition is, and therefore what particular cognitive states 
are, is what is in question. This can be seen, for example, in the debate over the 
“mark of the cognitive” in the extended cognition literature (e.g. Adams and Aizawa, 
2001; Clark, 2008). This is a debate over what features something must have in order 
to be cognitive, and over whether listing such features is the right way to go about 
analysing cognition in the first place (see Hurley, 2010 for an example of someone 
who believes it is not). 
 
Is this questioning of concepts internal to philosophy? I suggest that it is, because it 
has allowed philosophers to successfully meet the philosophical aim of engaging in 
debate. Questioning concepts is a very important part of debate in traditional 
philosophy; but more than this, philosophers debate over their aims, what would 
count as a good theory or explanation, what their methods should be etc. Philosophy 
seems to display far more radical plurality and disunity than even psychology.  
 
According to the account I developed in chapter 3, this is not a sign of immaturity in 
philosophy. I would argue that, unlike psychology which has not yet internalised 
either unity or plurality, philosophy has internalised plurality. Over time, plurality 
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has proved more successful than unity within philosophy. The nearest philosophy 
seems to come to unity is widespread general movements like logical positivism, 
although there is of course still much disagreement within them. But such 
movements have always collapsed, with logical positivism now being famously 
“dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes” (Passmore, 1967). 
 
Debate about the fundamentals of the discipline is a proper part of what philosophy 
is, with metaphilosophy and the philosophy of philosophy being hotly contested. 
Timothy Williamson says that ‘[t]he philosophy of philosophy is automatically part 
of philosophy, just as the philosophy of anything else is’ (Williamson, 2007: ix). 
 
This radical plurality requires concepts that are open to question in order to debate 
effectively. Given that there is disagreement about almost all aspects of theory and 
practice in philosophy, it is not surprising that there should also be disagreements 
about concepts, given what I said in chapter 2 about conceptual development. 
Concepts are shaped by the theories and practices of which they are a part. In order 
to debate fruitfully with this level of disagreement, it must be possible to develop a 
reasonably high level of understanding of other disputants’ points of view, and this is 
why philosophers must have some flexibility in their concepts. They must be able to 
envisage how a different concept would fit in with a different framework of theory 




In more modern philosophy of cognitive science, openness to questioning concepts 
has also proven successful by allowing philosophers to engage with a variety of 
scientific literatures and to collaborate with scientists from a variety of 
subdisciplines whose concepts are not the same as their own. This is another source 
of success that has led to the internalisation of having concepts that are open to 
question. 
 
In the sections that follow, I want to address several factors that arise from the 
situated cognition literature. All the philosophers I have looked at in this case study 
explicitly advocate one of the situated cognition perspectives (although, as discussed 
                                                          
52
 This flexibility of concepts is perhaps part of the reason why attempts to elucidate our concepts by 
means of lists of necessary and sufficient conditions have met with no success. 
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above, their implicit concepts may not match their avowals). All four papers refer to 
Clark and Chalmers’ paper proposing the extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers, 
1998), in which extended memory in the form of a notebook is one of the main 
examples. Addressing this example, and how BCIs are relevantly similar or 
dissimilar, is important for all of them. Because of this, certain features of the 
literature that has grown up around Clark and Chalmers’ paper are major factors in 
the epistemic niche of MEMORY for these philosophers. 
 
Science fiction 
The first of the factors derived from the extended cognition literature is the focus on 
new technology, particularly that with a science fiction flavour. The extended 
cognition literature is very much concerned with the so-called cyborg fantasy 
examples (the term is due to Wilson, 2010: 173) and claims to offer us a way of 
seeing cognition that is appropriate for the modern world and our increasing 
integration with technology (see e.g. Clark, 2003). BCIs bring out this element in the 
debate. The idea of the completely paralysed patient using a technological avatar is 
very similar to the science fiction scenarios that inspire a lot of writers on extended 
cognition. The prevalence of this literature creates a pressure towards extended 
cognition concepts of cognitive states and processes. 
 
This pressure is clearly external to philosophy. While science fiction scenarios can 
provide a useful heuristic, they do not provide criteria that philosophical accounts 
should meet. There is no history of success attached to endorsing theories that sound 
particularly like science fiction scenarios. 
 
Social explanations 
Another factor deriving from the literature is the social nature of cognition. The 
dependence of the LIS patient on communication with others highlights this factor. 
For someone who wants to argue that social interaction is essential for or constitutive 
of cognition, the LIS patients’ situation is likely to be interpreted as one in which 
their cognitive abilities are dependent on or partly constituted by communication 
with their care-givers. This creates a pressure towards seeing cognitive states or 
processes from a situated cognition perspective, particularly from the distributed 
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cognition perspective (although also to some extent from the extended and enacted 
cognition perspectives). 
 
To see whether this consideration is internal or external or a hypothesis for the 
authors in question, we need to assess whether giving socially based explanations 
has a history of success in philosophy. In many branches of philosophy (e.g. 
philosophy of science, epistemology) social theories do have a long history. They 
have provided a valuable foil for more individualist accounts of knowledge, enquiry 
etc. and in this sense have led to some success. However, providing socially based 
explanations is not something that has come to be used as a criterion in philosophy 
generally, or in any of these sub-branches of philosophy. It is merely one type of 
theory on the table here, albeit one the authors in some situated cognition traditions 
tend to favour. To favour such explanations just because they are social is to 
prejudge the question of whether these views of cognition are adequate, and it is 
therefore an external factor in the epistemic niche for MEMORY in philosophy. 
 
Ethics 
A third important factor coming from the situated cognition literature is a concern 
with the ethical implications of a situated cognition perspective. The debate in the 
papers I am considering here takes place in an ethics journal, so it considers the 
potential ethical implications of BCIs playing a role in cognition. These focus 
particularly on autonomy, selfhood and patient choice, all things which may be 
enhanced by a BCI. 
 
Considerations about autonomy and selfhood are particularly philosophical ways of 
looking at the issue, compared to the more obvious medical concerns with pain and 
being able to express it, and the ability to carry out everyday tasks. The philosophical 
literature on topics like the self and its relation to cognition is highly complex, and 
this complexity is part of the epistemic niche for MEMORY here. There is much 
debate in the literature over the role of cognition in selfhood, the role of a BCI in 
cognition, and whether considering such enhancement from a situated cognition 
perspective would have good or bad consequences. The number of competing 
perspectives here means that consideration of ethical issues applies pressure towards 
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flexible concepts of cognitive states; having such flexible concepts is the only way to 
adequately assess the competing perspectives. 
 
Ethical considerations are internal to philosophy. Analysing ethical implications has 
allowed philosophy to have success in its aim to answer questions about the sorts of 
things people care about. However, perhaps it is not always the case that such 
implications should be allowed to lead and shape philosophical theories. It might be 
thought that it is appropriate that they do so in value philosophy, but not in 
metaphysics for example. Although the ethical implications are important, we might 
think that the world is as it is independently of them, and we should theorize about it 
as such. If we grant that this is right, would the question about MEMORY be similar? 
 
Recall from chapter 1 that the question I am interested in is an epistemic one about 
investigative kinds. The concept used should be that which best facilitates fruitful 
science. Ethically sound science is a part of this, so the question is not entirely 
separate from ethics, even if we grant that a metaphysical question might be. Ethical 
considerations are internal to this kind of philosophy. 
 
One possibility that might concern us is that these authors are only considering the 
moral dimension because they are trying to get published in Neuroethics. Publication 
in a particular journal is not the sort of thing that can establish a track record of 
success, so cannot be an internal consideration. Is this the motivation in this case? 
 
I think actual motivation is not the important question here. Recall that Shapere’s 
internal/external distinction is not about motivation, but rather the theories and 
practices of the discipline. Ethical considerations are internal to philosophy, and so 
they should be allowed to shape philosophers’ concepts, even if they are being 
employed for other reasons like journal publications in a particular case. If a 
particular experimental method has a proven track record in science, experiments 
done using that method should not be considered less reliable just because the 
scientist has been bribed to perform them on this particular occasion (provided we 
can be sure that the method has been followed properly). Similarly, because ethical 
considerations have a proven track record in general, the fact that they might be 
being employed for other reasons in this specific case is not important, provided 
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those other reasons do not interfere with the application of the considerations. And in 
this case there seems to be no reason to think that the philosophers concerned will be 
any worse at thinking through the ethical dimension of the problem just because their 
motivation may be publication in an ethics journal rather than thinking about this 
aspect for its own sake. Ethical considerations are therefore an internal factor in the 
epistemic niche for MEMORY in this case. 
 
Having an impact on another field 
Another pressure on philosophers’ concepts that is relevant here, although it is not 
specific to the situated cognition literature, is the pressure to make a difference in a 
field outside of philosophy. Because the kind of philosophy I am considering falls 
under the banner of cognitive science, the ability to do interdisciplinary work is an 
important aim. Philosophy that can make a difference to another field can most 
successfully meet this aim, so this is an internal factor. 
 
In this case, this factor applies pressure towards the situated cognition concepts, in 
particular extended cognition. This is because encouraging scientists and medical 
practitioners to view BCIs as a part of the substrate of the cognitive process is a 
concrete recommendation that philosophy can make that would affect practice in 
these other disciplines. Because the extended cognition approach is probably the one 
to have received the most philosophical attention, there is most to say from that 
perspective. We can see the response to this pressure particularly in Heersmink’s 
paper, with his analysis of how BCIs might be improved to better meet the criteria 
for realising part of an extended cognitive system. 
 
Summary 






pressure to concept 
Concept encouraged by this 
pressure 
Internal / Hypothesis 
/ External 
Questioning concepts Flexible Internal 
Science fiction Extended External 
Social explanations Distributed (/extended / enacted) External 
Ethics Flexible Internal 
Impact in another field Extended Internal 
 
The internal factors for the philosophers’ concept are: openness to questioning 
concepts, considering the ethical implications of theories, and having an impact on 
another field. Openness to questioning concepts creates pressure towards a flexible 
concept of memory, which may is to being viewed from different perspectives on 
cognition. Considering ethical implications also creates some pressure towards 
flexible concepts. Having an impact on another field creates some pressure towards 
the situated cognition concepts, particularly extended cognition. 
 
The external factors are: science fiction scenarios, and giving explanations from a 
social perspective. The first of these applies pressure towards an extended cognition 
concept, and the latter towards a distributed cognition (or possibly extended or 
enacted) concept.  
 
Most of the authors considered here have flexible concepts, and this is legitimate and 
rational to the extent that it is shaped by openness to questioning concepts, and 
ethical implications. Heersmink’s extended cognition concept is perhaps too rigid 
according to my analysis, maybe as a result of giving too much weight to external 
considerations such as science fiction scenarios. However, it is legitimate and 
rational to the extent that it is shaped by the pressure to have an impact on another 
field. In addition, having flexible concepts may mean defending a certain concept at 
a certain time for the sake of argument (as all the authors here do at some point in 
their papers). It would therefore be premature to condemn Heersmink’s use of an 
extended cognition concept as non-legitimate. What is suggested here is that he (and 




There is evidence here of a flexible concept of memory functioning as an 
investigative kind in philosophy, and some evidence, albeit more tentative, of an 
extended cognition concept also doing so. 
 
Conclusion 
The above work has shown that cognitive scientists working mainly in 
neuropsychology and neurology tend to have a different concept of memory from 
those working mainly in philosophy, although there is also some variation within 
these groups. This difference is due to differences in the epistemic niches of the 
concepts – what the authors need their concepts to achieve in the work they are 
doing. These factors create pressure on the concept of memory, which the concept is 
shaped by. 
 
Whilst it is not possible to consider every factor in any scientific framework, I have 
tried to identify the most significant in the epistemic niche for MEMORY. Some of the 
factors identified have been dismissed as external to the relevant subdisciplines, and 
the concept of memory therefore both non-legitimate and irrational to the extent that 
it is shaped by pressure from these factors. No untried hypotheses were found among 
the factors considered in this case study, perhaps because all the subdisciplines in 




When just the internal considerations are taken into account, neuropsychologists and 
neurologists have some pressure towards a brainbound concept, and some pressure 
towards an embedded cognition concept, particularly when they are carrying out 
work that aims to take patients’ own views into account. These are the two kinds of 
concept that I argued the scientists considered here are in fact employing. The 
philosophers have pressure towards having flexible concepts which can be 
considered from various perspectives, including the situated cognition perspectives. 
They also have some pressure towards accepting a situated cognition concept 
(particularly extended cognition) to the extent that their work tries to have an impact 
in fields outside philosophy. I argued that most of them do employ a flexible 
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concept, and the one who does not (Heersmink) employs a situated cognition 
concept (in this case extended). 
 
Various different concepts are currently functioning as investigative kinds in the 
subdisciplines considered here. There is quite strong evidence for brainbound and 
flexible concepts functioning as investigative kinds, and some more tentative 
evidence for embedded and extended cognition concepts also so functioning. These 
subdisciplines should therefore remain pluralist with respect to their concept 
MEMORY, at least for the time being. A possible advantage of this can be seen, 
particularly with respect to the tension identified in León-Carrión et al.’s work 
between easy testability applying pressure towards a brainbound concept, and 
patient-centred care applying pressure towards an embedded cognition concept. This 
tension suggests that different kinds of concepts (and their accompanying 




7. Constructing Memory in Political Scandals: A Case Study 
 
Introduction 
This case study focuses on a study of memory by cognitive psychologist Ulric 
Neisser, and a methodologically different study of a similar case by discursive 
psychologists Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter. Edwards and Potter first criticise 
Neisser’s work, before going on to present their own study as an improvement in the 
respects on which they base their criticism. In this sense, the two works constitute a 
debate over how memory should be studied, fulfilling my desideratum that 
contrasting work should be the basis of case studies to get the most out of my 
methods. There are also various similarities between the cases that provide useful 
points of comparison, particularly regarding veridicality and the notion of memory as 
constructed, as will become clear below. 
 
Both case studies concern political scandals. Neisser’s work (Neisser, 1981) 
concerns a case from the U.S. in the 1970s, namely John Dean’s testimony in the 
Watergate scandal. Edwards and Potter’s case (Edwards and Potter, 1992) is a 
political gaffe from the UK in 1988, involving the then chancellor, Nigel Lawson. 
Both Neisser and Edwards and Potter are interested in the role of context, and both 
are looking at discourse of a kind, although they disagree on how these things should 
be treated. 
 
Neisser advocates the so called “ecological” approach (Gibson, 1979), in which 
subjects are observed in real world contexts rather than in artificial laboratory tests. 
His work on John Dean’s testimony is an example of this approach, and is reprinted 
in a collection of papers demonstrating this approach for memory (Memory 
Observed, Neisser, 1982).  
 
Edwards and Potter on the other hand are among the founders of discursive 
psychology, a form of discourse analysis applied to human psychology that was 
developed in the late 1980s and 1990s. This is an approach that takes ordinary 
contexts even more seriously by focussing on the discourse that takes place in these 
contexts. They accuse studies like Neisser’s of only looking at the world through the 




This focus on the importance of context, but disagreement over its precise role, 
makes these cases good places to look for situated cognition perspectives, since it is 
the role of context (that which is external to the organism) that is of interest in 
situated cognition, and is disputed between its different varieties. It is this dispute 
which makes this case study a good one for my project. 
 
I will first outline the two cases, then go on to identify the implicit concepts present 
in each, arguing that both are using situated cognition concepts of memory, although 
of different kinds. I will then go on to identify the most important features in the 
epistemic niche for MEMORY in each case, and discuss which of them are internal, 
which are untried hypotheses, and which external to the branches of science in 
question. 
 
The case study 
The Watergate scandal occurred in the USA as a result of a break-in at the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office complex in 
1972. It was alleged that the break-in was organised by the president Richard Nixon 
and his Republican government, and that this was subsequently covered up. The 
scandal resulted in Nixon’s resignation in 1974. The investigation involved the trial 
of many of Nixon’s advisors, including White House Counsel John Dean. Dean 
volunteered himself as a key witness for the prosecution, and in return pleaded guilty 
to only one offence, resulting in a reduced prison sentence. It is on his testimony that 
Neisser focusses his investigation. 
 
Shortly after Dean had given his testimony, it was discovered that conversations 
taking place in Nixon’s office had been covertly tape-recorded. There was therefore 
a record of important conversations that Dean had recounted in court, to which his 
account could be compared. Neisser notes that much of Dean’s testimony was wrong 
both in terms of verbatim recall, and the gist of the conversations (two categories of 
memory used in cognitive psychology). Yet Dean was not taken to be lying. Neisser 
therefore proposes a third category of memory, “repisodic memory”, to describe 
what was correct about Dean’s testimony. Repisodic memory is memory which 
appears to be episodic memory – recall of particular autobiographical episodes – but 
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is not. Instead, ‘what seems to be an episode actually represents a repetition…He is 
not remembering the “gist” of a single episode by itself, but the common 
characteristics of a whole series of events’ (Neisser, 1981: 114). Dean’s testimony 
was therefore taken to be an honest account of what was going on at the White 
House, and of Nixon’s involvement, although it did not have many of the features 
we would typically take an accurate memory to have. 
 
Neisser takes many of the more specific errors in recall to be the result of Dean 
recounting the conversations as he would have liked them to have gone, not because 
he was trying to mislead, but because this was how he remembered them. 
 
Edwards and Potter criticise Neisser’s study for the way it treats discourse, for 
Neisser’s attribution of errors to features of Dean’s personality (his remembering 
conversations as he would like them to have gone), and for his notions of truth and 
error. 
 
For Edwards and Potter, discourse should be the object of study. They accuse 
Neisser of seeing it instead only as a way to discover the inner cognitive states. They 
say:  
 
Instead of following Neisser’s ecological cognitivism and attempting to use Dean’s 
testimony as a pathway to the nature of the cognitive processes that allow him to remember 
correctly, we took Dean’s testimony, and the various reports of events in the Oval Office it 
contained, as discursive acts which were part of broader activity sequences involving blame, 
responsibility and mitigation. (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 156–157). 
 
This is an expression of the attitude to discourse that characterises discursive 
psychology. Discourse is not just an expression of internal memory states on this 
view; rather, memory is constructed through the discourse in a way that is 
appropriate to the context and what the rememberer is trying to achieve in that 
context (for example apportioning blame to others, or mitigating one’s own 
responsibility). This attitude constitutes a general move advocated by the discursive 
psychologists away from the psychology of inner cognitive states and toward the 
public acts of discourse and what they achieve. Discursive psychology is not 
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necessarily anti-representationalist, but discourse is not chiefly interesting for the 
inner states it represents, but in its own right.  In Edwards and Potter’s words: ‘The 
study of situated discourse redefines and relocates the relations between language 
and understandings, and it does this by placing language as representation (whether 
of cognition or of reality) in a position subordinate to language as action.’ (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992: 158). 
 
Their criticism of Neisser’s explanation of Dean’s errors can be seen in a similar 
light. Neisser attributes misremembering to Dean’s ego – his desire for the meetings 
to have gone a certain way. However, there is no corresponding account of his 
accurate memories. For Edwards and Potter, both accurate and inaccurate memories 
should be explained symmetrically, by reference to the pragmatics of speaking 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 47). Again, this is a refocussing on speech acts as acts 
which are designed to achieve something in the context in which they are uttered. 
Not only is Neisser’s explanation asymmetrical with respect to accurate and 
inaccurate memory, his account of Dean’s errors is too rooted in Dean’s individual 
dispositions, rather than his pragmatic aims. 
 
Even Neisser’s notions of accurate and inaccurate memory are criticised by Edwards 
and Potter. They argue for a better account of what counts as getting it right in 
remembering, based on the rememberer’s context, rather than the analyst’s 
categories of truth and error. Describing their recommended reorientation, they say 
‘[i]n effect, we are moving from a view of people struggling to remember with the 
aid of their mental faculties to a view of people struggling with one another in their 
talk and texts over the real nature of events’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 57). In other 
words, the focus is shifted from an individual using their inner cognitive processes to 
remember, to groups of people employing discourse to construct memories. As with 
their other criticisms, this advocates a stronger role for context than ecological 
cognitive psychology seems to have room for, given the latter’s focus on the inner 
cognitive states. 
 
Explaining why they chose to write about Neisser’s work on Dean, Edwards and 
Potter say it is ‘as close a study as we can find to the kinds of materials, concerns 
and methods of discourse analysis, while still retaining an explanatory base in the 
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cognitive workings of mind.’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 32–33). The way they 
approach their own case study – Nigel Lawson’s gaffe – therefore really highlights 
the disagreements they have with Neisser, because the cases are so similar in other 
respects. 
 
Like Neisser’s, their study is focussed on a political scandal, but one on a much 
smaller scale. In 1988, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, 
attended a press briefing. The type of briefing is described by Edwards and Potter as 
‘universally characterized as a regular event, one of a series of “off-the-record” 
briefings in which senior politicians are able to “float ideas in the press”: 
forthcoming policies, plans and so forth, to which they do not yet want publicly to 
commit themselves.’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 58). 
 
At this briefing, Lawson was alleged to have proposed a policy of means-testing 
pensioners for benefits. Although some would be better off on this system, others 
would be worse off. Subsequent headlines were not favourable. For example, the 
Mirror’s article from November 7th (three days after the briefing) is headlined “Fury 
at Tory Blow to Old Folk”. It talks about a scheme that ‘would bring financial 
misery to millions and a further serious erosion of the welfare state’ and describes 
the way the plans were revealed at the briefing as “underhand” (via ukpressonline). 
 
In the face of this media furore, Lawson initially denied that he had said any such 
thing,  
 
claiming at one point that the journalists had got together and their “fevered imagination” 
had produced a “farrago of invention”, “inaccurate, half-baked” accounts which “bear no 
relation whatever to what I said” (quotations from The Times and the Guardian, Tuesday 8 
November). (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 58). 
 
As the media storm continued, with the journalists vigorously denying his 
accusations, he backed down and admitted that he had talked about the issue, but had 
been misunderstood; the actual policy would involve some being better off, but none 
being worse off. This policy was eventually implemented at great expense, resulting 
in accusations that the government was covering up for Lawson’s gaffe (e.g. ‘Extra 
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200 million pounds for poorest pensioners; Surprise announcement defuses Lawson 
row’ The Times, 25 Nov 1988; ‘200 million pounds windfall for old: Extra benefits 
for 2.6 million pensioners rushed through to cover Lawson's means test gaffe’ 
Guardian, 25 Nov 1988, quoted in Edwards and Potter, 1992: 59). 
 
Edwards and Potter’s study focusses on the act of remembering what happened at the 
lobby briefing, via the newspaper reports and the official parliamentary record of 
debates, Hansard. Through this written discourse, the participants construct a 
memory of the briefing. In contrast to the Watergate testimony, there was no tape 
recording of the meeting. There should have been, but something went wrong with 
the tape, a fact which led to its own chain of speculation about what the problem 
could have been and whether it was accidental. This absence of a record for 
comparison is just the situation we most often find ourselves in in ordinary life, and 
this is one of the discursive psychologists’ important points. Although ecological 
cognitive psychology attempted to move away from the laboratory and its method of 
recalling lists set by the experimenter, it is still tied to the comparison of memory 
with “what really happened”. 
 
It is their disagreement over the role of context that makes these cases a good place 
to look for situated cognition concepts. In terms of my project, the debate constitutes 
a disagreement over MEMORY. In the next section, I will look in more detail at the 
concepts in use in each case. 
 
Concepts of memory 
Neisser 
Ecological cognitive psychology is premised on the idea that cognition in everyday 
contexts may be different to cognition in the laboratory. Laboratory experiments are 
said to lack “ecological validity”. This means that the results found by traditional 
experimental psychology may not translate back into real contexts, which are the 
very things they are supposed to illuminate. To put this another way, the context in 
which the person is embedded makes a crucial difference. This is exactly what is 




The role given to the environment is the main thing that changes in the move from 
traditional to ecological approaches in cognitive psychology. It is not just that being 
in their typical environment allows subjects to remember better than they would in 
the laboratory; MEMORY and the other cognitive states or processes are 
conceptualised as embedded in a context, and this has implications for how they 
should be studied.  
 
Robert Rupert, a proponent of embedded cognition, says ‘[a]ccording to HEMC [the 
Hypothesis of EMbedded Cognition], the human cognitive system does not extend 
beyond the boundary of the organism, although during cognitive processing, the 
human exploits environmental objects and structures in surprising and extensive 
ways.’ (Rupert, 2009). This seems to be the assumption behind ecological cognitive 
psychology. If the cognitive system depends on the environment in important ways, 
normal cognition should not be studied outside the environment in which it normally 
takes place. On a more traditional brainbound approach, the situation shouldn’t make 
a relevant difference to the cognition that takes place, so laboratory studies should 
provide results that are typical of cognition in any other context. 
 
Eugene Winograd sees both the ecological and cognitive approaches as descendants 
of functionalism, marking a move away from the tradition of experiments on recall 
of nonsense syllables that began with Ebbinghaus. He discusses this in his 
introduction to a collection of papers he co-edited with Neisser, Remembering 
Reconsidered. Here, “functionalism” refers to the function in a particular 
environment, as he says ‘… early functionalism, that is, the importance of adaptation 
to the environment’ (Neisser and Winograd, 1988: 16). Note that this is not the same 
thing as functionalism in modern philosophy of mind. Functionalism of the 
environmentally-embedded variety was increasingly popular in the 1930s with 
several figures who rejected behaviourism, including Bartlett, Dewey, Mead, 
Vygotsky, Baldwin, Bergson, von Uexküll, (see Wagoner, 2013: 555–556). In this 
kind of functionalism, the environment is given the important causal role it has in 





Neisser, with his ecological approach, can therefore be seen as at the forefront of a 
move from brainbound cognitive concepts to embedded ones. (Recall that it is 
implicit concepts I am interested in here, so it does not matter that Neisser would not 
put his own work in these terms.) 
 
As further support for this claim, I will briefly consider how Neisser sees external 
memory aids like notebooks and knots in handkerchiefs. In Memory Observed 
(Neisser, 1982), the collection of papers edited by Neisser in which the Dean case 
study is reprinted, external memory aids are of particular relevance in papers by 
Harris, Kreutzer et al., and Istomina. In his introduction to Harris’s paper (Neisser, 
1982: 337), Neisser talks about external memory aids as parallel to internal memory 
techniques like the method of loci. This is a memory technique which involves 
picturing the items to be remembered at particular spatial locations, such as rooms in 
a building, or landmarks along a well-known route. According to Neisser’s 
comparison here, external memory aids like notebooks therefore remain as mere 
memory aids (“mnemonic devices”), rather than playing a constitutive role as they 
would on an extended cognition view. They are however of crucial importance. In 
his introduction to Istomina’s paper, which concerns experiments on children’s 
memories, Neisser acknowledges that ‘…at all ages, even the most knowledgeable 
age, performance on laboratory memory tests is markedly poorer than in the more 
natural kindergarten setting.’ (Neisser, 1982: 350). This shows the environment 





Neisser has since been seen by some in the literature as a forerunner of the situated 
cognition movement, which perhaps provides more evidence for my claim that he 
was beginning a move in this direction. For example, Dahlbäck et al. say in a recent 
paper on “distributed remembering”: ‘The discussion on memory, starting with 
Neisser’s anthology Memory Observed (1982), was a forerunner that bolstered the 
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 Neisser even notes that whether we use internal or external resources as memory aids will depend 
on context (Neisser, 1982: 337). How the choice is made between internal and external resources is 
something that modern situated cognition theorists have devoted some time to, e.g. Clark (2007) and 
Rupert’s (2004: 31–35) criticisms of him on the subject of Gray et al.’s experimental work (Gray and 
Fu, 2004; Gray and Veksler, 2005). Here the debate is concerned with the processing cost of 
accessing the resource, while Neisser suggests instead reliability as a basis for choice. 
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emergence of the notion of distributed cognition (Salomon 1993).’ (Dahlbäck et al., 
2013). Their use of the word “distributed” here seems to be a general umbrella term 
like my use of the term “situated”. They cite both Hutchins (proponent of distributed 
cognition more narrowly construed, see chapter 1), and Clark and Chalmers 
(proponents of extended cognition). If Neisser was one of the first to begin this 
move, it is perhaps not surprising that his implicit concept would be embedded, as I 
have argued, rather than full-blown extended. That cognition is embedded is the 
weaker claim, so adopting it requires a smaller change from the purely brainbound 
perspective that is implicit in traditional cognitive psychology. 
 
For Neisser then, memory is still something that takes place in brains, but it depends 
in interesting and important ways on the environment or context of the rememberer. 
In other words, his implicit concept of memory is an embedded cognition theorist’s 
concept. 
 
Edwards and Potter 
I have said that the discursive psychologists’ approach takes context and 
environment even more seriously than Neisser’s ecological approach does. Does this 
indicate a concept of memory based in one of the “stronger” situated cognition 
perspectives than embedded cognition? I think it does. 
 
For discursive psychologists, the discourse itself is primary, and discourse is not 
brainbound. More than this, it is shared between participants. Even if only one 
person writes or speaks the piece of discourse in question, it is part of a process 
taking place between that person and the intended audience. This is part of the aim of 
the speaker or writer. This observation suggests a concept of memory that is less 
centred on a particular individual. In fact, Edwards and Potter specifically discuss the 
fact that their approach is not the basis for an individual psychology: 
 
Discursive psychology is concerned with the way psychological entities and processes are 
constituted in discursive acts, and there are two senses in which these acts are not reducible 
to individual psychology. First, as we have emphasized in various places above, even where 
an utterance has an individual speaker, this speaker is not necessarily considered to be in 
sovereign control of her talk. Simple examples of this occur in the sorts of discourse we have 
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concentrated on where news reports are sifted and edited, and television interviews may be 
scripted and preplanned and in various ways collaborative and collective products. At a more 
profound level, post-structuralists have produced searching critiques of the very notion of 
sovereign control in this way (cf. Sampson, 1988). 
 
Secondly, when the psychology of agents or entities is constructed in talk and texts, these 
things are not necessarily correlated with the unitary subjects who form the basis of much of 
psychology. We have been concerned with the construction of a whole variety of actors, sub-
agents and collectives. Motivation, for example, may be attributed to some sort of sub-
system of self (‘a part of me wants to get really angry with you’), to a more or less standard 
individual (‘Shelley wants an ice cream’) or to a wide range of collectives (‘the Kurds have 
been wanting autonomy for decades’; ‘children from broken homes are looking for 
security’). For these reasons, we have seen it as very important to eschew the image of the 
single individual accounting for the actions of another individual; in some ways this most 
common of psychological paradigms is the least interesting to study. (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 171–172). 
 
Something like Hutchins’ distributed cognition framework is a good fit with this 
non-individualist approach. Recall that Hutchins characterises distributed cognition 
as follows:  
 
[C]ognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group, cognitive 
processes may be distributed in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves 
coordination between internal and external (material or environmental) structure, and 
processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of earlier events 
can transform the nature of later events. (Hutchins (2000: 1–2). 
 
Constructing a memory through discourse involves distribution across the members 
of the group involved in the discourse, and also coordination with material structures 
in the case of written discourse (the journalists’ notebooks, the newspaper reports, 
and the record in Hansard in this case). In a case like the Lawson scandal, there is 
also distribution through time; later pieces of discourse are responses to earlier ones, 
and this is part of negotiating the memory of the event. 
 
The only other kind of situated cognition perspective that can involve the spread of 
cognition across multiple people is extended cognition, so this possibility is also 
worth considering. Although Edwards and Potter’s work could be seen from an 
185 
 
extended cognition perspective, it would diverge somewhat from Clark’s proposal. 
Hutchins, in a review of Clark’s book Supersizing the Mind, proposes  
 
the hypothesis of enculturated cognition: The ecological assemblies of human cognition 
make pervasive use of cultural products. They are always initially, and often subsequently, 
assembled on the spot in ongoing cultural practices. With Supersizing the Mind, Clark has 
delivered the sciences of mind to a prospect from which the field can turn from the tunnel 
vision of brainbound thinking to the panorama of the enculturated Supersized Mind. 
(Hutchins, 2011: 445). 
 
This proposal is briefly made in a short review, but it seems to offer a way of 
construing the extended approach that is much closer to the distributed view in its 
being non-individualist. It is proposed as an alternative to what Clark describes as 
the “Hypothesis of Organism-Centred Cognition” (Clark, 2008: 139). Hutchins is 
directly challenging the individualism of the Organism-Centred approach. If his 
enculturated version of extended cognition could be fleshed out, that too could be a 
good framework for describing the discursive psychological concept of memory. 
 
More generally, the discursive psychology literature at times sounds as though it is 
arguing for parity or impartiality in considering inner and outer elements of putative 
extended cognitive systems, much as the extended cognition literature does. For 
example, Smith, Harré and Langenhove suggest that we ‘keep in mind the important 
observation that remembering is a task for people and that the memory “machines” 
in their heads are of no more and no less significance than the tape-recorders and 
diaries they also use’ (Smith, Harré and Langenhove, 1995: 156).  Similarly, Harré 
and Gillett discuss the idea of the brain as a custom-made instrument (Harré and 
Gillett, 1994: 96). These examples refer to tools or artefacts rather than other people, 
suggesting that discursive psychology may be compatible with these versions of 
extended cognition as well as social versions. 
 
I leave here these tentative suggestions of a type of extended cognition approach that 
fits with the discursive psychological concept of memory. The view would not be the 
extended cognition view that is currently prominent in the literature, and would need 
to be fleshed out considerably – a task beyond the scope of my project. We already 
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have one framework that fits Edwards and Potter’s implicit concept of memory well, 
namely the distributed cognition approach. 
 
For Edwards and Potter, memory is something constructed between participants in a 
discourse, as part of an occasioned discursive achievement. It is distributed between 
the participants in this act of discourse. 
 
Summary 
In summary, Neisser has an implicit embedded cognition concept of memory, and 
Edwards and Potter have an implicit distributed cognition concept of memory. 
 
Identifying and assessing the epistemic niches 
Neisser 
As outlined in previous chapters, the epistemic niche of a concept is constituted by 
the surrounding parts of the framework which apply pressure to that concept, 
defining the role it is needed to play. Here I will examine some of the most important 
pressures on MEMORY for this case study, beginning with Neisser. 
 
Rejection of the dominant paradigm 
One important pressure on Neisser’s concept of memory was for it to play its part in 
the reaction against traditional cognitive psychology and in setting up ecological 
cognitive psychology. Being part of cognitive psychology creates a pressure towards 
a concept of memory as an internal state of an organism, but setting up the ecological 
version creates pressure towards this internal state having a strong dependence on the 
environment, i.e. towards an embedded cognition concept. This pressure comes in 
part from the experimental methods employed to investigate memory. These include 
a move away from Ebbinghausian recall of nonsense syllables, and eventually a 
move away from the laboratory altogether. 
 
This pressure created by reacting against traditional cognitivism and setting up the 
ecological approach is particularly important at the time of the John Dean case study. 
Neisser talks about the importance of the “low road” in memory research, and the 
papers collected in his Memory Observed (1982) are intended to be examples of this. 
In the preface, he says that ‘those on the low road want to understand the specific 
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manifestations of memory in ordinary human experience’ as opposed to those on the 
high road who ‘hope to find basic mental mechanisms that can be demonstrated in 
well-controlled experiments’ (Neisser, 1982: xi). His paper on John Dean’s memory 
is printed in this collection, and thus is an example of how to travel the low road, and 
part of his support for the claim that people should take this route. Neisser explicitly 
acknowledged later that this had been an aim of his: ‘The principal goals of Memory 
Observed were to illustrate the possibilities of naturalistic memory research and 
encourage people to do more of it.’ (Neisser and Winograd, 1988: 2).  
 
To decide whether this factor is internal to the science, it is helpful to look from 
Neisser’s point of view at how the shift to the ecological approach came about. First 
it is worth saying something briefly about the rise of cognitive psychology and the 
decline of behaviourism, because Neisser was a key figure in this change in the years 
before writing the John Dean case study (see especially Neisser, 1967), and early 
prefigurings of his ecological approach can already be found here. 
 
According to Winograd, as I said above, both the cognitive approach and its 
ecological version are descendants of the anti-behaviourist approach of 
functionalism, in the sense of being interested in function in a particular 
environment. Whilst the functionalists had some influence on Neisser, he himself 
attributes the collapse of behaviourism to ethology: 
 
The fundamental blow was struck by a small group of scientists who called themselves 
“ethologists”, and who were not concerned with learning theory at all…They were not so 
much interested in hypotheses as in the animals themselves…The work of the ethologists 
showed that the concepts and methods of learning theory were simply irrelevant to the 
understanding of natural behaviour.’ (Neisser, 1982: 10). 
 
The idea of natural contexts that became so important for the ecological approach 
was therefore there right from the start of the cognitivist movement for Neisser. That 
influence only grew stronger, and by the time of his keynote address at the first 
“Practical Aspects of Memory” Conference in 1978, Neisser was advocating its 
application specifically to the study of memory from an ecological perspective. The 
address is printed as the opening chapter of Memory Observed, entitled “Memory: 
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What are the Important Questions?” In his introduction to this chapter as editor, 
Neisser says that  
 
The orthodox psychology of memory has very little to show for a hundred years of effort, 
perhaps because it has always avoided the interesting issues. Just as the naturalistic, 
ethological study of animal behaviour has proved to be more rewarding than traditional 
research on “learning”, so a naturalistic study of memory may be more productive than its 
laboratory counterpart’ (Neisser, 1982: 3). 
 
In the address itself, Neisser memorably said ‘If X is an interesting or socially 
important aspect of memory, then psychologists have hardly ever studied X.’ 
(Neisser, 1982: 4). Memory Observed, including the paper on John Dean’s memory, 
was supposed to be a collection of papers dedicated to the underexplored but 
interesting and socially important work of ecological memory research. 
 
Did Neisser’s transition from traditional cognitive psychology to ecological 
cognitive psychology result in successful science?
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 Laboratory-based work was and 
is fruitful research; it has not been replaced by ecological work. Nonetheless, I 
would argue that ecological cognitive psychology grew out of legitimate concerns 
with the laboratory-based approach, and important questions that it was ignoring, or 
was not equipped to investigate. Laboratory work was not shown to be useless, or 
the assumptions behind it completely incoherent, but something else was needed, 
and the ecological approach seemed to fit the bill.  
 
Judging from the Neisser quotation above, it may look like it was imposed externally 
from ethology, but for this to be the case, it would have to have been relied upon 
without question, and continued to be relied upon without its demonstrating any 
record of success. When Neisser was writing about John Dean’s memory, ecological 
psychology was simply too new for this to have been true. The ecological approach 
was more of an untried hypothesis at the beginning of its career than an external 
imposition from outside the science. It had not yet demonstrated the history of 
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 Another interesting question is whether the transition from behaviourism to cognitivism resulted in 
successful science. I will not address that question here because it would require a wider-ranging 
history than I have space for. I will take it that the cognitive approach was established, so rejecting 
behaviourism was not a factor in the epistemic niche for Neisser’s concept by the time of the John 
Dean case study. 
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success required for internalisation, but nonetheless was rational to employ as a 
hypothesis. 
 
Is there any evidence to suggest that Neisser thought of it in these terms, or was he 
more evangelical? In an obituary article about him, Ira Hyman recalls: 
 
In the late 1980s, ecological memory research in general, and Neisser’s argument in 
particular, came under fire. I asked him if he had ever regretted his strongly worded assault 
on traditional laboratory memory research. He stated that he was right when he said it, and 
that the field had needed the push. Neisser was always proud that by championing the cause 
of ecological memory research, he helped open the field to a greater variety of research 
methods and questions. (Hyman, 2012). 
 
There might be a worry that Neisser was partly motivated by pushing the field in a 
new direction just for the sake of its novelty. Later in the same piece, Hyman says 
that 
 
[d]uring his career, Neisser was awarded a long list of honors, and he occasionally found 
himself in the center of broad movements. Neisser, however, always thought of himself as an 
outsider challenging psychology to move forward. He worked to create an alternative to 
behaviorism. He then tried to make sure that cognitive psychology was concerned with 
meaningful problems. (Hyman, 2012). 
 
This notion of Neisser as an outsider challenging one dominant view after another 
(behaviourism, then traditional cognitive psychology) perhaps indicates a desire to 
challenge orthodoxy for the sake of challenging it. This wouldn’t be an unusual 
attitude. Many want to make their mark on a field by being at the forefront of 
change. But in this case there were good reasons to seek change, and other evidence 
suggests that Neisser’s attitude to ecological psychology was more tentative. 
 
For example, in his introduction to Cole et al.’s chapter in Memory Observed, he 
says  
 
…they [the authors] believe that “ecological validity” may be an impossible goal. For my 
part, I think it is still too early to decide such questions. The study of memory in natural 
settings may or may not yield further insights; time will tell. Meanwhile, we must follow the 
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example of this study by looking at those settings as carefully as possible. (Neisser, 1982: 
367). 
 
This is just what I have described as the proper attitude to an untried hypothesis that 
is being newly tested in a particular field. The reaction against traditional 
cognitivism doesn’t seem to have been an external imposition. 
 
In fact, in his later writings, Neisser seemed to become less antagonistic to the 
laboratory-based approach. His being open-minded enough for this change in view to 
take place offers further support for the claim that the pressure to set up a new 
discipline was not an unquestioned external factor shaping his concept of memory. 
As an example of his changing view, in Remembering Reconsidered, he says: 
 
It is no longer enough to denounce the old laboratory methods and call for more ecologically 
oriented studies; we have now to examine the findings of those studies and try to understand 
them. And in doing so we must not make the mistake of supposing that the “traditional” 
psychology of memory has simply been standing still, waiting for the ecological approach to 
come along. Since the mid-1970s, the laboratory-based study of remembering has undergone 
what amounts to a revolution of its own. Tulving’s distinction between semantic and 
episodic memory, the postulation of  “schemata” for everything from stories to selves, the 
research on scripts and even representations, the rush of new findings on memory 
development in children – all these are signs of renewed vigor and creativity in the field that 
I criticized so sharply a decade ago. In chapter 14 of this book, I try to interpret these new 
developments in ecological terms: In effect, they expand our definition of what kinds of real 
things exist to be remembered. Partly for that reason, I believe that future relations between 
ecological and traditional studies are more likely to be complementary than antagonistic. In 
any case, it seems that the time may be ripe for another reconsideration of remembering. 
(Neisser and Winograd, 1988: 2–3). 
 
His co-editor Winograd’s introductory chapter of Remembering Reconsidered is also 
about the convergence of ecological and traditional approaches. 
 
It seems that the pressure on the concept of memory created by trying to set up 
ecological cognitive psychology as a new approach is not problematically external. 
Neisser treats it in the tentative and exploratory manner that one should treat new 
approaches, and there were good reasons that a new approach was needed. This 
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factor in the epistemic niche was therefore an untried hypothesis at the time of this 
case study. As such, to the extent that MEMORY was shaped by it, the concept was 
rational, but non-legitimate because ecological cognitive psychology was too new to 
have yet demonstrated a history of success. 
 
Having considered the pressure to be novel, I now want to consider another part of 
the epistemic niche here: the pressure for continuity. In his early work, Neisser 
worked within the dominant paradigms, first behaviourism, and later cognitive 
psychology. The pressure for continuity with his own earlier work within these 
paradigms strengthened a pressure for continuity with his contemporaries who still 
worked within them. This is a pressure to which even revolutionaries are not 
immune. In addition, the popular research frameworks of the day dictate the 
problems, concepts etc. available, which even someone reacting against them must 
work in terms of to a large extent. Here I will discuss two aspects of this pressure 
towards continuity: the influence of Bartlett, and the computer metaphor. What will 
ultimately be of interest is Neisser’s attempt to combine these two influences in his 
earlier work (Neisser, 1967). 
 
Bartlett 
The most important aspect of Bartlett’s influence is his notion of a schema (although 
he has some importance in other ways, and I will mention him again in the 
“constructed memory” subsection below). Bartlett does not give a completely clear 
account of schemata in his work, and in fact disliked the term (see Wagoner, 2013).
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In his (1932), Bartlett says: 
 
‘Schema’ refers to an active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences, which 
must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, 
whenever there is any order or regularity of behaviour, a particular response is possible only 
because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which 
operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass. 
… All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, 
organised setting. (Bartlett, 1932: 201). 
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 See Wagoner for the history leading up to Bartlett’s use of the term “schema”, the factors shaping 
his concept, and how it has changed in modern cognitive psychology. Wagoner’s analysis is very 




The notion was part of his attempt to set up a rival to the trace theory of memory. 
Wagoner says that ‘[f]or him, schema was to provide the basis for a theory of 
remembering that was embodied, dynamic, temporal, holistic, and social.’ (Wagoner, 
2013: 553). 
 
It can be seen here that Bartlett was an early proponent of the real world rather than 
laboratory-based approach, even as early as the 1930s. He worked in social 
psychology, with an interest in anthropology amongst other things, contributing to an 
approach not dissimilar from that of the ethologists in their research on animals. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that Bartlett is often hailed as one of the fathers of 
cognitive psychology, and part of its overthrow of behaviourism.  
 
He also criticised Ebbinghaus (see e.g. Bartlett, 1932: 2–7), and worked on memory 
outside the laboratory, in a way that resembles that advocated by modern situated 
cognition proponents. For example, he studied memory for playing cards during a 
game of bridge, versus when they are presented randomly in an Ebbinghaus-style 
laboratory experiment. As Wagoner says:  
 
In bridge there will be an active interest in remembering the cards to meet the needs of the 
game... Bartlett is emphatic that it is the former ability to remember, as part of a whole living 
social activity, that is needed for general functioning in everyday life. (Wagoner, 2013: 560). 
 
This embeddedness in environmental and social context is accompanied by 
embodiment of the organism for Bartlett. Here is Wagoner again:  
 
Despite its sometimes vague and sketchy formulation, it is clear that Bartlett emphatically 
rejects the trace theory of remembering and wants to replace it with one in which the whole 
active organism takes central place. “Attitude,” “schemata,” and “image” are all organismic 
concepts, for Bartlett, which are implicated in a person’s dynamic relating to the world. They 
are functions coordinated within a total system, which must make a unitary response in its 
environment. (Wagoner, 2013: 562). 
 
It seems from this that the influence of Bartlett may have been a pressure on 
Neisser’s concept of memory, pushing towards an embedded cognition approach. 
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(Recall that in chapter 1, I defined embedded cognition such that it includes 
dependence on the extra-cranial body, as well as the extra-bodily environment).  
 
However, the treatment of the bodily and external components in Bartlett is not that 
of a modern embedded cognition theorist. His work is closer to the radical enactivist 
perspective, in his focus on “dynamic relating to the world”, and his holistic rather 
than representationalist approach. This shows up particularly in a passage in 
Wagoner’s paper, discussing Bartlett’s dissatisfaction with the term “schema”, and 
some alternatives he uses elsewhere in his work. Wagoner says that  
 
…by 1932 Bartlett was growing dissatisfied with the word “pattern.” He ultimately prefers 
the term “organised setting,” which better highlights that schemata operate at the developing 
transaction between organism and environment, rather than being a purely cognitive 
phenomenon (i.e., a mental representation). (Wagoner, 2013: 559). 
 
Wagoner also says: 
 
In contrast to the trace theory, which treats memory as an isolated mental faculty, Bartlett 
starts with a whole organism actively involved with its environment. The mind is taken “out 
of the head” and situated in the ongoing transactions between a person and his or her 
environment. [4] (Wagoner, 2013: 555). 
 
This is very much like the enacted cognition approach. Footnote 4 reads: ‘The 
contemporary equivalent of this position is ecological psychology, which follows the 
work of J. J. Gibson.’ As we will see in the section on the Gibsons below, J. J. 
Gibson is a major figure in the history of modern enactivism. The influence of 
Bartlett’s work was therefore applying pressure towards an enacted cognition 
concept. 
 
Neisser’s use of Bartlett involved both his ideas and his experimental results (see 
especially Neisser, 1967). By the time Neisser was working, Bartlett’s ideas had 
already been taken up widely in psychology. He was hugely influential, becoming a 
Fellow of the Royal Society in 1932, and being director of the Unit for Research in 
Applied Psychology in Cambridge from 1944–1951. His work had practical 
applications, leading to him being knighted in 1948 for work in applied psychology 
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with the Royal Air Force during the Second World War. His experimental results, 
such as those on constructed remembering which I will discuss below, and his notion 
of schema, were fruitful in pointing the discipline in new directions. His influence 
had therefore been internalised into the discipline by the time Neisser was writing. 
 
However, the enactivist Bartlett I have described here, with his dynamic, 
contextually-embedded and socially-oriented schemata, was not Neisser’s 
reconstruction. Therefore, although the influence of Bartlett was an internal 
consideration, it seems that it was moderated, perhaps even distorted, by some other 
influence. The major candidate for this other influence is the computer metaphor. 
 
The computer metaphor 
Wagoner says: ‘In an early foundational book of cognitive psychology, Neisser 
(1967) drew heavily on Bartlett’s (1932, 1958) work, but did so very selectively in 
order to fit Bartlett’s ideas into the computer metaphor of mind.’ (Wagoner, 2013: 
565). In effect, Neisser makes Bartlett’s schemas equivalent to programs, i.e. 
software. Later in the same paper, Wagoner says that ‘[s]chema was transformed into 
a static knowledge structure composed of different slots or nodes that either accept 
incoming information or fill in default values where input is lacking. Schema is here 
severed from an organism’s functioning in the world.’ (Wagoner, 2013: 569). The 
pressure on MEMORY from the computer metaphor by the time of the John Dean case 
study is therefore in part a pressure towards continuity with Neisser’s own earlier 
work. We can see from the Wagoner quotation that the computer metaphor creates 




There was already precedent for this reading of schemata in some work done in 
Bartlett’s own laboratory by one of his students. Oldfield (1954) argued that using 
modern computers as a model of memory could make more sense of Bartlett’s 
experimental results than older static storage models based on metaphors such as the 
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 Brainbound concepts are not a necessary feature of the computational approach. Clark and 
Chalmers’ (1998) extended cognition can be given a functionalist (in the modern sense) reading, and 
this version of the position is arguably enabled by the computer metaphor. Roughly the idea is that 
there is nothing sacred about neural “hardware” because anything (including parts of the outside 
world) could implement the relevant “software”. However, the version of the computer model in play 
when Neisser was writing was a brainbound one. 
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photograph or gramophone record. This was the beginning of a more 
representational, atomist reading of Bartlett’s schemata (see Wagoner, 2013: 565).  
 
This view of schemata had been widely taken up in cognitive science by the time 
Neisser was writing the John Dean paper: ‘In the 1970s, a number of new concepts 
in cognitive psychology were explicitly derived from Bartlett’s schema, including 
Minsky’s (1975) frames, Shank and Abelson’s (1977) scripts, and Mandler and 
Johnson’s (1977) story grammar’ (Wagoner, 2013: 566). The departure from 
Bartlett’s conception in these versions is stark according to Wagoner: ‘In short, these 
early cognitive schema theories are spatial (not temporal), static (not developing), 
focused on elements or nodes (not holistic), passive (not active), individual (not 
social), and structural (not functional).’ (Wagoner, 2013: 567). This information 
processing view of schemata has been with us ever since. According to online 
encyclopaedia “PsychCentral”, modern cognitive psychology defines schema as ‘A 
mental structure that represents an aspect of the world, and streamlines information 
processing by categorizing objects.’ (Fournier, 2009). 
 
We can see here the tension between the pressure towards an enacted cognition 
concept from Bartlett’s influence, and the pressure towards a brainbound concept 
from the influence of the computer metaphor. What should be done in this situation 
depends on the status of the two considerations. I have argued that the influence of 
Bartlett was an internal factor, but what about the computer metaphor? 
 
In the last case study, I argued that using science fiction scenarios was external to 
science. Such scenarios seem to be metaphors, and I argued that they should not be 
allowed to apply pressure to scientific concepts. However, many metaphors for 
memory have resulted in some success e.g. the written word, the calculator, the 
photograph, the telephone exchange (see Draaisma, 2000). The computer metaphor 
is just the latest in this line of technological metaphors for mind.
58
 This type of 
metaphor seems different from the science fiction type; I suggest that science fiction 
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 Perhaps our new metaphor for the future is the human + computer integrated system (cyborg! see 
Clark, 2003) and this will apply more pressure towards situated cognition concepts. Such a metaphor 
would help the science to be relevant to everyday life (smart homes, wearable tech etc). I leave this 
suggestion as speculation here; we cannot anticipate future science. 
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cases are not true scientific metaphors because, unlike the computer and the 
telephone exchange, they are not models for the mind. They are therefore not a 
formal part of the science. Modelling is a scientific technique that has been 
internalised because it has been very fruitful in many scientific disciplines. 
 
At one stage, the use of metaphorical or figurative language was considered to be 
very bad form in science. In 1666, one member of the Royal Society, Samuel Parker, 
advocated banning it altogether. Draaisma quotes him as saying that metaphors’ 
‘wanton and luxuriant fancies climbing up into the Bed of Reason, do not only defile 
it by unchast and illegitimate Embraces, but instead of real conceptions and notices 
of Things impregnate the mind with nothing but Ayerie and Subventaneous 
Phantasmes’ (S. Parker, 1666, quoted in Draaisma, 2000: 55). This (highly 
metaphorical) criticism of metaphor was far from unique at the time, with others 
such as Thomas Sprat and Francis Bacon also advocating simple language, free from 
metaphor and imagery, as best for science (Draaisma, 2000: 54). 
 
In 1682, Robert Hooke delivered a lecture to the Royal Society, which was later 
published as An Hypothetical Explication of Memory: how the Organs made use of 
by the Mind in its Operation may be Mechanically understood. The lecture was full 
of metaphorical language. Hooke argued that this language was indispensable. He 
was presenting a materialist theory, and the metaphors allowed him to talk about the 
location of memory, among other physical properties (Draaisma, 2000: 62). He is 
quoted as saying: ‘It is not, I conceive, possible to be truly understood or described, 
but only by Similitude’ (Hooke, 1682, quoted in Draaisma, 2000: 63). 
 
To this day, metaphors have retained this indispensable quality in the sciences of 
memory. We often don’t have a literal way of saying what we say metaphorically. 
Draaisma says:  
 
Whereas in the case of physical processes like the interaction between immune cells and 
pathogens one can form some kind of idea about a literal description, the literal description 
of mental processes seems to be fundamentally excluded. What is the literal equivalent of 
“search processes” in the memory? How do you literally describe a process such as 
“storing”? If “filtering of information” is a metaphor, what literal description does it replace? 
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The problem with figurative usage in psychology is that no literal alternative is available 
(Draaisma, 2000: 11). 
 
Not only can we not do without metaphors, they seem to have positive virtues. 
Hooke suggested that metaphors and figurative language were essential for 
understanding memory processes, and also provided a familiar and intelligible basis 
for formulating hypotheses (Draaisma, 2000: 63–64). These features are still 
important today. Draaisma talks about two types of heuristic values of metaphors, 
theoretical and empirical: 
 
Theoretical heuristics means that a metaphor introduces new theoretical notions, brings 
coherence to hypothetical processes or is able to resolve apparent contradictions between 
experimental results, while empirical heuristics describes the degree to which a metaphor 
produced new topics for research. (Draaisma, 2000: 18). 
 
The use of metaphors therefore has positive benefits, which have contributed to a 
history of success and its internalisation into science. In psychology, it may well 
even be indispensable because we lack literal means of saying the same things. 
 
The computer metaphor in particular was also starting to lead to success when 
Neisser was writing. It was an integral part of the birth of cognitivism, and as I have 
said already, Neisser’s own earlier work was an important part of this. 
 
Both the influence of Bartlett and the computer metaphor were internal, but there 
was some tension between them. The pressure from the computer metaphor is 
towards a representationalist concept, so the enactivist tendencies coming from 
Bartlett’s influence are lost. The upshot of this is an embedded cognition concept, 
where the environment is important, hence Neisser’s ecological approach, but 
cognition is still construed in terms of inner representations. 
 
I have argued (see chapters 2 and 5) that, when faced with two fruitful frameworks, a 
science should remain pluralist. The same is true here – the appropriate strategy 
when faced with conflicting internal pressures would have been a pluralism of 
concepts. However, faced with Bartlett’s legacy, and the popularity of the computer 
metaphor, Neisser tried to integrate them. Attempting to integrate rival strands can 
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be a part of the pluralist strategy, as discussed in chapter 2 with reference to modern 
integrative pluralism (e.g. Mitchell, 2002, 2003). However, this relies on a certain 
amount of compatibility between the rival stands. In this case this is lacking, so 
much of what is important in Bartlett – what led to his influence being internalised – 
was lost. Pursuing both the Bartlett-influenced enactivist path, and the more 
representational brainbound computer metaphor, would have been a better strategy. 
This would have hopefully prevented the computer metaphor from becoming too 
dominant. 
 
Part of the problem here may have been pressure towards unification rather than 
pluralism because it is seen as a virtue in its own right, something which I have 
already argued (see chapter 3) is an external factor in the cognitive and social 
sciences. 
 
In his work on metaphor, Draaisma gives a more specific account of why unification 
may have been favoured in this case (although he does not put his discussion in 
terms of unification and pluralism). A metaphor causes research to focus on some 
aspects of a phenomenon while neglecting others; Draaisma talks about the meta-
metaphor of a filter. If something is viewed through a filter, as with a metaphor, 
some parts are highlighted while others are obscured. This led Freud to recommend 
changing metaphors regularly to avoid this problem (Draaisma, 2000: 18–20). 
 
The problem is that the computer metaphor for the mind (and other metaphors for the 
mind, e.g. the hologram) are so extensive, they cannot easily be alternated for other 
metaphors in this way. Draaisma suggests the term “metaphoric theme” rather than 
metaphor. He says of these metaphoric themes that ‘[t]hey not only furnish 
metaphorical terms for separate functions, they also provide a background against 
which all those separate metaphors have meaning. The interpretation of specific 
computational and holographic metaphors presupposes the metaphor theme of which 
they are a part.’ (Draaisma, 2000: 20). Therefore although the computer metaphor 
was internal for Neisser, it is an internal factor of a kind that particularly resists the 




In fact, we can see that Neisser was becoming sensitive to something like this 
problem by 1976, when he began to express doubts about the dominance of the 
computer metaphor. In his Cognition and Reality, he says: 
 
If cognitive psychology commits itself too thoroughly to this model [the computer model], 
there may be trouble ahead. Lacking in ecological validity, indifferent to culture, even 
missing some of the main features of perception and memory as they occur in ordinary life, 
such a psychology could become a narrow and uninteresting specialized field. There are 
already indications that this may be happening. (Neisser, 1976: 7). 
 
This was the beginning of Neisser advocating the ecological approach, largely under 
the influence of J. J. Gibson and his wife Eleanor. This influence loomed large by the 
time of the John Dean case study, to some extent working against the pressure from 
the computer metaphor, and the version of schemata based on computationalism (see 




James J. Gibson and his wife Eleanor Gibson were friends of Neisser’s, and he 
acknowledged their influence by dedicating his 1976 book Cognition and Reality to 
them. 
 
J. J. Gibson saw memory as tied up with perception, and for him, perception was 
direct. He advocated direct realism – the view that an organism can directly and 
veridically perceive the external world without intervening representations. The role 
of that world is of crucial importance for Gibson, and it is he who describes his 
approach as “ecological” (See e.g. “Ecological Optics” from 1961, in Reed and 
Jones, 1982: 61–75). This way of thinking culminated in his 1979 book The 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.  
 
Of perception and memory, Gibson says: 
 
The objective operations do not distinguish memory from perception. Only our subjective 
feeling about them separates the two kinds of activity. We have the feeling that perception is 
confined to the present, whereas memory refers to the past. But this distinction, be it noted, is 
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wholly introspective. Moreover, as will be evident later, it cannot be made with clarity. 
(Gibson, 1966, in Reed and Jones, 1982: 172). 
 
The reason the distinction cannot be clearly made is that Gibson views time as 
equivalent to space. Looking around through space is therefore importantly similar to 
“looking around” through time, i.e. remembering. He says that ‘[i]t is no harder for a 
brain to integrate a temporal arrangement than a spatial arrangement’ (Gibson, 1966, 
in Reed and Jones, 1982: 174). Much of this work is based on experiments on 
perceiving motion. The view is therefore dynamic, not like the static storage and 
retrieval view encouraged by the computer model. 
 
In “The Useful Dimensions of Sensitivity” from 1963, Gibson says: 
 
Information about the world that has been obtained will continue to be obtained, and the 
information-pick-up will improve with practice. This is perceptual learning. But this does not 
imply that information is stored in memory. The information continues to be available 
outside the skin, i.e. the invariants that specify the world. Perception is a skill, not a 
constructing of the mental world out of psychic components. The observer has no need to 
store information. The fact that he can recall, recollect, imagine, and think about parts of the 
environment “not present to the senses” is a different matter entirely. This fact does not 
prove that memories are combined with sensations so as to yield perceptions. (Gibson, 1963, 
in Reed and Jones, 1982: 372). 
 
Static storage of representations is replaced by skill at retrieving information from 
the world. This is the kind of “knowledge how” approach to cognition typical of the 




In her foreword to a collection of J. J. Gibson’s papers, his wife Eleanor Gibson 
says: 
 
He gave up the notion of the “retinal image” as being the basis of visual perception and 
began to think of visual perception as an active process of “looking” (searching for change 
and invariants), which involved a much enlarged receptive system that is not just receptive. 
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 It should be noted that skill and knowledge-how are also emphasized by Wheeler (2005) in his 
proposals for a Heideggarian cognitive science that is based on the embedded cognition perspective. 
However, Wheeler still leaves room for representations, making his approach further from Gibson’s 
picture than the enactivist is, as he himself notes (Wheeler, 2005: 301 note 9, 306 note 3). 
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Adjustments of the eyes, head and trunk are all involved and the perceiver is not static. He 
moves around and as he does so the scene is continuously changing, and the flow of 
stimulation as well.’ (Reed and Jones, 1982: xi). 
 
This kind of approach, where movement of the body is an important part of 
perception, is strongly reminiscent of Alva Noë’s enactivist work on perception 
(Noë, 2004). Although Noë does not endorse all of Gibson’s work as it stands, he 
thinks it can be defended and reconstructed in a way that is amenable to his project 
(see 2004: 21, 105). 
 
One of Gibson’s key contributions is his introduction of the concept of “affordances” 
into psychology. Here is Eleanor Gibson again: 
 
Before the book [J. J. Gibson’s The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception] was finished, 
a new concept was introduced – the concept of “affordances”. A careful description of the 
information for perception, even as it approaches elegance in the form of a mathematical 
statement [a reference to classical psychophysics, which Gibson came to see as inadequate], 
does not convey sufficiently the reciprocity of a creature and the environment, especially its 
own niche or habitat. This mutuality of creature and environment is the basis of the need for 
an ecological optics, one that is meaningful for a living creature. The surfaces and substances 
of this environment provide opportunities of diverse kinds for the creature’s activities, 
offering it support for living successfully in the world. These opportunities are its 
“affordance” (a made-up word)’ (Reed and Jones, 1982: xiii). 
 
Again, the environment is essential for cognition as we know it. The “mutuality of 
creature and environment” referred to here is at the root of another modern enactivist 
approach, that of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993). They note the compatibility 
of Gibson’s notion of affordances with their approach (Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch, 1993: 203), however they do emphasize other differences, seeing their 
enactivism as a middle way between Gibson and representationalist approaches 
treating the world as pregiven (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1993: 202). 
 
Although there are differences between Gibson’s work and the modern enactivist 
perspectives of Noë, and Varela, Thompson and Rosch, it is the closest match among 
the perspectives on cognition considered here, and Gibson has influenced the 
enactivists more than any other group. For the purposes of my project, we can 
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therefore see the influence of the Gibsons as applying pressure on Neisser’s concept 
towards an enacted cognition perspective. 
 
Neisser has Gibson’s view of memory in mind when he undertakes the John Dean 
case study, as he explicitly acknowledges in the introduction to that paper in Memory 
Observed:  
 
J. J. Gibson insisted that the study of perception should begin with veridical seeing rather 
than illusion and error; maybe the study of memory can benefit from a similar approach. It 
was partly with this possibility in mind that I undertook the study of John Dean’s testimony. 
What could psychology learn from a case where the witness was right? (Neisser, 1982: 139). 
 
This notion of veridical memory is part of what Edwards and Potter criticise in 
Neisser’s approach, and I will return to this issue below in the subsection on 
constructed memory. In the present subsection, the important question is whether the 
pressure from the Gibsons’ work towards an enacted cognition concept, as set out 
above, was an internal factor in shaping Neisser’s concept of memory. I have said 
that the broader framework of ecological cognitive psychology that Neisser was 
trying to set up was still too new to have a history of success, but the Gibsons’ more 
specific ecological work on vision and learning had been ongoing since the 1950s, so 
the same need not be said of it. 
 
It was in conflict with the dominant paradigm, which as we have seen was the 
information processing view of schemata – a paradigm within which Neisser had 
previously been working (Neisser, 1967). This representationalist, information 
processing view of schemata was successful, being responsible for most of the 
results psychology has obtained. J. J. Gibson’s view was and is less popular, but still 
successful. Its influence can still be seen in embodied, enactive, extended and radical 
embodied cognition theories (e.g. Noë, 2004; Chemero, 2009; Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch, 1991), Human Computer Interaction, Dynamical Systems Theory, and 
design, where his concept of affordances (discussed above) is of particular relevance. 
These disciplines have produced novel practical applications, as well as explanations 




At the time Neisser was writing, these successes were already beginning, although 
primarily in the guise of providing a fruitful new way of thinking about cognition, 
rather than experimental data (see Goldstein, 1981). Neisser described the Gibsons’ 
work as a “flourishing line of research” in Cognition and Reality (Neisser, 1976: 8), 
and he takes many ideas from their work throughout that book, supporting his claim 
that much of cognitive psychology was missing out the effects of real contexts on 
cognition. The influence of the Gibsons therefore had a track-record of success, and 
so was an internal factor. 
 
Both the influence of the computer metaphor and the influence of the Gibsons were 
internal, but there was tension between them, with the former applying pressure 
towards a brainbound concept, and the latter towards enacted cognition. This is the 
same kind of situation as we found between the influence of Bartlett and the 
computer metaphor. What Neisser did here, as there, was to combine the two 
influences, thus responding both to pressures for change, and for continuity with his 
former work. (See Neisser, 1976, chapter 4, “Schemata”, particularly pp.52–53). 
 
Again, as in the previous case, I would suggest that remaining pluralist would have 
been the better course. There are pressures from internal factors towards maintaining 
both views, and attempting to integrate them in this case means that something 
important is lost. Again, the external pressure towards unification for its own sake is 
probably at fault here (see above, and chapter 3).  
 
1980s intellectual milieu 
The next influence on Neisser’s concept I want to consider is another set of pressures 
toward continuity with others. In the 1980s, arguably the changes in many 
surrounding disciplines were laying the foundations for a situated cognition approach 
(see Michaelian and Sutton, 2013). Continuity with these surrounding disciplines 
was an important pressure on Neisser’s concept, if one that it is very hard to 
quantify. It is important to mention this more general intellectual milieu, as well as 
more specific influences like the Gibsons. I will consider several of his 





The influences in question include the failure of classical AI and the rise of 
connectionism, alliances with dynamical systems theory within cognitive science, 
Bruner’s notion of scaffolding learning with external resources, and the rediscovery 
of the ideas of Halbwachs and Vygotsky (Michaelian and Sutton, 2013: 4). 
 
Halbwachs was a French social theorist who worked in the early 20
th
 century. He 
was most famous for his work on collective memory, proposing that human memory 
can only function within a collective context (Halbwachs, trans. 1992). Vygotsky 
was a Soviet developmental psychologist who worked at around the same time. He is 
known for the influential idea that thought is an internalisation of language. Clearly 
both collective memory and the internalisation of previously external strategies are 
ideas related to modern situated cognition perspectives, and these figures have been 
an influence. 
 
In addition, around the time that Neisser was writing, new disciplines became 
involved in cognitive science, including anthropology, education, media theory, 
design, and the emerging discipline of Human Computer Interaction. These 
influences also encourage a situated approach to cognition where the influence of the 
environment, other people, and technology are given an important role. 
 
Were these influences internal factors in the epistemic niche for MEMORY? Some are 
pressures from other disciplines, so it may appear not. However, ideas were not 
being imported from these disciplines and relied on unquestioningly; they were just 
influences that were in the air at the time. The rediscovery of the work of Halbwachs 
and Vygotsky in particular may seem to be external because their influence had 
waned before this, suggesting their frameworks failed to result in success. However, 
rediscovery of old ideas can be successful; they may yet be internalised. Again, this 
is not about taking their ideas as authoritative and relying on them. They are merely 
being tried out, and old ideas are as reasonable a source for this as new ideas from 
neighbouring disciplines. 
 
The pressure to take account of these new ideas is just the pressure to maintain a 
connection to neighbouring disciplines, which is an internal consideration. Note that 
this is not as strong a consideration as unification, which I argued was external to the 
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cognitive sciences. It is just the weaker claim that it is good to take notice of what is 
happening in neighbouring disciplines. While taking account of neighbouring 
disciplines is an internal consideration, the influences themselves are untried 
hypotheses in this case. 
 
Constructed memory 
I now want to consider another idea which applied pressure toward a concept that 
was embedded in the real world. The idea is that of memory as constructed.
60
 Again, 
Bartlett is a large influence here. This seems to be an aspect of Bartlett’s work that 
Neisser took up right from the start. 
 
Michaelian and Sutton in Review of Philosophy and Psychology say:  
 
Bartlett’s account of individual remembering as the context-dependent reconstruction of 
momentary patterns from fragmentary, interest-ridden traces and schemas was taken up by 
both cognitivist and ecological psychologists interested in the limits and consequences of 
constructive processes (Neisser 1997; Saito 2000). (Michaelian and Sutton, 2013: 3–4).  
 
Bartlett’s work on constructive remembering is still well-known and well respected, 
particularly his work on memory for stories, such as “The War of The Ghosts” 
(Bartlett, 1932: ch V). This story comes from Canadian Indian Folklore. In the 
experiment, English participants were asked to read the story, and then recall it after 
various time intervals. Bartlett found that participants tended to change elements of 
the story – to reconstruct it – to fit better with their own culture. He described this in 
terms of altering the story to fit with the participants’ schemata. (Although as we 
have already seen, Bartlett’s original notion of schema was not the same as 
Neisser’s). 
 
Another influence on Neisser’s concept of memory as constructed was the work of 
Elizabeth Loftus on witness testimony in court. He includes some of her work in a 
section in Memory Observed on “Testifying” (Loftus and Palmer, “Reconstruction of 
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 Later in his career, Neisser became involved with the False Memory Syndrome Foundation. This 
suggests that he started to believe that the constructed memory notion was becoming too powerful 
(see also see Neisser and Winograd, 1988: 4), but at the time of the John Dean case study, it was very 
influential for him. 
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Automobile Destruction”, first printed as Loftus and Palmer, 1974). This section of 
Memory Observed also includes his paper on John Dean. 
 
Both Loftus’ and Bartlett’s work were widely influential, having practical success 
through changing how witness testimony is treated in court. Loftus first provided 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification for Washington state in June 1975. 
This was unprecedented at the time, but was something she continued to do in 
subsequent years (Zagorski, 2005). The idea of memory as constructed was 
internalised in psychology as a result of this kind of success.  
 
There is some dispute over in exactly what sense memory should be seen as 
constructed. According to Edwards and Potter, the influence of Gibson’s work on 
direct perception and memory changed Neisser’s view of construction. Gibsonian 
direct perception leaves no room for any construction. Edwards and Potter say 
‘Neisser has been moving from his early cognitive constructivist position (Neisser, 
1967) increasingly towards a position where memories are organized as reflections 
of the true facts, albeit after a process of repisodic synthesis.’ (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 56). Recall that repisodic synthesis, an important idea in Neisser’s analysis of 
John Dean, is when the subject has what appears to be an episodic memory of a 
particular event, but is really a synthesis of the common characteristics of a series of 
events. Although this analysis is still constructionist in a sense, in the Dean case 
study it is based on comparison of the memory with a correct version of events (the 
tape recordings of the meetings). 
 
Here we see the influence of Gibson, which I argued was internal, affecting the 
notion of construction coming from Bartlett and Loftus, which is also internal. For 
my purposes here, this conflict is less important to adjudicate than those discussed in 
the last two subsections, because it is not really a dispute among the different 
situated cognition perspectives. Pressure towards constructed memory is pressure 
towards taking the environment seriously, and therefore towards an embedded 
cognition concept, regardless of exactly what kind of construction is endorsed. A full 
analysis would have to take into account the recommendations of pluralism I made 
in the last two subsections, as well as the compatibility or otherwise of Gibsonian 
direct perception and Bartlett and Loftus’s kinds of construction. This would be a 
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large diversion, and I will therefore not consider this dispute further, but as a clash of 




I want to consider one final influence on Neisser’s concept of memory. This is a 
preoccupation with mnemonists: those who perform impressive feats of memory 
using special techniques. Neisser prefers the term “memorist” because this includes 
all those with particularly good memories, whether they use such special tricks or not 
(see his paper “Memorists” in Neisser, 1982: 377, 379). However, it is mnemonists 
that are of most interest from a situated cognition perspective. One common 
technique in particular, the method of loci, is important. In Vygotskian fashion, this 
technique is about internalising the external world. One memorises a list by 
imagining each item on the list at a particular location, e.g. along a familiar route. 
Imagining travelling this route then facilitates recall of the list.  
 
Neisser’s Memory Observed includes a section called “Special People” which 
includes his own chapter on “Memorists” as well as chapters from others on 
mnemonists. The book also includes a section on “Performing” which is about oral 
traditions of illiterate people, and also contains an impressive collection of memory 
feats. Neisser acknowledges that some chapters included in one section may have 
been in the other (e.g. “The Mnemonic Feat of the “Shass Pollak”” by George M. 
Stratton could have been included in the Special People section, while a chapter on 
Toscanini could have been included in the chapter on Performing, see Neisser’s 
introductions to these chapters). 
 
In his study of memorists, Neisser is interested in how different contexts affect 
memory. For example, he talks about what counts as remembering being different in 
different contexts: ‘Literal, verbatim memory does exist…It makes its appearance 
whenever a performance is defined by fidelity to a particular text.’ (“Literacy and 
Memory” in Neisser, 1982: 242). The book includes the extreme example of 
memorizing the Talmud (in “The Mnemonic Feat of the “Shass Pollak”” by George 
M. Stratton), where even typographical detail must be remembered. In his editor’s 
introduction to this chapter, Neisser says that ‘[c]ulturally defined memory 
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performances differ widely in the kinds of fidelity to the original that they require; 
individual skills of memory adapt themselves to those definitions.’ (Neisser, 1982: 
311). Here, the relevance of the embeddedness in context so important for the 
ecological perspective is clear. The context is causally relevant, but nothing external 
is constitutive of memory. The influence of mnemonists therefore applies pressure 
towards an embedded cognition perspective. 
 
At first glance, this looks like an external influence. Looking to the experts at a 
particular cognitive task is not something that has been internalised – one would 
normally look for typical subjects. There is no reason to think memorists are typical 
(quite the opposite) and their study hardly seems to be about remembering in a 
natural context. However, looking more closely at Neisser’s approach to studying 
these people, we can see that he doesn’t take for granted the conclusions that should 
be drawn from their study, but treats his work on them more as an untried 
hypothesis. 
 
He is very well aware that memorists may not be typical subjects, but suspects they 
are more common than we think. He does not take even that suspicion for granted, 
and advocates finding out just how many such people there are, and taxonomising 
them as a first step (Neisser, 1982: 379). 
 
He points out that their study has been largely neglected by experimental 
psychologists. He says that ‘[t]here are many reasons for this neglect. The one on 
which I wish to focus arises from the prevailing conception of memory itself – a 
conception that suggests no way in which the study of outstanding individuals could 
contribute to scientific progress.’ (Neisser, 1982: 377). However, to challenge this 
conception is not to problematically take for granted its opposite. 
 
Neisser’s suspicion is that the study of memorists risked falsifying the prevailing 
hypothesis that we all have more or less the same unalterable hardware, and that 
different mnemonic techniques are just software. This is why Neisser is interested in 
memorists who are not mnemonists. He is open to the possibility that these 
phenomena are not always just the result of special tricks. For Neisser, the prevailing 
hypothesis was what led people into the laboratory – because laboratory work is a 
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good way to study a universal mechanism (Neisser, 1982: 378). Studying memorists 
is therefore part of the ecological approach that hopes to lead people out of the 
laboratory and into the world. It is therefore part of the rejection of the dominant 
paradigm that I argued was a hypothesis in the first subsection. 
 
Summary 
In summary of what I have said about the epistemic niche for Neisser: 
Factor applying 
pressure to concept 
Concept encouraged by this 
pressure 
Internal / Hypothesis 
/ External 
Rejection of dominant 
paradigm 
Embedded Hypothesis 
Bartlett Enacted Internal 
Computer metaphor Brainbound Internal 
Gibsons Enacted Internal 
Unification Embedded (in this case, because 
unifying brainbound and enacted) 
External 
1980s milieu Situated (various) Hypotheses 
Constructed memory Embedded Internal 
Mnemonists Embedded Hypothesis 
 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that Neisser’s implicit concept of memory was an 
embedded cognition concept, and here I have considered several factors that applied 
pressure towards this embedded concept. These include reacting against the 
dominant paradigm (mainstream cognitive psychology) and setting up the new 
ecological version, the idea of memory as constructed, and the study of memorists or 
mnemonists. Other influences in the intellectual milieu of the time (failure of 
classical AI, involvement of new disciplines in cognitive science, rediscovery of 
Halbwachs and Vygotsky etc.) also applied pressure towards a situated cognition 
concept of some kind. All of these are untried hypotheses apart from the idea of 
constructed memory.  
 
The number of hypotheses reflects the newness of ecological psychology, an 
approach that Neisser was still working to set up at the time of the Dean case study. 
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Constructed memory had been internalised at a coarser level of grain (into 
psychology in general) so was not a hypothesis. However, there is some possible 
tension between it and the Gibsonian perspective, which I mentioned above but 
largely set aside as outside the scope of this project. Recalling that a concept is 
legitimate to the extent it is shaped by internal factors, and rational to the extent it is 
shaped by internal factors and hypotheses, we can see that the embedded cognition 
concept is rational to the extent that it is shaped by all of the factors mentioned so 
far. It is legitimate to the extent that it is shaped by the idea of constructed memory, 
though non-legitimate to the extent it is shaped by the untried hypotheses. The 
evidence for the embedded cognition concept functioning as an investigative kind is 
therefore relatively weak when we only consider direct pressures towards an 
embedded concept. However, that is not the end of the story. 
 
There are also pressures towards other types of concept. The influence of Bartlett 
applies pressure towards an enacted cognition concept, while the pressure to retain 
continuity with the dominant paradigm (in particular the computer metaphor) applies 
pressure towards a brainbound concept. Both of these pressures are internal, and 
Neisser tries to integrate them, reinterpreting Bartlett’s schemata to fit in with 
computationalism, and resulting in an embedded cognition concept. I have argued 
that pluralism would have been a better option than integration here, because the two 
pressures were not compatible enough to integrate without something essential being 
lost, in this case from Bartlett’s approach. The integration is likely to have come 
about under the influence of the external pressure towards unification for its own 
sake, and to the extent that this was the case, the resulting concept is non-legitimate 
and irrational. 
 
The pressure from the computer metaphor was mitigated somewhat by the influence 
of the Gibsons, another internal pressure towards an enacted cognition concept. 
Again, Neisser tried to integrate the computational reinterpretation of schemata with 
the Gibsonian approach, probably as a result of external pressure towards unification 
for its own sake. Again, I argued that pluralism would have been a better approach. 
The embedded cognition concept that resulted was legitimate and rational to the 
extent that it was a result of the influence of the Gibsons, Bartlett, and the computer 
metaphor, but a single embedded concept was still not the best response to these 
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pressures combined. This case study therefore provides some evidence of an 
embedded cognition concept functioning as an investigative kind in cognitive 
psychology, although that evidence is not very strong. It does however provide some 
evidence that multiple concepts should be in use at once, including another situated 
cognition concept (in this case enacted). Therefore there is still a reasonable amount 
of evidence in favour of the situated cognition approaches here. 
 
Edwards and Potter criticise Neisser, and have a different concept of memory. I will 
now go on to consider the pressures on their concept in a similar manner. 
 
Edwards and Potter 
Setting up a new subdisipline 
In a similar manner to Neisser, Edwards and Potter are partly motivated by reacting 
against mainstream cognitive psychology. However they are also reacting against its 
ecological version. Setting up a new subdiscipline in competition to the dominant 
approach is part of what their concepts (including MEMORY) are needed to do. For 
them, the new subdiscipline in question is of course discursive psychology. Setting 
up this new approach applies pressure towards a distributed cognition concept of 
memory because, as I said above, constructing a memory through discourse involves 
distribution across the members of the group involved in the discourse, coordination 
with material structures (e.g. written discourse), and sometimes also distribution 
through time because later pieces of discourse are responses to earlier ones. 
 
Discursive psychologists saw their work as leading a “second cognitive revolution”, 
the first having been the overthrow of behaviourism by the cognitive paradigm (see 
e.g. Harré and Gillett, 1994: ch 2). Edwards and Potter are quite explicit about the 
role the case studies in their book Discursive Psychology play in this endeavour. 
When discussing their choice of cases, they say: ‘In each case, these materials 
provide an excellent opportunity for developing the main themes of the discursive 
action model which we are offering as a centrepiece of discursive psychology’ 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 6–7). Additionally, they spend a lot of the book 
differentiating themselves from both cognitive psychology and social psychology, 





Although this discursive revolution doesn’t seem to have swept all before it as 
intended, was the aim of setting it up internal to the science? Differentiating itself 
from other disciplines (e.g. social psychology) just to show that it has something 
different to offer is not a method that has been internalised. However, this is not all 
that is happening here. The discursive psychologists do offer real critiques based on 
what cognitive and social psychology leave out. 
 
Even ecological cognitive psychology disregards important things because the 
experimenter has the “correct version”, or knowledge of the input to memory. In the 
John Dean case study, this is the tape recordings of the conversations. As Edwards 
and Potter say, the presence of these recordings was the whole reason for Neisser’s 
study (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 33–34). For the discursive psychologists on the 
other hand, ‘we might say that everyday conversational remembering often has this 
as its primary concern – the attempt to construct an acceptable, agreed or 
communicatively successful version of what happened (Edwards and Middleton, 
1986a, refer to this as the ‘validation function’ in conversational remembering).’ 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 75). On their view, other goals may be more important 
than strict accuracy, and what strict accuracy is varies with the goals and criteria for 
remembering in that particular context.  
 
There is nothing wrong with pointing out an aspect of the phenomena that current 
approaches do not consider, and this can result in success. Because it was new at this 
time, discursive psychology had not had time to acquire a track record of success. 
Setting up this new approach is therefore an untried hypothesis. 
 
Influence of other disciplines 
Another important pressure on the discursive approach, and therefore on MEMORY, is 
the influence of other disciplines. Here I will discuss three of these: other fields 
which make use of discourse analysis, later Wittgensteinian philosophy, and the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). All three of these emphasize discourse, so 





Discursive psychology is a variety of discourse analysis, so we might think that 
pressure is being externally imposed from other disciplines that already employ 
discourse analysis. At the time of writing the book, Potter was a reader in discourse 
analysis in the department of social sciences, and Edwards was a social psychologist, 
and both were members of the interdisciplinary “Discourse and Rhetoric” group at 
Loughborough University. They were therefore both familiar with discourse analysis 
as it is more traditionally applied in the humanities. Discourse analysis has diverse 
influences, for example from semiotics, narratology, ethnographic approaches etc. It 
seems that there is a risk of taking for granted techniques that worked when 
discourse analysis was applied in other disciplines, and importing them into 
psychology as external considerations. Edwards and Potter were immersed in these 
techniques, so this seems like a real possibility. 
 
However, when a new subdiscipline is first set up, it is often too early to see whether 
this is happening. Techniques, theories, etc. have not yet had time to establish a track 
record of success, and so it is here. The techniques of discourse analysis seem to be 
reasonable techniques to try here, given that what Edwards and Potter argue is 
missing from psychology is a study of the discursive construction of memories etc. 
This influence is therefore not problematically external, but is an untried hypothesis. 
 
The second important influence I will consider here is the later work of Wittgenstein. 
The importance of this factor is clear in Edwards and Potter’s focus on pragmatically 
occasioned accomplishments occurring in discourse. In their criticism of Neisser’s 
treatment of his Dean case study, they say of their suggested improvements in 
approach: 
 
It is to shift our allegiance from the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, looking for the rules of 
correspondence between propositions and the world, to the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical 
Investigations, looking for the uses of language for constructing truth inside the ‘language 
games’ that make up a ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1953). (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 
40). 
 
They are seeking an even more contextualised approach than that of ecological 
cognitive psychology. Part of the point of this is for psychology to make itself 
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relevant to everyday life, and this concern is internal to the science. A science that 
did not do this to some extent would be of little use. However, the specifically 
Wittgensteinian approach is an approach that is only just being tried out in 
psychology, so it hasn’t had time to be internalised, but it is not being relied on 
unquestioningly, so is an untried hypothesis. 
 
Another powerful influence on discursive psychology, and on Potter in particular, is 
SSK. Sociologists of scientific knowledge treat science as a social practice, and use 
the techniques of sociology, including discourse analysis, to study it. Potter at one 
stage planned to do a PhD with prominent sociologist of scientific knowledge Harry 
Collins. In the end the offer was withdrawn due to funding cuts, but Potter continued 
to work in the philosophy and sociology of science, with an interest in many of its 
major figures, including Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Collins, Mulkay, Latour and 
Woolgar. 
 
The influence of SSK can be seen in Edwards and Potter’s work on Lawson, and 
their criticism of Neisser. In particular, in their criticism of Neisser for using his own 
categories of accuracy or truth in remembering, they cite major figures from SSK 
and say ‘it is vital to maintain a neutral position with respect to what the participants 
treat as facts, or else their own interests and purposes begin to contaminate the 
analytical conclusions (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1981; Mulkay, 1979)…this is precisely 
the issue raised by Neisser’s (1981) study’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 57). This 
recommendation to use participants’ categories rather than analysts’ categories is 
part of their rejection of an objective truth independent of the experimenter, which is 
an important idea in SSK. In Neisser’s case study, the problem is, as I said above, his 
focus on the “correct version” – the tapes of the conversations. In their words: ‘In the 
case of cognitive studies of memory, truth is equivalent to the psychologist’s direct 
access to the input.’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 73). 
 
Another of their criticisms of Neisser is also heavily influenced by SSK. They 
criticise Neisser for his appeal to Dean’s vanity as a distorting influence to account 
for particular errors in remembering (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 72). According to 
the strong program in SSK, social factors must be appealed to in order to explain 
what happens when science gets it right, as much as when it gets it wrong. The same 
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is true here; veridical memory needs to be explained as much as erroneous memory. 
As Edwards and Potter say, ‘[a]n infinity of falsities is possible, so we need to 
account for why particular ones are produced. (It is our own argument, of course, 
that truthful descriptions can also be indefinitely elaborated).’ (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 72). Neisser’s talk of a distorting influence in some cases is therefore the 
wrong approach from this perspective. They explicitly cite the sociologist of 
scientific knowledge Bloor in this discussion (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 73). 
 
Is the influence of SSK an internal factor? The techniques of discourse analysis it 
employs have not yet been tried out in psychology, so as I said before, they have not 
had time to develop a track record of success and be internalised. These techniques 
seem to be good ones to try out here; SSK involved looking closely at discourse, 
among other social aspects of the scientific process, and this is part of what seems to 
the discursive psychologists to be lacking in cognitive psychology. 
 
Although there are good reasons to try these techniques, there is some reason to be 
concerned that their application is not speculative enough, and the theories of SSK 
are being taken too much for granted as theories that will also apply in psychology. 
Figures from SSK are cited as authorities in Edwards and Potter’s book in a way that 
perhaps suggests their ideas are not sufficiently open to question and may be being 
externally imposed. However, it is too early in the history of discursive psychology 
to say this for sure.  
 
Edwards and Potter do make some remarks about their treatment of Latour, which 
suggest that they are aware of taking his work for granted, but that doing so is a 
methodological necessity. They use Latour’s own term “black boxing”, saying that 
they black box Latour, as opposed to their treatment of Neisser, where ‘we have 
opened the lid to gaze at the workings of this piece of research’ (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 71). They point out that not doing this black boxing ‘would quickly make all 
accumulative talk and text impossible’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 71). This is surely 
right, and their self-awareness on this issue suggests that the black boxed ideas could 
still be subject to question in other circumstances, and are therefore untried 





Another influence on Edwards and Potter’s work and on their concept of memory 
was Bartlett. When I discussed Bartlett as an influence on Neisser, I considered 
Wagoner’s claim that Neisser’s early work distorted Bartlett’s notion of a schema, in 
particular neglecting its more social aspects. Edwards wrote a paper in 1987 with 
David Middleton, reinterpreting Bartlett as a fruitful source of inspiration for 
discursive psychology. In that paper, they share Wagoner’s suggestion that Neisser 
and others neglected important parts of Bartlett’s work, thus distorting it. In 
particular, they say that the affective and contextual aspects of schemata have been 
ignored largely because of the influence of the information processing account. They 
say:  
 
For Bartlett, schemata were not static knowledge structures stored in the brains or minds of 
individuals for the interpretation of experience, but rather were functional properties of 
adaptation between persons and their physical and social environments. Their essential 
properties therefore were social, affective and purposive, the basis of actions and reactions in 
the contexts of living one’s life. (Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 80). 
 
Their reconsideration of the more social aspects of Bartlett’s work applies pressure 
toward a situated cognition perspective. Edwards and Middleton complain that 
recent study of memory has been too individualist, and advocate instead a focus on 
discourse as ‘directly instrumental in the realisation and constitution of both 
individual and collective remembering’ (Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 89). Notice 
that discourse here is constitutive, not just something that has an effect on 
remembering. The position in question here therefore seems to be something 
stronger than Neisser’s merely embedded cognition. They go on to say:  
 
Bartlett was truly concerned with social-cognitive issues. He was concerned not with the 
ways in which social factors affect individual cognitions (e.g. Stephen, Brandstatter and 
Wagner, 1983), where two heads are seen to be more effective than one, but rather with the 




Pressure toward a distributed cognition perspective specifically can be seen in this 
understanding of Bartlett.
 61
 The focus is not individual cognition extended through 
discourse, but the discourse constructed by multiple individuals acting in concert. 
 
Edwards and Middleton argue that the focus on social context leads to a loss of focus 
on accuracy of memory, and that Bartlett saw this. They quote him as saying: 
‘“There is ordinarily no directed and laborious effort to secure accuracy”…(Bartlett, 
1932, p. 96)’ and ‘“literal recall is extraordinarily unimportant”… (ibid., p. 204)’ 
(Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 85). Bartlett’s influence is therefore also partly 
responsible for the idea of shifting focus away from comparison with a correct 
version of events. 
 
Another way in which an acquaintance with Bartlett’s work may have applied 
pressure toward a distributed cognition concept of memory is through his work on 
what Edwards and Middleton call “symbolic remembering”, i.e. ‘putting things into 
words, into conventional and communicable symbols.’ (Edwards and Middleton, 
1987: 82). Bartlett was interested in what he called “conventionalization”, i.e. the 
process by which material (e.g. techniques, customs, institutions) are changed when 
they are adopted into an alien culture (Bartlett, 1932: ch. XVI). He says of this 
material: ‘The new material is assimilated to the persistent past of the group to which 
it comes’ (Bartlett, 1932: 280). The part of this persistent past that most interested 
Edwards and Middleton is that embodied in symbolic form that can then be 
transmitted via text and pictures (Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 78–79). This recalls 
Hutchins’ work in distributed cognition in the navigation of a naval vessel, in 
particular the role of maps and charts. For Hutchins, the symbols in maps and charts 
show the distribution of cognition, not just across people and artefacts, but also 
through time, as they are handed down and sometimes changed from one user to 
another (Hutchins, 1995).  
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 When looking at Bartlett’s influence on Neisser, I claimed that his work applied pressure towards 
an enacted cognition concept. This is compatible with it applying pressure towards a distributed 
cognition concept for Edwards and Potter, because they are responding to different aspects of 
Bartlett’s work, interpreted differently. The aim here is not to find out Bartlett’s implicit concept and 
claim that reading him applies pressure in that direction, but to see how his influence appeared to 
those he was influencing. 
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Bartlett’s symbolic remembering is also linked to the irreducibly social nature of 
cognition for discursive psychology, because the symbols exist only as part of a joint 
activity in some sense. As Edwards and Middleton say, ‘[t]he study of discourse in 
the functional contexts of everyday life offers the bridge between the individual and 
the social that Bartlett sought throughout his work, and attempted to capture through 
the conventionalization of successively remembered symbolic materials.’ (Edwards 
and Middleton, 1987: 89). In terms of the modern distributed cognition framework, 
the transmission of memory through symbolic materials can be seen as the 
distribution of memory across groups of people, the symbolic materials themselves, 
and through time (compare Hutchins, 1995). 
 
This use of Bartlett’s work in the new field of discursive psychology has not yet had 
time to acquire a history of success and be internalised, but is it being 
problematically imposed from an external perspective, or treated as an hypothesis?  
 
The role Bartlett is playing here is not that of an authority figure whose words should 
be accepted without question. Edwards and Middleton are not entirely uncritical. For 
example, they note that Bartlett was still looking through discourse, rather than at it 
as they advocate (Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 87). It is also important that 
Bartlett is not being set up as anything like a discursive psychologist from before 
discursive psychology was invented. Rather he is being treated as a potential source 
of inspiration. Edwards and Middleton say explicitly that they are not reinvestigating 
Bartlett to set the historical record straight or to provide a definitive account of his 
work, but ‘[r]ather the prime concern is with the value of such a re-examination for 
certain issues which are currently significant in cognitive psychology and in the 
study of social cognition’ (Edwards and Middleton, 1987: 77). His views are not 
being imposed on the field from outside, but are just being explored speculatively. 
His influence is therefore an untried hypothesis. 
 
1980s intellectual milieu 
Having considered some specific influences on Edwards and Potter, I now want to 
mention the more general intellectual milieu, as I did for Neisser. The influences 
here are much the same as they were for Neisser, given that they were only writing a 
few years later. Recall that these included the rediscovery of the work of Halbwachs 
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and Vygotsky, the failure of classical A.I. and the rise of connectionism, the 
influence of dynamical systems theory, and new disciplines becoming involved in 
cognitive science, including anthropology, education, media theory, design, and 
Human Computer Interaction. 
 
The discursive psychologists are in a similar position to Neisser here, in that reacting 
to what is happening in neighbouring disciplines helps them to stay relevant to those 
disciplines. These are not influences that are being treated as authoritative, merely 
possible sources of inspiration for new methods and explanations to try out in a 
developing discipline. They are therefore untried hypotheses. 
 
The Gulf War 
I want to consider one final influence on Edwards and Potter’s concept of memory, 
and this is the Gulf War, and particularly its portrayal in the media. Edwards and 
Potter’s book was written at the time of the Gulf War, and they specifically discuss it 
in both the introduction and the conclusion. In fact, in the very first paragraph, they 
say that while writing the book: ‘We were particularly struck by the way that what 
we were writing about psychology could be applied to the versions of the Gulf War 
that were made available in a torrent of media coverage.’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 
1). 
 
At the end of the book, they give some suggestions as to how their ideas might be 
applied, in particular with relation to some of the words used in the media reports, 
what those words were meant to accomplish, and what inferences from the reports 
were licensed by them that may not have been licensed if other words had been used 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 170–175). 
 
Looking at the media construction of accounts of the war as an important illustration 
of their approach is part of the epistemic niche for the discursive psychologists’ 
concepts. Significant events like wars are important examples of memories which 
can be seen as distributed across a number of people and texts, and through time. 





Looking for ways to apply techniques to current issues is something that is internal 
to all sciences. That is not to say that there can’t be research that cannot be so 
applied, only that when it can be, the idea of doing so is an internal consideration. 
Such relevance to important contemporary issues is part of what constitutes success 
for a science, so it is something like an analytic truth that it has a track record of 
success and is therefore an internal consideration. In this instance, despite discursive 
psychology’s immaturity, the fact that this factor is internal at a coarser level of grain 
makes it internal here. 
 
Summary 
In summary of what I have said about the epistemic niche for Edwards and Potter: 
Factor applying pressure to 
concept 
Concept encouraged 
by this pressure 
Internal / hypothesis / external 
Setting up a new 
subdiscipline 
Distributed Hypothesis 
Influence of other disciplines  Distributed Hypothesis 
Bartlett Distributed Hypothesis 
1980s milieu Situated (various) Hypothesis 
Gulf War Distributed Internal 
 
All of the factors in the epistemic niche considered here apply pressure towards a 
situated cognition concept of memory, in most cases a distributed cognition concept. 
I have considered the effect of reacting against cognitive psychology and setting up 
the new subdiscipline of discursive psychology, the influence of the ways in which 
discourse analysis was applied in other disciplines, the work of later Wittgenstein, 
SSK, the reconsideration of Bartlett’s work, other influences in the intellectual 
milieu of the time (failure of classical AI, involvement of new disciplines in 
cognitive science, rediscovery of Halbwachs and Vygotsky etc.), and the application 
of the discursive approach to Gulf War narratives in the media at the time. I have 
argued that none of these influences are problematically external, so the distributed 





The application to Gulf War narratives is an internal factor, so the distributed 
cognition concept is legitimate to the extent that it is shaped by this factor. It is non-
legitimate to the extent that it is shaped by the other factors considered here, but this 
is because discursive psychology is not old enough at the time of this case study for 
any of the other factors to have had a history of success and been internalised. There 
is therefore relatively weak evidence for a distributed concept functioning as an 
investigative kind in discursive psychology, but that is due to the newness of the 
subdiscipline, and it is at least suggestive that a situated cognition concept is 
rationally being tried out in a newly emerging field. 
 
Conclusion 
This case study has revealed that Neisser (an ecological cognitive psychologist) and 
Edwards and Potter (discursive psychologists) are working with situated cognition 
concepts of memory. In Neisser’s case the concept is embedded, and in Edwards and 
Potter’s case it is distributed. In each case I have considered some of the main factors 
in the epistemic niches of the concepts of memory which are responsible for them 
taking the shapes they do. 
 
Neisser’s concept is being shaped by a variety of competing factors, some applying 
pressure towards an embedded concept, some enacted, and some brainbound. There 
are internal considerations in all three of these categories. There is some evidence 
that the embedded cognition concept is functioning as an investigative kind, but I 
have argued that the pressures on Neisser’s concept should result in pluralism, where 
multiple kinds of concept and their accompanying frameworks are in use side by 
side. Therefore there is evidence here of a situated (in this case embedded) cognition 
concept functioning as an investigative kind, and scope for more kinds of concept to 
do so too. 
 
Edwards and Potter’s distributed cognition concept is rational to the extent that it is 
shaped by all the factors considered here, and legitimate to the extent that it is shaped 
by the application of the discursive approach to Gulf War narratives in the media. It 
is non-legitimate to the extent that it is shaped by the other factors considered here, 
but this is because discursive psychology is not old enough at the time of this case 
study for any of the other factors to have had a history of success and been 
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internalised. This is not surprising, given what I have said about immature sciences 
in previous chapters. 
 
It is too early to tell whether the discursive psychologists’ distributed cognition 
concept will pick out an investigative kind, but it is suggestive that a situated 
cognition concept is rationally being tried out in a newly emerging discipline. There 
is no way of knowing whether it will be a successful concept, but there is no reason 
to think that it will not be. There is therefore no reason to stipulate that the science 
would be best served by sticking to brainbound concepts, as some critics of the 




8. Transactive Memory Systems: A Case Study 
 
Introduction 
This case study focuses on a social variety of situated cognition, where memory is 
putatively extended (or distributed etc.) over other people rather than over artefacts 
or tools. In particular, the topic is Transactive Memory Systems, proposed in 1985 by 
Wegner, Guiliano and Hertel (hereafter WGH) in their chapter “Cognitive 
interdependence in close relationships” in W. J. Ickes (Ed.), Compatible and 
incompatible relationships, a book in the Springer Series in Social Psychology. A 
Transactive Memory System (TMS) is defined as ‘a set of individual memory 
systems in combination with the communication that takes place between 
individuals’ (Wegner, 1986: 186; see also WGH, 1985). 
 
The idea was enlarged upon in Wegner’s paper “Transactive Memory: A 
Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind” (Wegner, 1986). A TMS is something 
like a post-cognitive-revolution group mind. Wegner and his collaborators are keen 
to distance themselves from older discredited group mind notions, and to use the 
tools and ideas developed in the cognitive revolution (an encoding-storage-retrieval 
model of memory based on the computer metaphor etc.) This interesting relationship 
to their own history will be important in what follows. 
 
The case study will compare the social psychological work of WGH with work in 
Communication Studies, a complex interdisciplinary hybrid of psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, journalism, political science and English, among others. In 
particular I will focus on a discussion of TMS in the journal Human Communication 
Research in 2003. Here Pavitt (a professor of communication) criticises the notion of 
a TMS (Pavitt, 2003a), others in his field respond (Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003; 
Propp, 2003; Wittenbaum, 2003), and Pavitt replies in light of their responses 
(Pavitt, 2003b).  
 
The main point of contention is what the relevant baseline against which a putative 
TMS is tested should be. There are at least two important questions that comparison 
with a baseline can be used to answer: (a) whether a TMS exists, and (b) whether the 
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TMS is functioning well. These questions are often not well distinguished, and I will 
discuss this further below.  
 
Other important issues are the role of communication between the individuals in a 
TMS, and the relationship between the concept of a TMS and older notions of a 
group mind. The latter is something that has received considerable attention from 
participants in the debate, and which my historical approach is ideally placed to 
investigate. All of these issues turn on what it is to remember for the different 
groups, i.e. on MEMORY. 
 
The case study 
WGH’s initial research proposing the idea of the TMS concerned remembering in 
long-term heterosexual couples. WGH argued that such dyads were able to 
remember things that neither individual could remember alone, using processes such 
as interactive cuing (WGH, 1985: 256–257). Essential to this achievement is meta-
memory, in particular remembering one another’s areas of expertise (WGH, 1985: 
264). These meta-memories may be based on stereotypes (e.g. that the female 
remembers things to do with the children), or specialisms (e.g. one partner typically 
takes responsibility for remembering social engagements), or who acquired a 
particular piece of information first (e.g. in taking a telephone message). (See WGH, 
1985: 265–266; Wegner, 1986: 191–192). 
 
The relevance to social versions of extended cognition, and to distributed cognition, 
should be obvious. I will consider below whether the participants in the debate 
actually seem to be making use of such concepts of memory, or whether this link is 
only apparent. More recently, philosophers have noticed this work and connected it 
explicitly with distributed cognition, for example Theiner (2013) and Tollefsen et al. 
(2013), and I will briefly mention their papers in the next section.  
 
This case study is important for my overall project because there may be important 
differences between social versions of situated cognition and the more artefact-based 
versions I have considered so far. Tollefsen et al. explicitly suggest that social 
extended cognition is plausible whereas artefact extended cognition is not (Tollefsen 
et al., 2013: 58, note 7). Although my last case study concerned memory as 
225 
 
constructed between participants in discourse, written records of the discourse (tape 
recordings and newspaper reports) still had an important role. Although the idea of a 
TMS including artefact memory has been discussed (e.g. Wegner, 1986: 187–189), it 
is usually considered to be purely social. This is important if Tollefsen et al. are 
correct about the difference in plausibility between artefact and social varieties of 
situated cognition. 
 
There has been considerable interest in the notion of a TMS from business, 
management and communication studies because the ideas can be applied to work 
groups and teams, and possibly to larger organisations (although this presents more 
challenges). The results of such research may help groups to work more efficiently, 
thus benefitting businesses. 
 
For the communication studies side of my analysis, I will look at criticisms of the 
TMS from Pavitt (a professor of communication) in Human Communication 
Research in 2003, and some responses to his work.  
 
Pavitt is concerned that TMS research is rejuvenating the old abandoned idea of the 
“group mind”, even though its proponents go to great lengths to explain how their 
proposal is different from the work of Jung, Durkheim, Hegel, Rousseau, Wundt, 
McDougall, etc. Pavitt acknowledges that it can be valuable to apply terms usually 
used about individual cognition to the group level. However, he goes on to say that 
‘[t]his use is, however, inherently metaphorical, and there is a risk that the idea of 
“group information processing” will become reified.’ (Pavitt, 2003a: 593).  
 
Pavitt’s main dispute is over the baseline to which a putative TMS should be 
compared. His claim is that TMS supporters have taken the wrong baseline in their 
studies.  He argues that a group such as those studied in TMS research performs no 
better than an aggregate of individuals (a nominal group). He uses a mathematical 
model (Lorge and Solomon model B) to calculate the performance such a nominal 
group should have, and compares this to the results of TMS research.  
 
Lorge and Solomon (1955) propose a model (Model A) which predicts group 
performance under a series of assumptions, most importantly the assumption that 
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communication between group members serves as an accurate conduit for 
communication of the results of individual problem solving, but no more. The model 
therefore gives the expected result of a nominal group – a group whose performance 
is that of the aggregate of its individual members – rather than the result of a group 
whose interactions allow new properties to emerge at the group level. Model B is an 
extension of Model A to allow it to handle problems with multiple stages. 
 
In every case Pavitt considers, the group remembers more than an individual, but 
less than the prediction of Lorge-Solomon model B (Pavitt, 2003a: 597, table 1). 
According to Pavitt, this shows inhibition caused by the communication between 
group members. This is because, given that Lorge-Solomon model B’s prediction 
should give the result expected for the aggregate of the individuals, if the group 
underperforms this, the group is less than the sum of its parts. To use Pavitt’s term, 
we should be “reductionists” about group memory. Because there is nothing special 
emerging at the group level, for Pavitt the term “Transactive Memory System” 
should only ever be used as a metaphor; it does not describe a real new phenomenon, 
hence his worries about “reifiying”, quoted above. 
 
Three responses to Pavitt in the same journal issue are more optimistic about the 
usefulness of the idea of a TMS. The first of these is Hollingshead and Brandon 
(2003). They argue that a group that has a TMS outperforms a group that does not. 
They say: ‘When group members divide responsibility for different knowledge areas 
and are aware of one another’s expertise (i.e., when they have a transactive memory 
system), groups perform better than when they do not (Stasser, Stewart & 
Wittenbaum, 1995).’ (Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003: 608). This disagreement 
with Pavitt could either be due to a difference in appropriate baseline, or in what 
groups are classed as having a TMS. In fact it seems to be both, although they only 
explicitly argue the latter. 
 
As a baseline, much of the research looked at by Hollingshead and Brandon took 
actual results from testing of nominal groups rather than using a mathematical model 
as Pavitt does. Although they do not explicitly argue that this is a problem for Pavitt, 




What Hollingshead and Brandon do explicitly argue is that most of the research 
looked at by Pavitt does not even concern groups that have developed a TMS. They 
say of the cases Pavitt refers to:  
 
Group members were strangers to one another prior to the study (with the exception of the 
dating couples in Wegner et al., 1991), and did not have an opportunity to learn about each 
member’s expertise and abilities. Participants learned the information individually, and then 
were asked to retrieve the information collaboratively, so the ability to communicate and to 
collaborate with others on the memory task varied during the learning and the recall phases 
of the studies. Many of the tasks used in the studies involved episodic rather than semantic 
memory, and specific knowledge areas were not clearly defined, which may have made them 
less conducive to a division of labor. Based on these features, we believe that it is unlikely 
that the groups in the studies reviewed by Pavitt (2002, with the exception of Wegner et al., 
1991) had a developed transactive memory system.  (Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003: 613). 
 
There is disagreement over both the baseline and the putative TMS that is being 
compared to it. There is therefore some debate over what counts as a TMS, i.e. what 
counts as remembering for the group. Because this is a disagreement over what 
counts as remembering, it is a disagreement over MEMORY. I will consider this issue 
in more detail below, as part of a discussion of the pressure particular notions of 
“success” (what it is to succeed at remembering) exert on MEMORY. 
 
The second paper from the communication group that is favourable to TMS is Propp 
(2003). She argues that Pavitt’s critique should be taken as a spur to further work, 
particularly on the communication between individuals in a TMS. Pavitt appears to 
gloss over this issue, and again the problem is with his use of a mathematical model 
as baseline. 
 
Pavitt’s favoured Lorge-Solomon model B makes the following assumptions: 
 
(a) communication serves as a flawless conduit for information, such that if any group 
member solves a given problem the group will accept the member’s solution as correct, and 
(b) the odds of different members solving that given problem are independent of one another. 




To assume that communication is flawless is to ignore the importance of variations 
in communication. Propp therefore disputes assumption (a) as follows: 
 
It is important to note that while metaphors of collective information processing and TMS 
posit the centrality of communication, they do not presume, as Pavitt (2003) suggests, that 
interaction will be flawless (or even effective) in the creation of a group memory. Actually, 
quite the opposite is true. To extend the collective information processing metaphor, just as 
individuals are prone to processing limitations and errors, the group also will experience 
processing limitations and errors, and these problems are by definition communicative 
phenomena when examined at the group level (see Wegner, 1986; Propp, 1999, for 
discussion of the ways interaction can inhibit group memory). Moreover, even as we seek to 
substantiate assembly bonus effects [beneficial effects of working in a group beyond the 
summing of individual group members’ contributions] we should also identify the ways in 
which interaction inhibits group memory, because it may be through the understanding of 
process loss that methods for enhancing process gains are identified. (Propp, 2003: 602). 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, Propp is arguing that a group need not 
communicate completely effectively in order to have a TMS. Her disagreement with 
Pavitt concerns whether a group that remembers less well than a particular baseline 
(itself contentious) should be classed as not having a TMS, or as having one that is 
functioning poorly. In other words, it is a question of whether poor recall should not 
be classed as memory at all, or whether it should just be classed as bad memory. 
 
Making a related point about successful remembering, Propp also says:  
 
It is possible that the definition of improved performance might need to be conceptualized 
more broadly to account for the presumption of groups’ superiority in organizational theory 
and practice. This definition of performance might include other group outcomes that have 
been found to make groups superior, such as representation of diverse goals and values, 
distribution of responsibility for decisions, and increased commitment to an action (Gigone 
& Hastie, 1996). (Propp, 2003: 604–605).  
 
In other words, there may be more to the idea of a group performing better than an 
aggregate of individuals than exceeding a baseline like Lorge-Solomon model B. 
Like Hollingshead and Brandon, Propp is disputing Pavitt’s assumptions about what 
counts as having a TMS, and therefore what counts as remembering for a group (see 




The final response to Pavitt is Wittenbaum (2003). Her main point appears to be 
similar to Propp’s although it is expressed as a suggested expansion of Pavitt’s work 
rather than a criticism. I will not consider her response further here, as much of the 
paper is a summary of Pavitt’s work citing data in support of it, and this does not 
give enough information to infer what her concept of memory might be. 
 
Pavitt’s response to these three papers is to clarify his point about relevant baselines 
as follows: 
 
If the relevant question is whether groups remember items of information better than do 
individuals, the correct baseline for evaluating group memory is individual memory. If the 
relevant question is whether group interaction enhances, retards, or has no impact on group 
memory, the correct baseline is whether groups of a given number of people remember items 
of information better or worse than either equal-sized combinations of analogously skilled 
individuals (“nominal groups”) or, as I did using Lorge-Solomon Model B (1955), 
arithmetically derived facsimiles of such combinations. The researchers I critiqued in the 
opening essay used the former baseline when they should have used the latter. (Pavitt, 2003a: 
626). 
 
Here he sticks to the claim that Lorge-Solomon Model B is an accurate reflection of 
the performance of nominal groups, but is more open about what counts as 
successful remembering; it need not always be performing better than this particular 
baseline. 
 
Pavitt also says in his response that he agrees with Propp and Wittenbaum that 
communication researchers have an important role to play in studying the 
communication between group members, and that more research in this area would 
be welcome. I will return to this point in my discussion of the pressure placed on 
MEMORY by the aim to consolidate the subdiscipline. 
 
In the next section, I will discuss the implicit concepts of memory employed in this 





Concepts of memory 
Social psychology 
Wegner is a social psychologist, but one of his collaborators, Hertel, is a cognitive 
psychologist. Cognitive psychology is typically individualist, and WGH are very 
keen to incorporate the insights of the cognitive revolution so that they are not seen 
to be going back to older group mind ideas. As they say, ‘references to the group 
mind in contemporary literature has dwindled to a smattering of wisecracks’ (WGH, 
1985: 253). However, it seems that social psychology must assume that groups (or at 
any rate society as a group) exist in some interesting sense. The resolution of this 
tension is often to see groups in terms of the individuals that comprise them. This is 
reflected in the definition of a TMS as ‘a set of individual memory systems in 
combination with the communication that takes place between individuals’ (Wegner, 
1986: 186, my emphasis). 
 
Does this relatively individualist stance indicate a brainbound perspective on 
cognition rather than a situated one? I don’t think it can do so without giving up on 
the very idea of a TMS. In TMS research, it is the group that is typically said to 
remember. Wegner says quite explicitly that ‘[t]ransactive memory is…not traceable 
to any of the individuals alone, nor can it be found somewhere “between” 
individuals. Rather, it is a property of a group.’ (Wegner, 1986: 911). The only 
candidates for a perspective on cognition that captures this social element of the 
TMS are distributed cognition (e.g. Hutchins, 1995), and social versions of extended 
cognition (e.g. Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark 2003, 2008).  
 
There is an important difference between these two views, namely that extended 
cognition is organism centred (see especially Clark, 2007) – someone’s memory 
extends over or into another person or people. On a distributed cognition perspective, 
the memory may be a property of the group as a whole (see Hutchins’ 2011 review 
of Clark’s Supersizing the Mind for more on this difference). A TMS is therefore a 
distributed cognition notion, rather than an extended one, because it is the group that 
is said to remember. In fact, given Wegner’s definition, a distributed cognition 
concept is essential to the idea of a TMS; anyone who accepts TMS as true group 




Some indications of this implicit concept can be found in the writing of TMS 
researchers, for example WGH say that ‘[t]o build a transactive memory is to acquire 
a set of communication processes whereby two minds can work as one’ (WGH, 
1985: 263, my emphasis). WGH also talk about an analogy between the functions of 
group memory and individual memory, saying of the functional equivalence of 
individual and transactive memory: 
 
Both kinds of memory can be characterized as systems that, according to general system 
theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968), may show rough parallels in their modes of operation. Our 
interest is in processes that occur when the transactive memory system is called upon to 
perform some function for the group – a function that the individual memory system might 
reasonably be called upon to perform for the person (WGH, 1985: 256). 
 
This is reminiscent of the Parity Principle (the argument that there is functional 
parity between brainbound cognition and extended cognition (Clark and Chalmers 
1998)), but here it is being used to argue for something more like distributed 
cognition. The equivalence is not between a person’s brain and their brain plus 
external elements (perhaps other people), but between an individual and a group as a 
whole. 
 
The attitude that it is the group that remembers is also revealed in the experiments 
carried out. It is the group’s answer to a question or task that WGH were interested 
in. In the main piece of research they discuss (Guiliano and Wegner, 1983), 
negotiation to produce a single answer from the dyad was important. The research 
compared “close” and “distant” couples, where the close couples were those who 
had carried out together a task designed to induce cohesion before testing. They say: 
 
The hypothesis was that “distant” couples, when faced with disagreement would opt for the 
personal choice of one or the other partner; “close” couples, in contrast, were expected to use 
such conflict as a stimulus to invent a new, group-generated possibility (WHG, 1985: 268). 
 
From this interest in negotiation to produce a single answer, it is clear that memory 
was seen as something attributed to the dyad, as we would expect from the 
distributed cognition perspective, not to one member but including the other as a 




It is also suggestive that some philosophers interested in distributed cognition have 
recently taken an interest in TMS research. Theiner (2013) and Tollefsen et al. 
(2013) write papers concerning TMSs in a special issue of Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology. The purpose of the special issue is to look at the theoretical arguments 




All these things point to the fact that the TMS as conceived by WGH essentially, if 
implicitly, involves a distributed cognition concept of memory. 
 
Communication studies 
Does the same apply to Pavitt and the other communication researchers? Must their 
concept of memory be distributed simply because they are discussing TMSs? 
Pavitt’s for one need not, since he is arguing against the notion; in fact, it seems that 
having a different concept of memory is a large part of Pavitt’s rejection of TMS. A 
consequence of this is that the participants in the debate are talking about different 
(although of course overlapping) things when they talk about memory. 
 
I quoted above Pavitt’s fear ‘that the idea of “group information processing” will 
become reified’ and his belief that all talk of cognition at the group level is 
“inherently metaphorical” (Pavitt, 2003a: 593). Given that he admits that such talk 
can be valuable, his argument against it cannot be based on what is fruitful for 
science, but must be based on what he takes memory to be. This interpretation is 
backed up by his choice of the phrase “inherently metaphorical”. It also receives 
some support from the fact that he often (although not always) uses scare quotes 
when talking about putative group mental states (e.g. what the group “knows”, group 
“memory”, etc.). This suggests that he has a concept of memory according to which 
“memory” cannot be literally applied at the group level.  
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 A caveat here is that the focus of the special issue is on what I have called “situated cognition” 
perspectives more broadly, despite their use of the term “distributed”. In their editors’ introduction, 
Michaelian and Sutton talk about “distributed/extended” ideas (2013: 1). Neither Theiner nor 
Tollefsen et al. are particularly interested in the taxonomy of the different situated cognition positions, 




If this reading is correct, then Pavitt certainly does not have a distributed cognition 
concept of memory; but what kind of concept does he have? It is individualist, but 
that does not mean that it isn’t a situated cognition concept of some kind. All the 
situated cognition perspectives apart from distributed cognition are individualist, 
even the social variety of extended cognition, because it is organism-centred, as I 
said above.  
 
However, extended cognition does not seem to be the perspective that Pavitt has in 
mind. In the experiments he cites (see Pavitt, 2003a: 595–596), individual recall is 
compared to group recall, but in the group recall condition it is the answer of the 
group to each memory task that is recorded. If he was working with an extended 
cognition concept, these experiments would not be relevant, and instead he would be 
interested in the answers of a particular individual after consulting with the group. 
 
We can also rule out embedded and enacted cognition by looking at the experiments 
Pavitt cites. They are laboratory-based experiments, and he makes no mention of 
possible problems with this fact, or of the role that the wider environment could be 
expected to play. In both the embedded and enacted cognition approaches, this 
would be essential. There is also no reason to think he has an embodied cognition 
concept since there is no mention of the role of the body in his paper or in any of the 
experiments he cites. That leaves us by elimination with the conclusion that his 
concept of memory is a brainbound one. 
 
Pavitt is at least implicitly aware that accepting WGH’s notion of a TMS would 
involve accepting a distributed cognition concept of memory. In fact, I argue that his 
rejection of the notion of a TMS is partly because he implicitly rejects this concept in 
favour of a more individualist, brainbound concept of memory. Do the other 
communication researchers share Pavitt’s concept? 
 
As I have said, the TMS as construed by WGH essentially involves distributed 
cognition. Given that Hollingshead and Brandon and Propp are critical of Pavitt and 
favourable to the notion of a TMS, these researchers must either have a distributed 
cognition concept of memory, or they have a different idea of the TMS. In the latter 




Hollingshead and Brandon introduce the idea of the TMS by analogy with memories 
being stored in an external artificial device like a personal digital assistant 
(Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003: 608). This makes it sound as though they are 
thinking in terms of extended cognition, acknowledging that other people can 
function as an external memory store, much like artificial devices (compare Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998). However, as discussed above, this way of thinking is not a 
very good fit with the TMS because memories belong to the group, not to an 
individual using the rest of the group as a cognitive tool. It therefore seems unlikely 
that their implicit concept matches this explicit avowal. 
 
Later in the paper, they talk about ‘the development of an effective group memory 
system’ (Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003: 608). They also talk about other mental 
states at the group level: 
 
Communication can give groups the opportunity to develop a shared representation or shared 
mental model of their task (e.g., how they will work together to learn and later remember the 
words, who will assume responsibility for which categories). Shared mental models provide 
group members with a set of organized expectations for collective performance (Mohammed 
& Dumville, 2001). Creating a shared representation may be useful when groups know they 
will have the opportunity to interact when they need to recall the information. (Hollingshead 
and Brandon, 2003: 612). 
 
The repeated use of the word “shared” in this quotation could either mean that each 
individual has the same representation, model etc., or that that these things can 
actually be found at the group level. The former option cannot be right because 
differentiation of tasks is an important part of the TMS (strategies for who will 
remember what etc.) The best interpretation of “shared” is therefore that 
representations, models etc., and memory too, are actually found at the group level. 
Therefore their uses of “memory” in the phrase “group memory” cannot be 
metaphorical, which indicates that they have a distributed cognition concept of 
memory, true to the original notion of the TMS. 
 
Propp on the other hand talks about ‘metaphors of collective information processing 
and TMS’ (Propp, 2003: 602, my emphasis). It seems that she does not take the TMS 
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to be one kind of description of what memory is, but rather as a fruitful metaphor for 
research. She has a different idea of the TMS to WGH for whom, as I argued above, 
it is a genuinely distributed memory. Although this indicates that she has an 
individualist brainbound concept like Pavitt’s, there is some evidence that her 
concept is more flexible than his. She claims that ‘it is premature to halt attempts to 
identify assembly bonus effects’ (Propp, 2003: 601), arguing for further study of the 
communication between group members instead. 
 
She also shows some flexibility in terms of what should count as performing well for 
a group, as I said above (Propp, 2003: 604–605). Changing this criterion would 
effectively be a redefining of what counts as remembering, i.e. of MEMORY, although 
not necessarily with respect to taking a brainbound or situated cognition approach. 
This indicates some flexibility in her concept, much like that seen in the 
philosophers’ concepts in the first case study. What the concept should be is part of 
what is at issue in the research for Propp. 
 
There is therefore some variation in concepts among the communication researchers, 
with Hollingshead and Brandon having a distributed cognition concept, and Pavitt 
and Propp retaining a more individualist brainbound concept with references to 
“group memory” being only metaphorical. However, Propp’s concept is more 




The social psychologists have a distributed cognition concept. Of the communication 
researchers, Pavitt has a brainbound concept, Hollingshead and Brandon have a 
distributed cognition concept, and Propp has a concept that is brainbound, but with 
some degree of flexibility. 
 
Identifying and assessing the epistemic niches 
Social psychology 
The epistemic niche of a concept is constituted by the features of the context which 
apply pressure to the concept. Here I will therefore consider the influences on WGH, 
236 
 
and what they needed their concept of memory to do. The first influence I will 
consider is older ideas about a group mind. 
 
Rejection of old group mind ideas 
Getting away from old group mind ideas and their bad associations is a major 
pressure on MEMORY for WGH. It is a pressure away from a distributed cognition 
concept, where memory is viewed as something that a group can possess, and 
towards an individualist concept. As I said in the last section, any of the other 
positions I am considering here could be individualist. However, in this case, 
pressure away from the distributed cognition concept is pressure towards a 
brainbound concept, because the kind of work being done is laboratory-based 
experimental work that does not concern itself with the environment or context in the 
way that any of the other situated perspectives would do. 
 
WGH begin their paper with a lengthy section about what was bad about older group 
memory research, and how different their work is from this discreditable history. 
They say that they are ‘hoping to establish a more verifiable (and falsifiable) analysis 
by means of the idea of transactive memory’ (WGH, 1985: 256). The group mind 
notion has overtones of the supernatural, and they are particularly concerned to 
distance themselves from this. However, there is more to it than this supernatural 
element – it was a dominant research program for a long time – and there therefore 
seems to be a risk of throwing out something important. 
 
Whether or not distancing themselves from their own history in this way is internal 
to the science will depend on why the old group mind notions were discredited, and 
whether WGH are taking these reasons into account, or for example just trying not to 
associate themselves with a tainted research paradigm for reputation’s sake. This 
latter situation could have the bad consequence of throwing out something important 
along with that which should be discarded.  
 
In the paper itself, WGH do discuss how the old group mind idea came to grief. They 
say that being forced to see the group mind as nothing more than a group of 
individuals was in danger of giving the group mind proponents nothing interesting to 
say, so they retreated to the supernatural in order to retain something distinctive (see 
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WGH, 1985: 255). Here they cite some works on the history of social psychology 
(Allport, 1968; Knowles, 1982), suggesting some regard for their own history 
beyond the stereotype of the supernatural group mind. They also consider what 
might have been positive in the old idea: ‘Is there anything in the idea worth 
preserving? Along with the early theorists, we believe that an emphasis on the 
difference between group and individual mental processes is an indispensable part of 
the definition of each’ (WGH, 1985: 255). 
 
This doesn’t grant much to the old ideas, but it does show some consideration of 
advantages as well as disadvantages. Of course, this could be mere lip service to 
history, so it is important to look at the wider story beyond WGH’s work to see the 
origin of this pressure to avoid the group mind idea. 
 
The notion of a group mind enjoyed wide acclaim for a time in both psychology (e.g. 
Jung, 1922; Wundt 1910/1916) and sociology (e.g. Durkheim 1915). It is therefore 
perhaps unsurprising that it was an important idea in the foundation of social 
psychology, as a hybrid of the two disciplines. According to The Blackwell 
Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes: 
 
Two of the earliest texts in social psychology were Le Bon’s (1896/1960) Psychologie des 
Foules (Psychology of Crowds) and McDougall’s (1920) The Group Mind. Both espoused as 
a central tenet the view that behaviour in social aggregates was not simply a function of 
some combination of individual acts. Rather, they saw social behaviour as being guided by 
forces defined by the aggregate – a “collective consciousness” or “group mind” – that could 
not be understood fully by simply understanding individual behaviour or individual minds. 
Such ideas were not unusual for the times. Durkheim (1893/1984, 1965), Mead (1934) and 
other sociologists and social philosophers also saw collective or shared meaning as an 
integral component for understanding social behaviour (see Farr, 1996). (Hogg and Tindale, 
2001: 1). 
 
Since then, the fortunes of the group mind notion have changed somewhat. The 
Blackwell Handbook goes on to say: 
 
However, with the onset of Behaviourism, psychology’s focus moved almost exclusively 
onto the individual, and the notion of collective thought and meaning fell out of favour 
(Allport, 1924). In mainstream social psychology, focus on aggregates versus individuals has 
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waxed and waned (see Steiner, 1974, 1986; Moreland, Hogg & Hains, 1994 for reviews), but 
the key explanatory variables have remained mainly at the individual level. Thus in recent 
social psychology textbooks, the early ideas concerning “collective cognition” are rarely 
mentioned except for historical context, if they are mentioned at all (e.g., Baron & Byrne, 
2000). (Hogg and Tindale, 2001: 1). 
 
By the time WGH were writing, behaviourism had largely been replaced by 
cognitivism, but the individualism remained. I will discuss the influence of 
cognitivism in a later subsection, but we can see already that the move towards 
individualism was part of a wider story in which the dominant paradigm for the 
whole discipline of psychology changed. 
 
More specifically, there were important critiques of the older group mind notion as 
part of this shift. One of these came from Bartlett, a major figure in both early 
cognitive psychology and early social psychology, who I have already introduced in 
this thesis (see chapter 7). Bartlett criticised the notion of a collective unconscious, 
in particular Jung’s work, in his (1932), relating his criticism particularly to memory 
research. 
 
According to Bartlett, the collective unconscious in social psychology is an analogue 
of memory traces in individual or general psychology. He had already argued against 
the static trace theory of memory in the first half of the book, so this comment sets 
up his criticism of the collective unconscious. More precisely, he says that Jung 
confuses a storehouse of knowledge with capacities or functions.  He quotes Jung as 
saying: 
 
Every man is born with a markedly differentiated brain which makes him capable of very 
varied mental functions, whose acquisition and development are not ontogenetic in origin. 
Now, in proportion as the brains of all human beings are equally differentiated, the mental 
functions rendered possible by this level of differentiation are collective and universal. (Jung, 
1916, quoted in Bartlett, 1932: 285).  
 
Bartlett says that this is both vague and confused. The confusion is between what 
brain differentiations are and what they allow people to do. He points out that 
‘[n]obody knows precisely what brain differentiations are capable of producing in 
the way of human reaction; but it is fairly certain that they are a basis for the 
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subsequent development of functions, and not a storehouse of a mass of detailed 
acquired knowledge.’ (Bartlett, 1932: 285).  
 
Bartlett also considers the evidence in favour of the collective unconscious 
(intelligence tests on institutionalised children from varying social classes), and 
shows it to be wanting (Bartlett, 1932: 282–283). Such evidence is supposed to show 
“biological continuity” that is not just due to the children’s surroundings. Innate 
continuity of this kind would suggest a collective unconscious. Bartlett allows that 
there may be some positive evidence, but shows that this evidence falls well short of 
proof (Bartlett, 1932: 283, 291). 
 
The beginning of the backlash against the collective unconscious and the group mind 
can be seen here as part of a wider story, in this case the move from a static trace 
theory of memory to a broadly functionalist theory, in the sense of “functionalist” 
introduced in the last chapter (concerning function in a particular environment). 
Early rejections of the group mind idea, like Bartlett’s, were motivated by 
consideration of the evidence, and their alternative functionalist paradigm was 
successful. Many of these successes were surveyed in the last chapter, including 
Bartlett’s own work, that of the Gibsons, and Neisser’s ecological psychology. 
Modern cognitive psychology is a descendant of this kind of functionalism, and this 
had also had much success by the time WGH were writing. I will consider this fact 
and its implications for social psychology in more detail in the subsection on 
cognitivism below.  
 
WGH’s rejection of the group mind is part of this bigger picture, and fitting in with 
the narrative in which older group mind ideas (e.g. the collective unconscious) were 
rejected is therefore an internal factor in the epistemic niche of MEMORY for WGH. 
 
It should be noted here however that this older discredited kind of view was not the 
only path available at the time WGH were writing that a science of the group mind 
could proceed along. In the next subsection, I will consider the pressure towards 




New group mind ideas 
Wegner says of the old group mind ideas: ‘Obviously, these ideas do not represent 
the only direction in which group mind theories may develop (cf. Bartlett. 1932), and 
this chapter presents a fresh start toward a more useful formulation’ (Wegner, 1986: 
185). In this subsection, I want to look at the pressure towards an alternative group 
mind thesis, and where this pressure came from. Like the older group mind idea, this 
is a pressure towards a distributed cognition concept of memory. 
 
Wegner mentions Bartlett’s 1932 work, which I have already discussed in some 
detail in the last case study. Recall from that discussion that Wagoner (2013) accused 
Neisser of misinterpreting Bartlett, leaving out the more social and culturally-
embedded side of his work. Wagoner goes on to say that ‘[b]y the late 1980s, 
psychologists were beginning to again acknowledge the social and cultural side of 
Bartlett’s thinking’ (Wagoner, 2013: 567). He goes on to talk about discursive 
psychology and ecological psychology. These movements, as discussed in the last 
case study, were part of a broader move in the 1980s, including the rise of 
connectionism due to the failure of classical AI, alliances with dynamical systems 
theory within cognitive science, Bruner’s notion of scaffolding learning with 
external resources, and the rediscovery of the ideas of Halbwachs and Vygotsky 
(Michaelian and Sutton, 2013: 4). 
 
However, this resurgence in more social ideas was not yet really underway when 
WHG were writing. The Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology notes that 
cognitivism led to a decline in research on groups in social psychology in the 1970s 
and ‘80s so that ‘by the mid-1980s, the notion of groups as a focus of the field had 
all but evaporated.’ (Hogg and Tindale, 2001: ix). WGH were writing at exactly this 
low point for work on groups, so their work can be seen as part of the beginning of a 
resurgence, rather than as joining a trend that was already dominant. In this respect, 
their use of the new group mind ideas was an untried hypothesis. Although it was 
derived from some older ideas such as Bartlett’s, some newer influences such as 
connectionism and Dynamical Systems Theory were also important, and its 




There is an interesting tension between this new kind of group mind theorizing and 
the dominant cognitivist paradigm, and the next subsection will begin to explore this 
and its effects on MEMORY. 
 
Cognitivism 
Cognitivism was the dominant framework in psychology as a whole at the time that 
WGH were writing. It applies pressure towards a brainbound concept of memory
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and in this sense is a contradictory pressure to the new group mind ideas just 
discussed. Its emphasis on individualism has already been mentioned (see above), as 
has its dominant model of the computer (see chapter 7). The mind is conceived in 
terms of software running on the hardware of the brain, and memory is described in 
terms of encoding, storage and retrieval. (This framework is still dominant today, 
although its form, particularly with respect to memory, has changed somewhat).  
 
We can see its influence on WGH in the way they structure their work on TMS in 
terms of transactive encoding, transactive storage and modification, and transactive 
retrieval (WGH, 1985: 258–263). They describe this as an “analogical leap” from 
individual to transactive memory systems, but claim that it is reasonable ‘as long as 
we restrict ourselves to considering the functional equivalence of individual and 
transactive memory’ (WGH, 1985: 256, emphasis in original). Here we see the 
influence of the computer metaphor and modern computational functionalism: as 
long as we stay at the software level the analogy holds, so we can talk about the 
same processes (encoding, storage and retrieval) in both individual and transactive 
systems. 
 
At the time WGH were writing, the dominance of cognitivism meant that it was 
natural to make use of it, and it was helpful for them in showing their move away 
from the discredited old group mind. The computer model seems as far from the 
supernatural overtones of the collective unconscious as could be. This is one 
motivation for working with it, and in the same passage of the paper that the analogy 
with individual memory is set up, we see WGH emphasise that there is nothing to 
                                                          
63
 Unless you are doing the kind of ecological cognitive psychology discussed in the last case study. 
Here I am talking about what I there referred to as “traditional cognitive psychology” because this 
was the dominant framework. 
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their version of the group mind apart from individual memory systems and 
observable communicative processes between individuals. Because of these 
communicative processes, the result is a system at the group level that is greater than 
the sum of the individual systems, but one which is nevertheless still marked by the 
individualism of cognitivism. 
 
Moving away from the old group mind is not the only motivation for adopting the 
insights of cognitivism however. The cognitive paradigm, and the work of its major 
early figures (e.g. Neisser in the early part of his career, see chapter 7), resulted in 
fruitful research in cognitive psychology, as I discussed in the last chapter. However, 
what is of interest here is social psychology because, although one author (Hertel) is 
a cognitive psychologist, WGH’s work on TMSs is a work in social psychology (the 
book in which it is included is part of the Springer Series in Social Psychology). In 
particular, what is of interest is the social psychology of groups. At the time WGH 
were writing, because work on groups was only just making a return, the application 
of cognitivism to such work was new. Like the new group mind ideas, cognitivism 
was an untried hypothesis for WGH’s social psychology of group memory.  
 
We might speculate that because of the overall dominance of cognitivism, there is 
some risk of it being retained as an external factor if it fails to acquire a history of 
success in this kind of social psychology of groups. However, there are some 
pressures in place working against this. One is the new group mind ideas already 
discussed; cognitivism and the new group mind are two hypotheses applying 
pressure in different directions (the former towards an individualist, brainbound 
concept, and the latter towards a more social, distributed cognition concept). Here 
we see the factors in the epistemic niche applying pressure to one another as well as 
to MEMORY, resulting in tensions in the niche which I will explore further below. 
 
Success 
I now want to discuss an aspect of MEMORY that is particularly important for this 
case study, and is importantly linked to cognitivism, namely what counts as success. 
The standard for successful remembering is crucial because it is the main point on 
which Pavitt criticises TMS research; recall that he argues that TMS researchers 
were using the wrong baseline to assess the memory capacities of the groups. Before 
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looking more closely at Pavitt’s favoured baseline and notion of success in the next 
section, it is important to look at the view he was criticising. We therefore need to 
consider what success was for WGH, and where that notion of success came from, to 
determine whether it was an internal factor in shaping MEMORY for them. 
 
The original notion of success in WGH was a dyad remembering something that 
neither individual could remember alone (e.g. by interactive cueing). The baseline 
here then is an individual’s memory. This is the baseline that was used in what is 
often considered to be one of the first papers on group memory, namely Shaw, 1932. 
But ‘[t]he classic (e.g., Shaw, 1932) question, “which is more productive, individuals 
or groups?” has (appropriately) been supplanted in social psychology with the 
question suggested by Steiner (1972), “do groups do as well as they could, and when 
they don’t, to what can we attribute their suboptimality?” (Hogg and Tindale, 2001: 
109). 
 
I will return to this changing standard in the next section when I discuss Pavitt’s 
criticisms of the baseline used in TMS research, but in this section I want to focus on 
whether accuracy of memory of any kind is an appropriate measure of success. 
 
The research cited by WGH (Giuliano and Wegner, 1983) is more about the 
processes involved in the TMS than success, in particular the strategies adopted 
when dyads are faced with a task. WGH say: 
 
Because the emphasis of this research was on transactive processes, and not on the accuracy 
of group retrieval of presented information, it was not necessary to develop these findings in 
the context of a standard memory paradigm. Until further inquiry is made into the production 
of unique, integrative knowledge in close relationships, the generality of the observed 
phenomenon – and its impact on the accuracy of transactive memory – can be anticipated 
only in broad outline (WGH, 1985: 271). 
 
It seems from this quotation that WGH would be in favour of more work that 
considers accuracy rather than transactive processes. While they recognise other 




A likely reason for this is the ready measurability of success. Although exactly what 
should be measured is much disputed, the idea of being able to produce numerical 
results is a seductive one. Laboratory-based cognitive psychology in the tradition of 
Ebbinghaus has been a big influence on the field in this respect; on this approach 
memory, often of simple words or nonsense syllables, is tested by comparison to a 
correct answer held by the experimenter.  
 
The philosophers whose work I introduced above mention another possible notion of 
success: consolidating group identity (Theiner, 2013: 78). This aim can be met even 
when there is collaborative inhibition, i.e. performance could be terrible but the 
group identity could benefit. Propp also mentions the possibility of a greater 
diversity of standards for success, as I mentioned when introducing her work, and as 
I will return to below when considering the epistemic niche for her concept.  
 
If it lacks accuracy, something meeting these other aims would just not count as 
memory for the laboratory-based cognitive psychologists, therefore if this factor 
exerted maximal pressure on WGH’s concept, memory would have to be accurate in 
order for a TMS to be said to exist. Stipulating the accuracy-based notion of success 
rather than being open to various possibilities of what might constitute success 
therefore makes it less likely that a TMS can be said to exist. Because the idea of the 
TMS essentially involves distributed cognition, the accuracy-based standard for 
success is a pressure away from a distributed cognition concept, and towards a 
brainbound one.  
 
Although WGH were influenced by the cognitive psychologists’ notion, they did not 
go so far as to say that anything failing to meet this standard couldn’t be a TMS, as 
can be seen from the last quotation. This fact can be explained with reference to 
interaction with other factors in the epistemic niche that apply pressure towards a 
distributed cognition concept, particularly the new group mind ideas. As part of the 
new group mind ideas, there was some pressure towards an identity-consolidation-
based notion of success when WGH were writing. The social identity perspective in 
social psychology arose in the 1970s and 1980s. It is cited as one of the things that 
brought groups back into the limelight in social psychology (see Hogg and Tindale, 




I argued that both the new group mind ideas and cognitivism were hypotheses, but 
that there was tension between them. The easily testable standard of success fits 
naturally with cognitivism, and the more social new group mind ideas such as 
Bartlett’s earlier work give rise to the alternative constructivist notion of success. 
Bartlett says of accurate memory: 
 
[S]o-called “literal,” or accurate, recall is an artificial construction of the armchair, or of the 
laboratory. Even if it could be secured, in the enormous majority of instances it would be 
biologically detrimental. Life is a continuous play of adaptation between changing response 
and varying environment. Only in a relatively few cases—and those mostly the production of 
an elaborately guarded civilization—could the retention unchanged of the effects of 
experience be anything but a hindrance. (Bartlett, 1932: 15–16). 
 
Bartlett prefers a more constructivist notion of memory that is flexible according to 
context. This kind of notion has been taken up by many who are arguably moving 
toward situated cognition frameworks for memory, including the ecological and 
discursive psychologists discussed in the last chapter. 
 
Arguably the constructivist notion would fit better with WGH’s discussion of the 
TMS in intimate relationships, and I will return to this issue in the subsection on 
aims below. However, it seems that WGH were somewhat more in favour of an 
easily testable notion of success. Why was this, and was it an internal consideration? 
I have already suggested the influence of Ebbinghausian laboratory-based 
psychology on the field, largely due to its presentation of phenomena such as 
memory as measurable. I discussed this feature of psychology in chapter 3 of this 
thesis; mathematization is an external factor imposed on psychology due to its track 
record of success in physics.  
 
In the first case study, I also discussed easy testability of memory in some detail. I 
argued that this factor is internal to disciplines that are under pressure to produce 
results fast (in that case neuropsychologists and neurologists improving the rate of 
diagnosis to improve patient outcomes). However, for disciplines that primarily aim 
to explain and predict the world, it is external. Social psychology is a research-based 




Overall therefore, the idea of a standard for accurate memory is an external factor in 
the epistemic niche of MEMORY for WGH. Mathematization and easy testability 
were external considerations for social psychology. Although the accuracy-based 
standard fits well with their cognitivism, another promising alternative was available 
at the time, in the form of a standard where success was about consolidating group 
identity, not strict accuracy. The more constructivist concept of memory associated 
with this alternative standard fits well with the new group mind ideas. Again, 
tensions within the niche are important here. 
 
Aims 
Before moving on to discuss the communication researchers’ concepts, I want to 
look at the aims of TMS research in social psychology. What the research is intended 
to do is an important pressure on MEMORY in its own right, as well as exerting 
pressure on other factors we have already considered, creating tensions within the 
epistemic niche. In the next subsection, I will talk about the aim of bringing respect 
and a distinct identity to the subdiscipline of social psychology, but here I want to 
talk about the specific aim of WGH’s research, namely to say something about 
intimate relationships. I will also mention the important aim of aiding work groups 
and organizations (see Wegner 1986 for other possible applications). Consideration 
of these applications applies pressure towards taking for granted that there is such a 
thing as a TMS, and therefore towards a distributed cognition concept of memory, 
because the TMS essentially involves such a concept. 
 
WGH are writing in a book called Compatible and Incompatible Relationships and 
are trying to explain compatibility via the successful development of a TMS. They 
say that ‘much could be learned about intimacy’ by researching cognitive 
interdependence in close relationships (WGH, 1985: 253). They go on to make the 
bold claim that ‘[a] transactive memory is a fundamental component of all close 
relationships…[T]he potential for transactive memory makes intimacy possible…’ 
(WGH, 1985: 271).  
 
I have already mentioned that the constructivist group-consolidation notion of 
success might well meet the aim of saying something about intimate relationships 
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better than the accuracy-based notion of success. We can see this particularly in the 
final major section of WGH’s paper, “Transactive Memory and Intimate Life” 
(WGH, 1985: 271–274). Here, they talk about the influence of a TMS on building 
and maintaining closeness, and about the impact on an individual after the 
breakdown of a relationship and its accompanying TMS. In both of these instances, 
the identity of the group would seem to be important, and in the former case in 
particular, it seems more important than strict accuracy of memory. If the goal of 
having a TMS is primarily to maintain the relationship, then constructed memories 
which contribute to consolidation of the dyad meet this aim better than strictly 
accurate memories which do not, and which may even contribute to its breakdown. 
 
I have also suggested that the new group mind ideas would fit more naturally with 
the group-consolidation notion of success than individualist cognitivism, and now I 
want to add that these parts of the epistemic niche fit well with the practical 
applications that TMS research aims at. This is brought out best in relation to another 
aim of TMS research, namely that of aiding groups and teams for businesses and 
other organisations. The aim of aiding work groups and organizations is cited as one 
of the reasons for the resurgence in research on groups in the Blackwell Handbook of 
Social Psychology (Hogg and Tindale, 2001: 2) that I discussed under the “new 
group mind” heading above. The first work on organizations that the Blackwell 
handbook cites is Weik, 1979, although most of the citations are from the 1990s. As 
I have said, the resurgence in work on groups was only just beginning with WGH’s 
work in 1985, and the aim of aiding organisations was also new. 
 
Although these specific practical applications were being newly considered by 
group-focussed social psychology, I have argued that working towards practical 
applications that are of immediate social importance is an internal factor for all 
sciences (see chapter 7). Because this consideration has been internalised at a coarser 
level of grain, the more fine-grained applications considered here are internal 
considerations. 
 
Consolidating the subdiscipline 
A more general and implicit aim of WGH’s research is that of consolidating social 
psychology, by trying to win it both respect, and identity as a distinct subdiscipline. 
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As an uneasy hybrid of sociology and more individual psychology, it has always 
been a contested discipline struggling to reconcile competing methods and 
worldviews from its parent disciplines, and to carve out a distinctive niche of its 
own. 
 
The pressure created by this goal is important because it in part explains WGH’s 
hastiness to divorce themselves from earlier discredited theories of the group mind 
that gave social theory a bad name, to latch on to highly respectable cognitivism to a 
greater extent than to the new group mind ideas, and to favour testable measures of 
accuracy over a more constructivist notion of memory. Because of its fit with all of 
these factors, consolidating the subdiscipline can be described as applying pressure 
towards a brainbound concept of memory. It does not apply this pressure directly, 
but via its influence on other factors in the epistemic niche that favour a brainbound 
concept. 
 
It is worth noting that this pressure is not totally unambiguous because, in some 
respects, responding to the new group mind notion and adopting a distributed 
cognition concept work towards meeting the aim of forging a distinct identity, for 
example by making social psychology more distinct from individual psychology. 
However, there is a danger that in better distinguishing itself from individual 
psychology, it could risk being less distinct from sociology. More importantly, the 
prestige and respect attached to cognitivism and easy testability outweigh this 
possible consideration in favour of distributed cognition with respect to this factor. 
 
The desire to demonstrate that your discipline is respectable and engaged in research 
that other disciplines have considered worthwhile is an external factor. It is 
something that is imposed from those other disciplines, rather than having had a 
successful track record within the discipline in question. However, making your 
discipline coherent by finding what it can offer that is distinct from neighbouring 
disciplines can be construed as an internal factor. This is because it is part of 
establishing any kind of track record of success that a discipline or subdiscipline has 
an identity of some sort. In order to be an internal factor, this attempt to create and 
maintain an identity must be carried out with an awareness of its own history. If it is 
not done in this way, then the discipline would not be basing itself on a history of 
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success, developing according to a rational narrative of its own. Instead, it would 
have to rely on considerations chosen at random, or those that have proved 
successful in other subdisciplines, i.e. external considerations. Of course, it is fine to 
try out things that have been successful in other subdisciplines, but only with an 
awareness of where they have come from, and therefore the tentative attitude I have 
described as characterising the use of untried hypotheses as opposed to external 
factors.  
 
Social psychology does not display sufficient awareness of its own history for this to 
be an internal factor here. Allport ends his history of social psychology with some 
words about social psychologists’ awareness of their own history. He says that 
‘journals and textbooks are filled with specific and particular investigations, with a 
minimum of theorizing’ but that this may change: 
 
Interest in broad theory may again have its day. If so, investigators who are familiar with the 
history of social psychology will be able to strike out with firm assurance. They will be able 
to distinguish what is significant from what is trivial, to progress from platitude, and to 
borrow selectively from the past in order to create a cumulative and coherent science of the 
future (Allport, 1968: last paragraph of paper). 
 
This is very much in keeping with what I am saying about the role of understanding 
of their own history in maintaining a successful subdiscipline with its own identity 
(Allport’s words “cumulative and coherent” here are at least analogous in spirit to 
“successful…with its own identity”). Until this awareness of history is in place, 
consolidating the subdiscipline is an external factor. 
 
Summary 






Factor applying pressure to 
concept 
Concept encouraged 
by this pressure 
Internal / hypothesis / 
external 
Rejection of old group mind Brainbound Internal 
New group mind Distributed Hypothesis 
Cognitivism Brainbound Hypothesis 
Success (easy testability) Brainbound External 





In this case study, tensions within the niche are of great importance. Certain 
considerations fit best with certain others, so the pressure they apply to one another 
ends up being important in determining which apply most pressure to MEMORY. In 
particular, cognitivism, easy testability, and the aim of consolidating the 
subdiscipline fit together and all apply pressure towards a brainbound concept. The 
new group mind (which involves a more constructivist concept of memory with 
possible broader notions of success) and the aim of providing certain practical 
applications apply pressure towards a distributed cognition concept. I have argued 
that a distributed cognition concept is essential to the TMS as WGH define it, so a 
move in response to the pressures towards a brainbound concept of memory would 
involve a redefinition of the TMS. 
 
The aim towards practical applications is internal, while the aim to consolidate the 
subdiscipline is external, suggesting that the former is the better option. This is 
backed up by the claim that the consideration of easy testability that would help meet 
the external aim is itself external. Both the new group mind ideas, and the 
application of cognitivism to group social psychology are untried hypotheses, so 
they do not help to decide the issue. The concept is rational to the extent that it is 
shaped by either of them, but non-legitimate because neither has had the opportunity 




However, despite this apparent superiority of the distributed cognition concept, there 
is also pressure towards a brainbound concept from the internal consideration of 
moving away from the older group mind ideas. A brainbound concept would be 
rational and legitimate to the extent that it was shaped by this pressure. We therefore 
cannot reach an unambiguous conclusion here. I argued that WGH employ a 
distributed cognition concept, and we can see that there was some pressure towards 
this from internal factors. To the extent that it was shaped by these pressures, their 
concept was legitimate and rational. There is therefore some evidence of it 
functioning as an investigative kind. However, we cannot conclude that it was the 
best or only concept they could have employed under the circumstances. 
 




Many of the factors that apply pressure to the communication researchers’ concepts 
are the same as those affecting the social psychologists’ concepts, but some are new, 
and some of those that are the same affect them differently because they are from a 
different subdiscipline and were writing several years later (2003). 
 
Previous TMS research 
An important pressure on the communication researchers’ concept is previous 
research on the TMS. They are writing some years after WGH first proposed the 
notion (2003, compared to 1985), so there has been plenty of time for such research 
to accumulate, and this is a major respect in which they differ from WGH.  
 
This previous TMS research is important because it justifies Propp and Hollingshead 
and Brandon’s assumption that memory can be something possessed by a group. 
This is part of what allows them to advocate going ahead and investigating the 
workings of the TMS rather than recommending a baseline to test for its very 
presence like Pavitt does. They take it for granted as something to have its properties 
investigated, rather than a hypothesis having its existence investigated. This was 





Interest in transactive memory has accelerated in the past 10 years. At the same time, the 
proportion of papers that refer to transactive memory systems but in which TMS is not the 
core topic of the paper has also grown significantly. These are signs that transactive memory 
systems are being reified, as with other well-known concepts such as absorptive capacity 
(Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). In other words, as more people become familiar with the 
concept, they begin to “take it for granted” and use it conveniently to meet individual 
research needs, with little consideration of the original assumptions and propositions that 
define the relationships of the construct with other constructs. (Ren and Argote, 2011: 194). 
 
If Ren and Argote are correct in this assessment, then in 2003 when the papers I am 
analysing were written, this process of reifying would already have been happening. 
It seems it was something that Pavitt was trying to resist, while the other 
communication researchers were already beginning to take the concept for granted. 
This gloss on the debate would explain their comfortable talk of group memory, 
despite it being what was supposed to be at issue. We can explain Pavitt’s resistance 
in terms of his responding more to pressures towards a brainbound concept, for 
example cognitivism and rejection of the old group mind ideas. 
 
Taking the TMS for granted is something that came about from previous fruitful 
research using it. As Ren and Argote say: 
 
Compared with the antecedents to transactive memory systems, findings are much more 
consistent about the impact of transactive memory systems on group outcomes. Numerous 
studies have shown the positive effects of transactive memory systems on a variety of group 
outcomes such as group learning, team creativity, effectiveness, and member satisfaction 
(e.g., Austin, 2003; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Lewis, 2003; Liang et al., 1995; Michinov et al., 
2008) (Ren and Argote, 2011: 205). 
 
Research showing the TMS having such positive outcomes translates into success for 
the TMS framework, because it is the framework that is allowing the positive 
outcomes to be demonstrated, resulting in useful descriptions and recommendations 
for practical improvements in team behaviour. The studies cited in this quotation 
demonstrate successes across a broad range of subdisciplines, most of which date 
from before the papers I am looking at here (2003). The breadth suggests that 
responding to the pressure exerted by previous TMS research is not just internal to 
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social psychology, where the concept and accompanying framework was first 
proposed, but that it has been internalised at a coarser level of grain by this point. It 
is therefore an internal consideration for communication studies. 
 
This does not mean that the TMS framework and distributed cognition concept that 
go along with it are necessarily appropriate for the papers I am looking at here 
however. Previous work on TMS is only one consideration in the epistemic niche for 
their concept, and it might be that others are internal and apply competing pressure. I 
will now go on to look at some other considerations to investigate whether this is the 
case. 
 
Rejection of old group mind ideas 
Another important influence, as for the social psychologists, is the pressure to get 
away from earlier discredited group mind ideas. Pavitt is particularly affected by 
this, and he thinks that WGH don’t go far enough in this respect. The other 
communication researchers do not mention the old group mind ideas, so it is hard to 
say whether it exerts any pressure on their concepts. This subsection therefore 
mainly concerns Pavitt. 
 
Rejecting the old group mind ideas applies pressure away from a distributed 
cognition concept and towards a more individualist one. As I said when discussing 
the social psychologists, in this case, pressure away from the distributed cognition 
concept is pressure towards a brainbound concept, because the kind of work being 
done is laboratory-based experimental work that does not concern itself with the 
environment or context in the way that any of the other situated cognition 
frameworks would do. 
 
Pavitt says that Wegner 1986 was ‘purposely attempting to reintroduce the “group 
mind” notion’ (Pavitt, 2003a: 593). As I said above, Pavitt acknowledges that it can 
be valuable to apply terms usually used about individual cognition to the group level. 
However, he goes on to say that ‘[t]his use is, however, inherently metaphorical, and 
there is a risk that the idea of “group information processing” will become reified’ 




When I considered this factor for the social psychologists, I examined the reasons for 
the rejection of older group mind ideas within the subdiscipline, and looked to see 
whether WGH were responding to this tradition, or trying to distance themselves 
from a tainted research program for reputation’s sake. There is no corresponding 
history of proposal and rejection of these group mind ideas in communication studies 
as such. Communication studies is an interdisciplinary hybrid subject, and the 
rejection of the group mind has a history of success only in some of the relevant 
subdisciplines. It is therefore not something that communication studies as a whole 
can take for granted and rely upon.  
 
It seems that this is exactly what they are doing, however. Pavitt does not make any 
mention of Wegner et al.’s disclaimers about and discussion of earlier group mind 
notions. Although in a sense he is right that Wegner (1986) seeks to reintroduce the 
group mind notion in some form, he does not distinguish the influence of what I 
have called the “new group mind” ideas (reintroduction of the work of Bartlett in 
particular, see the discussion above) from ideas like Jung’s collective unconscious. 
Wegner himself distinguishes them somewhat more clearly. For example, he shows 
his awareness of what he is taking from the old ideas and what has changed, when he 
says: 
 
Like early theories of the group mind, transactive memory draws deeply on the analogy 
between the mental operations of the individual and the processes of the group. Unlike early 
theories of group mind, the new notion of transactive memory benefits from recent advances 
in the study of the thinking processes of the individual (Wegner, 1986: 185). 
  
Pavitt may disagree that this is a worthwhile research program, but he does not 
discuss this, instead seeming to assume that anything tainted by group mind notions 
is to be avoided, despite his avowal that the concepts of “collective information 
processing” and “transactive memory systems” can have some value (Pavitt, 2003a: 
597–598).  
 
Rejection of the group mind is an external consideration imposed on communication 
studies from social psychology. Although some parts of psychology are part of 
communication studies, making this seem an odd use of the term “external”, the 
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proposal and rejection of the older group mind ideas do not have a history within all 
of the participating subdisciplines, or the interdisciplinary hybrid. It therefore should 
not be taken for granted as an established fact, as Pavitt seems to do, but should be 
treated more in the manner of a hypothesis. 
 
Cognitivism 
Another factor which affects the communication researchers as much as it affects 
WGH is cognitivism. It was still the dominant paradigm when Pavitt, Propp and 
Hollingshead and Brandon were writing (and it still is). It is likely that Hollingshead 
and Brandon were particularly influenced by it because Hollingshead has a 
background in psychology (she has a B.A. in Psychology and an M.A. and Ph.D. in 
Social Psychology), but the impact of cognitivism has been so great that it is a big 
influence on everybody. As I said in the section on the social psychologists, it 
applies pressure towards an individualist, brainbound concept of memory. 
 
I argued above that for WGH, cognitivism was an untried hypothesis. At that stage it 
did not have a history in social psychological research on groups, because such 
research had not been taking place since cognitivism became the dominant paradigm, 
and was only just beginning a resurgence. As I said in the first subsection concerning 
the communication researchers, by the point they were writing, TMS research had a 
history, so such group work was more established. TMS researchers had continued 
to make use of cognitivist ideas (for example speaking of transactive encoding, 
storage and retrieval, see Ren and Argote, 2011), and using this framework had 
proved successful (see subsection above on previous TMS research). Cognitivism 
was therefore internal to TMS research. 
 
To be internal to a particular research program is to be internal at a finer level of 
grain than the subdiscipline. Communication studies as a subdiscipline is composed 
of elements of many different other subdisciplines, not all of which make use of 
cognitivist ideas; cognitivism is therefore not internal to communication studies. It 
seems that as TMS researchers, Pavitt et al. are entitled to take cognitivism for 




The relevant framework here is the coarser-grained framework of communications 
studies, rather than the finer-grained one of TMS research. This is because the point 
of the papers in question here is not to carry out research into the TMS, but to talk 
about whether and how communication researchers should contribute to such 
research. Given that cognitivism is internal to TMS research, ignoring it entirely 
would be irrational, but when engaged in the kind of project being undertaken here, 
the researchers should not be taking for granted things that are external to their 
subdiscipline, like the cognitivist paradigm with its computer metaphor.  
 
However, the evidence suggests that they do take it for granted. In particular, they 
seem to have forgotten that much of the cognitivist paradigm is metaphorical (the 
computer model, talk of “storage” etc.). I quoted Pavitt above as saying of the 
extension of individual mental terms to groups that ‘[t]his use is, however, inherently 
metaphorical, and there is a risk that the idea of “group information processing” will 
become reified.’ (Pavitt, 2003a: 593). He does not seem to recognise here that 
“information processing” is already a metaphor (part of the computer metaphor). In 
addition, all the papers concerned here use the cognitivist encoding, storage, and 
retrieval model of memory without question. 
 
It is one of the advantages of interdisciplinary collaborations such as communication 
studies that multiple frameworks can be employed to look at the same problem from 
different perspectives. This is one way in which things that are taken for granted in 
one subdiscipline (internal considerations in their framework) can be brought into 
question in a productive way. (Some things must be taken for granted for research to 
proceed, so we need internal factors, but nothing in science is ever put beyond 
question for ever). This productive questioning is something that communication 
studies researchers from subdisciplines other than social psychology could offer with 
respect to TMS research. The communication researchers I am discussing here seem 
to recognise this to some extent; they consider what distinctive elements 
communication studies could bring to the table. However, they do not sufficiently 
recognise that cognitivism is a presupposition they should raise questions about. 
 
A better awareness of their own history would help the communication researchers 
here, by making them more explicitly aware of the metaphorical nature of 
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cognitivism. There is some evidence suggesting that communication studies as a 
discipline has a good awareness of its own history, and I will talk about this below in 
the subsection “consolidating the subdiscipline”. However, the history of 
cognitivism is not part of the history of communication studies as such, so this 
historical self-awareness is not of much help to them here.  
 
The communication researchers are taking cognitivism for granted and relying on it, 
but not because of a history of success within their own subdiscipline’s framework, 
so it is an external factor for them. 
  
I argued above that Propp shares Pavitt’s conviction that the group mind should 
remain a metaphor, and thus construed the TMS differently to WGH. Individualist 
cognitivism is a major factor applying pressure in the direction of doing this. 
However, Propp’s concept does have some flexibility, and this can be explained with 
reference to other factors in the epistemic niche, as I will explain below. 
Hollingshead and Brandon have a distributed cognition concept of memory, and 
cognitivism would apply pressure away from this. Therefore, they have resisted this 
external factor, despite Hollingshead’s background in psychology. This can be 




As I did for the social psychologists, I want to look at the aims of the research being 
carried out. They are part of what the concept of memory is needed to do. One major 
aim, as for the social psychologists, is to help businesses by researching work groups 
and teams. This factor applies pressure towards taking for granted that there is such a 
thing as a TMS, and therefore towards a distributed cognition concept of memory, 
because the TMS essentially involves such a concept. 
 
I have argued previously that providing practical applications that are important for 
society is an internal consideration because providing such applications is part of 
what sciences exist to do. This consideration has therefore been internalised at the 
relatively coarse level of grain that is science in general. However, the situation is 
not quite so simple for communication studies, because it is a hybrid subject 
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consisting of humanities subdisciplines as well as sciences. I therefore cannot rely on 
internalisation at a coarser level of grain because communication studies does not 
fall neatly under a single category at such a level. More needs to be said about the 
history of the discipline itself. 
 
Communication studies had pragmatic aims from its inception, or at least from the 
period of its institutionalisation as a fully-fledged discipline with specialised 
departments, journals and conferences. Although there are some disagreements about 
the origins of the discipline, many agree that the Second World War (and later the 
Cold War) were very important in determining the interests and available funding for 
research. The media and mass persuasion were of particular interest (see Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2004: 551). 
 
As Simpson [1994] argued, the psychological warfare effort of the American government 
during the Second World War shaped the communication research community and 
determined “which of the competing scientific paradigms of communication would be 
funded, elaborated and encouraged to prosper” (p.3). (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2004: 552). 
 
Wahl-Jorgensen argues that the origins of the discipline are to be found even earlier, 
in Chicago from the university’s inception in 1892. He says: 
 
Chicago is known as the birthplace of pragmatism and, more generally, of an American 
social science (cf. Bulmer, 1984; Abbott, 1999). This was a social science engaged with 
tangible problems of urban life and determined to make a difference (cf. Bulmer, 1984, 
p.23). To the turn-of-the-century pragmatists, newspapers and other media were central to 
this process, as they went about studying how the ethnic groups who shared Chicago sought 
to survive and make sense of life there. 
 
As such, mass communication and its role in society had been on the research agenda at the 
University of Chicago since its inception (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2004: 550). 
 
Concern with practical applications was fruitful for Communication Studies, 
allowing it to get off the ground as a discipline, acquire funding and become 
institutionalised. It was thus internalised. The application of helping work groups 




Consolidating the subdiscipline 
Another important aim of the research is, as for the social psychologists, 
consolidating their own discipline. This is arguably even more pressing for 
communication studies because it is an even newer discipline, and an even more 
complex interdisciplinary hybrid (of psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
journalism, political science and English, among others). 
 
The communication researchers’ response to this consideration can be seen in their 
insistence on more focus on the communication taking place between individuals in 
a TMS. This focus would give them something particular to contribute to the 
research that is distinct from psychologists’ contributions. This applies pressure 
towards taking the TMS seriously as something that really exists, and therefore 
towards a distributed cognition notion of memory. 
 
I said above that the desire to acquire and maintain a distinctive identity can be an 
internal factor if the discipline has sufficient awareness of its own history. In general, 
communication studies has a good awareness of its own history, so this factor is 
internal for them. Since its inception, the discipline has been concerned with its own 
history and this has proved fruitful in terms of allowing them to get funding and 
become institutionalised, as Wahl-Jorgensen explains in this quotation: 
 
The roots of mass communication scholarship in the U.S. are by no means a new research 
topic. Ever since the 1980s, disciplinary genealogies have become both fashionable and 
necessary. In the face of budget cuts, it is increasingly important for each discipline to justify 
its own existence by defining its core, its boundaries, its unified and identifiable projects, and 
its myth of origin. For a young and untenured discipline such as ours, this process has been 
particularly crucial. As Carey (1996) pointed out: 
 
The history of mass communication research is a recent literary genre, albeit a 
minor one: a self-conscious creation (and now an endless recreation)…the 
[historical] narrative that emerges serves ultimately a variety of purposes: 
principally to focus, justify, and legitimate a 20
th
-century invention, the mass media, 
and to give direction and intellectual status to professional teaching and research 




Histories, in imposing a unified narrative of our origins, organize and structure our activity 
by locating our roots (cf. Wahl-Jorgensen, 2000). As Peters (1986a) has put it, historical 
accounts have as their subtext the “transformation of communication research from an 
intellectual to an institutional entity” (p.537). (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2004: 548).  
 
The fact that historical papers such as Wahl-Jorgensen’s are published in the Journal 
of Communication shows the continuing relevance of their history for the discipline. 
 
Attempting to consolidate the discipline in an historically informed way is internal, 
even if it is a factor that researchers do not always respond appropriately to. Not 
every communication researcher will be appropriately aware of their history on 
every occasion (for example I have argued above that Pavitt fails to be with respect 
to the older group mind ideas, and all the communication researchers fail to be with 
respect to cognitivism). This may be explained with reference to competing factors 
in the epistemic niche (particularly in this case, see summary below), and with 
reference to lack of fit between concept and niche. 
 
Success 
Another factor affecting the communication researchers as well as the social 
psychologists is concern with a particular notion of success. This is a major point of 
contention in the debate I am considering. Pavitt has a different standard for success 
compared to the other communication researchers, so I will deal with his paper first, 
then move on to talk about Hollingshead and Brandon and Propp.  
 
Recall that Pavitt’s favoured measure of success is comparison with a baseline 
calculated using Lorge and Solomon’s Model B. The model is a prediction of the 
performance of a nominal group (an aggregate of the performances of the individuals 
in the group assuming effective pooling of answers but no other interaction).  
 
Above, I quoted the Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology as saying that ‘[t]he 
classic (e.g., Shaw, 1932) question, “which is more productive, individuals or 
groups?” has (appropriately) been supplanted in social psychology with the question 
suggested by Steiner (1972), “do groups do as well as they could, and when they 
don’t, to what can we attribute their suboptimality?” (Hogg and Tindale, 2001: 109). 
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Pavitt is effectively suggesting a more specific version of Steiner’s question, cashing 
out “as well as they could” in terms of Lorge-Solomon Model B. This stringent 
standard that must be met before a TMS can be said to exist makes it less likely that 
a group can be said to remember, i.e. less likely that a distributed cognition concept 
of memory will be appropriate. It therefore applies pressure towards a brainbound 
concept of memory. 
 
Lorge and Solomon’s paper was written in 1955 in Psychometrika. Lorge was a 
psychologist and Solomon a statistician. Their model has been used in social 
psychology, including to analyse the results of Shaw (1932), usually cited as the 
classic experiment on group problem solving (Lindzey and Aronson, 1954/1968: 
236). Their model therefore has a history in social psychology, so Pavitt’s suggestion 
that WGH should have used it is not unprecedented in their field (although this does 
not make it internal to his).  
 
As I argued was the case for WGH, part of the reason for Pavitt’s choice of measure 
of success is easy testability. Pavitt takes this even further than the social 
psychologists; a mathematical model doesn’t even need an experimenter, unlike 
comparison of performance of putative TMSs with individuals or nominal groups in 
the laboratory.  
 
For the social psychologists, I argued that this concern with easy testability was an 
external factor, as was a desire for mathemetization brought about by the success of 
quantitative methods in physics. For the communication researchers, easy testability 
is similarly an external factor because, like the social psychologists, they are a 
research discipline not under particular time pressure to produce applications (unlike 
e.g. medicine or law). Mathematization on the other hand has a different history in 
communication studies than in social psychology, so a little more needs to be said 
about this. 
 
Communication studies has its origins in so many disciplines that there are many 
different methodological traditions in its history. Mathematical methods were an 
important part of the mix right from the start however. Fiske says in his Introduction 
to Communication Studies, ‘Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of 
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Communication (1949; Weaver, 1949[…]) is widely accepted as one of the main 
seeds out of which Communication Studies has grown.’ (Fiske, 1990: 6). Shannon 
and Weaver’s work sets out a quantitative model in information theory, developed 
during the Second World War in Bell Telephone Laboratories. Mathematical 
methods have been fruitful in the past, so they are internal to communication studies. 
 
The combination of what I have said about easy testability on the one hand, and 
mathematization on the other, means that it is legitimate to use a mathematical 
standard, but not just because it is easily testable. In this case, looking at tensions 
within the epistemic niche is instructive. The question is whether a mathematical 
standard could meet the aims of the research. The aims I have looked at here include 
practical applications such as helping work groups and teams, and consolidating 
communication studies as a subdiscipline. I argued that both are internal, and both 
are pressures towards a distributed cognition concept. As part of working towards 
both of these aims, the communication researchers are working to say something 
about the communication between the individuals in a TMS. A measure of success 
like Lorge-Solomon Model B is not the best way to meet this aim because it is a 
measure of remembering well, not just of remembering and the mechanisms by 
which it takes place in a group. 
 
The philosophers’ discussion of TMS is helpful here. Tollefsen et al. say in a 
footnote: 
 
Incidentally, it occurs to us that it may not be the best way to test the existence of a system 
by whether it performs better or worse than some other system; the question is whether two 
people indeed act as a transactive system, and this seems to be separate from whether they 
are performing well. (Tollefsen et al., 2013: 56).  
 
This is a helpful critique to apply to Pavitt’s standard for success, and highlights the 
tension between it and the aims of the research. There could still be much to say 
about how the TMS functions in terms of the communication between individuals, 
even if there is collaborative inhibition (the group performs worse than the aggregate 
of its members). The use of a baseline like Lorge-Solomon model B would insist that 
in this case there could not even be a TMS. Therefore, although mathematization is 
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internal to communication studies, Pavitt’s standard for success does not fit well 
with other parts of the epistemic niche, in particular the aims of the research, and is 
likely to have come about as a response to the external consideration of easy 
testability. 
 
This gets to the major difference between Pavitt and the other communication 
researchers. For Pavitt something must meet a minimum level of success to count as 
a memory; he argues that the systems considered do not do so, so they are not group 
memories. For Propp and Hollingshead and Brandon, the groups are assumed to 
have a TMS that they then advocate a particular way of investigating. If they are 
right, an appropriate baseline may not even be needed; it might be that another 
notion (e.g. memory as consolidating group identity as discussed above) is more 
appropriate. 
 
Propp is relatively explicit about this. As I quoted above, she says: 
 
Based on previous research, it is possible that even the study of specific interaction patterns 
under optimal conditions may fail to substantiate the existence of the assembly bonus effect 
as it is currently defined. It is possible that the definition of improved performance might 
need to be conceptualized more broadly to account for the presumption of groups’ 
superiority in organizational theory and practice. This definition of performance might 
include other group outcomes that have been found to make groups superior, such as 
representation of diverse goals and values, distribution of responsibility for decisions, and 
increased commitment to an action (Gigone & Hastie, 1996). (Propp, 2003: 604–605). 
 
Such a redefinition would change the standard for what it is for a group to be said to 
remember, and so would represent a change in MEMORY. This is a change that makes 
it easier to say that a TMS exists, i.e. that a group can be said to remember, and so is 
a pressure towards a distributed cognition concept.  
 
Neither Propp nor Hollingshead and Brandon stipulate a particular standard that 
must be met for success. The main point of their papers is to argue that Pavitt has 
been too hasty, that we should not have such stringent standards as to what 
constitutes a TMS, and to encourage further research, particularly from 
communication studies. In their openness to continuing to look for positive effects of 
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groups remembering together, they are treating any standards for success they 




In summary of what I have said about the epistemic niche for communication 
researchers: 
Factor applying 
pressure to concept 
Concept encouraged by 
this pressure 
Internal / hypothesis / 
external 
Previous TMS research Distributed Internal 
Moving away from 
group mind (mainly 
Pavitt) 
Brainbound External 







Success Brainbound for Pavitt; 
Distributed for H&B and 
Propp 
External for Pavitt; 
Hypothesis for H&B and 
Propp 
 
Of the factors in the epistemic niche looked at here, those that apply pressure 
towards a brainbound concept of memory have all been found to be external. These 
include cognitivism, Pavitt’s standard for success, and moving away from the old 
group mind ideas, which is mainly a factor for Pavitt. 
 
The factors applying pressure towards a distributed cognition concept are previous 
TMS research, the aim to help work groups and teams, the aim of consolidating 
communication studies as a discipline, and Hollingshead and Brandon and Propp’s 
broad notions of success. All of these are internal apart from the last, which is an 
untried hypothesis. I argued that only Hollingshead and Brandon have a distributed 
cognition concept. We can now see that this concept is both legitimate and rational. 
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There is therefore evidence of a situated cognition concept (in this case distributed) 
functioning as an investigative kind in communication studies. Pavitt and Propp both 
have brainbound concepts, and this can be seen to be a result of responding to 
pressure from external considerations. Their concepts are therefore non-legitimate 
and irrational to the extent they are shaped by the factors considered here. Propp’s 
concept has some degree of flexibility, indicating that she is more open to the 
influence of the internal factors than Pavitt. Her openness to more flexible notions of 
success is particularly interesting. Although this is only an untried hypothesis at this 
stage, it may indicate a future move toward a more distributed cognition concept. 
Pavitt does not share that openness, and there are particular tensions in the epistemic 
niche for him, in particular between his notion of success and the aims of the 
research. He is also particularly affected by the external pressure to move away from 
the old group mind ideas, which he does not sufficiently separate from the new 
group mind ideas I discussed in relation to the social psychologists. 
 
Both Pavitt and Propp would do better to move in the direction of a distributed 
cognition concept of memory if they want to talk about TMSs, and this is not 
surprising, given that I argued that a distributed cognition concept is essential to the 
TMS framework as it has grown out of the work of Wegner et al. It is Wegner et al.’s 
framework for the TMS that participants in the debate cite, but the internalisation of 
cognitivism into TMS research suggests that they cannot really be using it, because 
cognitivism applies pressure towards a brainbound concept of memory. What a TMS 
is, and therefore what it means for a group to remember, has changed since the work 
of WGH. TMS has come to mean something different for researchers such as Pavitt 
and Propp, but according to what I have argued here, there are reasons to think that 
the concept of memory involved in this change is non-legitimate and irrational. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the social psychologists working on TMS have a distributed 
cognition concept of memory. Of the communication researchers Pavitt, who 
criticises the social psychologists, has a brainbound concept. Of the communication 
researchers who criticise Pavitt, Propp shares his brainbound concept but with more 
openness to changing it based on the results of future research, while Hollingshead 




Examination of some of the main factors in the epistemic niches shaping these 
concepts has revealed that, for the social psychologists, there was some pressure 
from internal factors towards their distributed cognition concept. To the extent that it 
was shaped by these pressures, their concept was legitimate and rational. There is 
therefore some evidence of it functioning as an investigative kind. However, we 
cannot conclude that it was the best or only concept they could have employed under 
the circumstances because there is also some pressure from internal factors towards a 
brainbound concept. Cognitivism also applies pressure towards a brainbound 
concept, and was a hypothesis at the time WGH were writing. If it were to go on to 
be successful (which I argued in the section on communication studies is exactly 
what happened in TMS research), then there would come to be another internally 
generated pressure towards a brainbound concept. This would create further tensions 
within the epistemic niche because cognitivism fits poorly with some other internal 
factors, and it is too early to say by the date I am looking at here whether this would 
play out in favour of a distributed cognition concept. 
 
For the communication researchers, there was pressure from internal factors towards 
a distributed cognition concept, and all the pressures towards a brainbound concept 
were from external factors. Hollingshead and Brandon’s distributed cognition 
concept was therefore legitimate – i.e. functioning as an investigative kind – and 
rational. Pavitt and Propp’s brainbound concepts were found to be largely non-
legitimate and irrational, although there is some evidence of Propp moving towards a 
distributed cognition concept. This case study has therefore not only provided 
evidence of a situated cognition (in this case distributed cognition) concept 
functioning as an investigative kind, but also provided evidence suggesting that 







The question addressed in this thesis has been: “Are there any situated cognition 
concepts of memory functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory?” 
– what I have been referring to as “the situated cognition question”. The short 
answer to this question is “yes”. I will give a slightly more qualified and fleshed out 
answer below, after briefly reviewing how we got there. 
 
Whether or not a concept is functioning as an investigative kind is the 
epistemological question of whether it can support fruitful science. I have argued 
that how concepts are individuated depends on the level of analysis, and that the 
level of grain at which the framework is viewed depends on the analyst’s aims. I 
have focussed primarily at the subdiscipline level of grain, because MEMORY often 
varies between subdisciplines, and the communication difficulties stemming from 
this variation are part of the problem I have been addressing.  
 
I have used a case study-based conceptual ecology to determine what concepts were 
in play in particular projects in various subdisciplines of memory science, and what 
the epistemic niches for those concepts were. An historical study of the epistemic 
niches then revealed whether the major factors in those niches were internal or 
external, or untried hypotheses. Many of the sciences of memory are immature, so in 
some of my case studies, the concepts of memory were found to be weakly 
constrained by internal factors, with many untried hypotheses. However, I claimed 
before embarking on the case studies that it is important to try to begin to answer the 
situated cognition question because of the importance of memory research, and in 
fact I have found enough internal and external factors to draw some substantial 
conclusions about the legitimacy and rationality of particular concepts. Recall that to 
the extent that a niche is made up of internal factors, the concept it shapes is 
legitimate, and to the extent that it is made up of internal factors and untried 
hypotheses, the concept is rational. Concepts that are functioning as investigative 




In line with Shapere’s rejection of imposing metascientific standards, I have tried to 
treat the scientists’ work as much on its own terms as possible, looking at how 
different aspects of their frameworks fit together and apply pressure to MEMORY. I 
made use of Khalidi’s interpretationist strategy (proposed as a solution for the 
concept individuation problem for the Theory Theory), which explains how we can 
analyse concepts in the framework despite standing outside the framework ourselves. 
This strategy involves treating the concept users as intentional agents, and assuming 
they have at least a minimal level of rationality. Despite this standard for what it is to 
be rational being shared at the coarse level of grain that is epistemic enquiry in 
general (see chapter 4), I did not assume that this is enough of a constraint to rule out 
the possibility of pluralism of frameworks at finer levels of grain. In particular, I left 
open the option that multiple different concepts of memory may be functioning as 
investigative kinds in the case studies I investigated. 
 
This kind of pluralism is in fact what has been found. Although I have only looked at 
three case studies, and the analysis has only focussed on a few important features in 
the epistemic niches for each, the case is already more than suggestive. Further work 
improving the richness of the historical analysis of these case studies, and addressing 
others, could paint a somewhat different overall picture, but it would be surprising 
from what has been revealed here if that picture did not include multiple different 
situated cognition concepts functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of 
memory. 
 
In the case study on locked-in syndrome and brain computer interfaces, I found that 
there was some variation even within the subdisciplines I looked at, with some 
neuropsychologists and neurologists having a brainbound concept, and others an 
embedded cognition concept. Most of the philosophers I looked at had flexible 
concepts that are open to interpretation from different perspectives including the 
situated cognition perspectives, but one had an extended cognition concept. I found 
that when just the internal considerations were taken into account, the 
neuropsychologists and neurologists had some pressure towards a brainbound 
concept, and some pressure towards an embedded cognition concept, particularly 
when carrying out work that aims to take patients’ own views into account. The 
philosophers had pressure towards having flexible concepts. They also had some 
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pressure towards accepting a situated cognition concept outright (particularly 
extended cognition) to the extent that their work tries to have an impact in fields 
outside philosophy. Therefore all of the various concepts in play here were found to 
be functioning as investigative kinds in the subdisciplines considered, although the 
evidence was considerably stronger for the brainbound and flexible concepts, and 
more tentative for the embedded and extended concepts. I argued that therefore these 
subdisciplines should remain pluralist with respect to their concept MEMORY for the 
time being, although it is too early to say whether any of them should eventually 
adopt a unified situated or brainbound perspective on memory, or retain their 
plurality of concepts indefinitely. 
 
The case study on constructing memory in political scandals revealed that Neisser 
(an ecological cognitive psychologist) was working with an embedded cognition 
concept, and Edwards and Potter (discursive psychologists) were working with a 
distributed cognition concept. Neisser’s concept was shaped by a variety of 
competing factors, some applying pressure towards an embedded cognition concept, 
some enacted and some brainbound, with internal considerations in all three of these 
categories. There is evidence that his embedded cognition concept was functioning 
as an investigative kind, but I argued that the competing pressures taken together 
should result in pluralism, with multiple kinds of concept and their accompanying 
frameworks in use side by side. Discursive psychology was a new subdiscipline with 
many untried hypotheses, so it was too early to tell whether the discursive 
psychologists’ distributed cognition concept would pick out an investigative kind. 
However, it was rational to use such a concept, and this is suggestive. Although there 
was no way of knowing whether it would go on to be a successful concept, there was 
no reason to think that it would not. I therefore found no reason to stipulate that the 
science would be best served by sticking to brainbound concepts, as some critics of 
the situated cognition approaches might recommend. 
 
The case study on Transactive Memory Systems revealed that the social 
psychologists had a distributed cognition concept, but there was some variation 
among the researchers in communication studies. Pavitt had a brainbound concept, 
Hollingshead and Brandon had a distributed cognition concept, and Propp had a 
brainbound concept, but with some degree of flexibility. For the social 
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psychologists, there was some pressure from internal factors towards their 
distributed cognition concept, and to the extent that it was shaped by these pressures, 
their concept was legitimate and rational. There was therefore some evidence of it 
functioning as an investigative kind. However, I argued that we could not conclude 
that it was the best or only concept they could have employed under the 
circumstances because there was also some pressure from internal factors towards a 
brainbound concept. Cognitivism also applied pressure towards a brainbound 
concept, and was a hypothesis at the time WGH were writing. If it were to go on to 
be successful (which I argued later in that chapter is exactly what happened in TMS 
research), then there would come to be another internally generated pressure towards 
a brainbound concept. I discussed tensions within the epistemic niche at the time of 
the case study, and further tensions that would be created by this development, 
concluding that it was too early to say by the date of the case study whether the 
situation would play out in favour of a distributed cognition concept. For the 
communication researchers, there was pressure from internal factors towards a 
distributed cognition concept, and all the pressures towards a brainbound concept 
were from external factors. Hollingshead and Brandon’s distributed cognition 
concept was therefore rational and legitimate, i.e. functioning as an investigative 
kind. Pavitt and Propp’s brainbound concepts were found to be largely non-
legitimate and irrational, although there was some evidence of Propp moving 
towards a distributed cognition concept. This case therefore not only provided 
evidence of a situated cognition (in this case distributed cognition) concept 
functioning as an investigative kind, but also provided evidence suggesting that 
situated cognition concepts should be employed to a greater extent. 
 
Overall then, I have found evidence in recent research in the sciences of memory of 
brainbound, embedded cognition, extended cognition, and distributed cognition 
concepts of memory, as well as flexible concepts that are open to interpretation from 
different perspectives, all functioning as investigative kinds. I also found internally 
generated pressures towards concepts that were not in play in the cases where those 
pressures were found, and these included pressures towards brainbound and enacted 
cognition concepts. I also found a distributed cognition concept in play in a new 
subdiscipline (discursive psychology) that was potentially set to develop into an 
investigative kind in the future of that subdiscipline, and a brainbound concept that 
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the evidence suggested would have been better replaced by a situated cognition 
concept (for the communication researchers in the TMS case study). 
 
At the level of the sciences of memory, this suggests that pluralism with respect to 
MEMORY is the best option, at least for now. There are multiple different kinds of 
concepts of memory, many of them situated cognition concepts, functioning as 
investigative kinds in these sciences. This is not just a brand new development; the 
case studies span dates from the early 1980s to today, and the roots of their use of 
situated cognition concepts go back much further (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Gibson’s work 
from the 1960s and 1970s). This offers considerable support to the case for situated 
cognition frameworks. 
 
Although some variation was found within subdisciplines, the greatest variation in 
MEMORY is found between subdisciplines, and this creates many of the 
communication difficulties I outlined as part of the problem. The recommendation of 
pluralism would seem to exacerbate this problem and associated worries about the 
fragmentation of the disciplines involved. So how are we to deal with pluralism? 
Here I can only make some speculative comments in answer to this question, but 
they are important speculations which help to situate the more specific conclusions 
drawn here in current and future scientific practice. 
 
Broader context of these conclusions 
In chapter 1, I quoted Clark’s discussion of the debate between HEC (the Hypothesis 
of Extended Cognition), HEMC (the Hypothesis of EMbedded Cognition), and his 
solution HOC (the Hypothesis of Organism Centred cognition). Clark says: 
 
HEC, HEMC, HOC? We should not feel locked into some pale zero-sum game. As 
philosophers and as cognitive scientists, we can and should practice the art of flipping among 
these different perspectives, treating each as a lens apt to draw attention to certain features, 
regularities, and contributions while making it harder to spot others or to give them their 
problem-solving due. (Clark, 2008: 139). 
 
This recommendation of flipping between different perspectives seems apt for the 
situation I have uncovered in this thesis. Pluralism does not necessarily mean 
fragmentation, but there is a risk of fragmentation occurring because of the 
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communication problems pluralism creates. My concept-centred approach in 
particular highlights the difficulties scientists face in communicating about memory 
– they do not even share a concept of the target phenomenon. If individuals and the 
subdisciplines of which they are a part were better at this flipping between 
perspectives, this problem could be alleviated. Doing so would involve fluency in 
multiple frameworks, which is a challenge, but which might be achieved with some 
changes in how scientists are educated and how their enterprise is thought of. There 
are already some relevant suggestions in the literature, for example Sternberg and 
Grigorenko’s advice to individuate fields by the phenomena they study, rather than 
the methods used (memory or emotion, rather than social psychology or clinical 
psychology) and to therefore educate psychologists in multiple methodologies 
(Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001). 
 
Why should we undertake this difficult task? I said in chapter 3 that pluralism is 
becoming increasingly popular, both with respect to cognitive science in particular, 
and science in general. I went on to argue that the cognitive and social sciences 
should not use unification for its own sake as a criterion, because it is an external 
consideration for them. This does not rule out the future internalisation of 
unification, but with such a pluralist turn beginning to take place in the literature, the 
prospects for this look poor. 
 
There are perhaps reasons to be optimistic about this. I also said in chapter 3 that 
pluralism is not just an increasingly popular position, but also a fruitful one. I 
mentioned there the argument in the feminist philosophy of science that theories and 
models are currently partial and goal-directed according to the interests of particular 
groups, and that pluralism could allow traditionally marginalised voices to be heard 
(Longino, 1996: 275–277).  
 
As we have seen, pluralism about frameworks also involves pluralism about the 
concepts embedded in those frameworks. This entails a pluralism about kinds or 
categories, which also has implications for feminist theory. Dupré describes how the 
anti-essentialism of a view like his promiscuous realism about kinds has positive 
implications for how we think about sex and gender (Dupré, 2002: 175–195), 
homosexuality (Dupré, 2002: 156), and disability (Dupré, 2002: 67). Pluralism about 
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natural kinds, or kinds of kinds, also allows us to study, in terms of kinds, some 
things that cannot be assimilated to the essentialist natural kinds program. For 
example Haslam makes a pluralist argument that different mental illnesses can best 
be described as falling under different kinds of kind (Haslam, 2002). Machery notes 
that according to a pluralist conception of natural kinds (in this case the pluralist 
interpretation of homeostatic property cluster theory), artefacts can be classed as 
natural kinds, and therefore a proper object of scientific research, as they are in 
Paleoanthropology (Machery, 2009: 234). Such examples suggest that pluralism is 
not only increasingly popular, but advantageous. 
 
I have speculated that what is needed is a change in the way we think about science 
in favour of both individuals and subdisciplines flipping between different 
perspectives. I also suggested in chapter 3 that the road to maturity for the social and 
cognitive sciences may involve internalising pluralism, if such an approach was to 
prove successful. Clark also links the idea of flipping between different perspectives 
to maturity in the conclusion of his Supersizing the Mind: ‘The appeal to 
embodiment, if this [combining new perspectives on the mind with old 
representational and computational ones] is correct, signals not a radical shift as 
much as a natural progression in the maturing of the sciences of the mind.’ (Clark, 
2008: 219).  
 
The cognitive and social sciences appear to be maturing in a pluralist manner in the 
middle of a pluralist turn in the philosophy of science. The situation with respect to 
situated cognition perspectives, and the work I have done regarding it in this thesis, 
is a good example of this. Even if the physical sciences were to make a pluralist turn 
in the future, they have recently undergone a long monist phase, and they reached 
maturity as monistic sciences.
64
 The situation is different for the cognitive and social 
sciences, and this gives us a perhaps unique opportunity to see a science mature in an 
intellectual climate of pluralism. 
 
                                                          
64
 It might be that the physical sciences would have matured somewhat differently in a more pluralist 
intellectual climate like that developing today. Alternatively their subject matter may be sufficiently 
different that this would not have been the case. 
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However, philosophy of science is not just about observing science. As well as 
watching this narrative develop, we can contribute to its smoother unfolding. The 
kind of flipping between different perspectives I have talked about here is something 
that much of science is still ill-equipped to handle, and in the future we can make 
recommendations to change this. These are large projects. There is much to be said 
about the future of subdisciplines, interdisciplinarity, the training of scientists, the 
role of integration as a kind of unification within pluralism,
65
 and the relationship of 
a pluralist science to society and culture more broadly. These are tasks with which 
the philosophy of science should concern itself in the immediate future. 
 
Sources of reflexivity 
One interesting and inescapable aspect of work in any human or social sciences or 
humanities discipline is its inherent reflexivity. I want to end by briefly considering 
this aspect of my project. The broad question is whether my methods can be applied 
to my own thesis. Thus far, I have only talked about how they might apply to the 
sciences of memory. Even the philosophers I considered in chapter 6 were doing a 
type of philosophy that would be widely classed as cognitive science. The same 
could not be said of my own work. 
 
It seems clear that the main themes of the approach could be applied to philosophy, 
but not necessarily the specifics. For example, the idea of research frameworks 
would generalise, but the kinds of theories and practices the frameworks consist of 
would differ. Trying to apply a framework account here would be a considerable 
undertaking in the philosophy of philosophy, but I will try to say some more specific 
things below by addressing questions about the epistemic niches for my concepts, 
pluralism in philosophy, and the consequences of my work for interdisciplinarity in 
philosophy. 
 
It is worth noting that if my methods are applicable outside the sciences, they may 
also be applicable to other philosophy of memory, for example in traditional analytic 
philosophy of mind, and in continental philosophy, and to other humanities studies 
                                                          
65
 For example, Brigandt suggests that we don’t need unity for its own sake, but may need it for 
certain specific problems, and there is much more to be said about this (Brigandt, 2010a; 2011: 17; 
2012: 82, footnote 5). 
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of memory more broadly (for example in history or literature). This would offer 
considerable scope for expanding the kind of project I have undertaken here. 
 
 What is the epistemic niche for my concept of memory (and for other 
concepts I employ)? What sorts of factors does the dynamic framework for 
my research consist of? 
 
If the idea of a dynamic framework can be applied beyond the sciences, it 
should be applicable to my own research. It would seem fair to say the same 
of my concept of memory as I said of the philosophers in chapter 6: My 
concept is flexible in the sense of being open to interpretation from different 
perspectives, because which perspective to employ is what is in question. 
 
What kinds of things would be in the epistemic niche shaping this concept? 
Openness to questioning concepts is an important factor (compare chapter 6). 
My aim was to say something useful about how scientists and philosophers 
of science should proceed with respect to the situated cognition question, so 
this aim would also be part of the framework. Looking to my framework 
more broadly, the very situated cognition perspectives I am investigating are 
also important. The dynamic framework viewed at the subdiscipline level of 
grain could be seen as a shared cognitive system, and therefore analysed in 
terms of distributed cognition; alternatively, because of the role played by 
methods, apparatus etc. as well as theory, my methods could be seen from an 
embedded, extended or enacted cognition perspective. 
 
Deciding which of these approaches is best for my work, or whether 
remaining flexible between them is the best option would involve tracing the 
history of the factors in my framework. I cannot undertake this task here; 
however, it is clear that my work, like any in philosophy, is embedded in 
various literatures that have their own histories (in this case some of the most 
obvious examples are the literatures on situated cognition, concepts, the role 
of history of science, pluralism, and the post-Kuhnian literature on paradigms 
and their kin). As philosophers, we do tend to concern ourselves very much 
with our relationships to these literatures, and the work I have done here 
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would suggest that we are correct to do so, but not to establish the prestige of 
our pedigree, rather to demonstrate the history of success attached to factors 
in our frameworks, thus showing that they are internal to our discipline, 
subdiscipline, or research project. 
 
 Is philosophy a monistic or pluralistic discipline, and which should it be? 
 
I argued in chapter 6 that philosophy has internalised plurality because over 
time it has proved more successful than unity. In particular, flexible concepts 
have allowed us to see things from others’ perspectives and therefore engage 
in debate more effectively. While I think this is true of our implicit 
framework, many philosophers have remained more explicitly committed to a 
kind of monism. We seek the correct or best account, not just an account that 
works well for our particular purposes. If what I have said about the success 
and internalisation of plurality is right, it might be that that ought to change. 
A genuinely pluralist philosophy would harness argument to eliminate 
frameworks that do not work, and to work out which frameworks are best for 
which purposes, but it would no longer consider such arguments a fight to the 
death for one framework or the other.  
 
A pluralist approach to the project carried out in this thesis would allow that 
other ways of construing science than the dynamic framework account could 
be useful for other purposes, and this is something I have allowed here. I 
hope the work I have done shows that the framework approach is fruitful for 
my purposes, but this does not rule out other kinds of account. 
 
 What can my approach say about communication within philosophy, and 
interdisciplinarity, for example between philosophy and science? 
 
If we apply the framework account to philosophy, we can see that we should 
expect communication problems, both within the discipline, and between 
philosophy and other disciplines we would like to work with (for example 
science, history). Ways to alleviate this might include the kind of 
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perspective-flipping approach I suggested above for science. In fact, if what I 
have said about philosophers tending to have flexible concepts is right, we 
have a head start in this respect. Philosophers are used to thinking in terms of 
others’ frameworks in order to argue against them. If the suggestion that 
philosophy should be more self-consciously pluralist is correct, this skill 
could be put to good use finding the best framework for a particular purpose. 
The same is true at a coarser level of grain for interdisciplinary work. The 
more differences there are between frameworks, the greater the challenge of 
the perspective flip, but because fine-grained sharing is not needed for every 
project, the task is not as formidable as it might seem. 
 
The key here is that there is something we share with everybody if you look 
at a coarse enough level of grain. I argued in chapter 4 that a concept of 
rationality emerged and was internalised at the very coarse-grained level of 
epistemic enquiry in general. I said that the interpretationist strategy only 
works in virtue of this fact because it is what entitles us to treat anyone we 
are studying as at least minimally rational, and allows a principle of charity to 
get off the ground. Based on what I have said here, we can now see that this 
is true not only of philosophers of science studying scientists, but of 
philosophers working with one another, and with people from other 
disciplines. The way into another’s framework is via what we already share 
at a coarser level of grain; this allows us to build to the point where seeing 
things from the other’s perspective is possible. 
 
The suggestion of this last section has been that many of the conclusions we draw 
about best practice in science can teach us something about our own best practice. 
Far from being damagingly circular, this implication gives us a way to improve our 
methods based on our own conclusions. This is what we should expect from a 
Shaperean point of view; we learn how to learn as we learn (Shapere, 1977b: 185; 
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